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South Africa is faced with extraordinary challenges when it comes to managing its 
water resources. To redress the results of discrimination caused by Apartheid and 
its political antecedents, the modern constitutional state sought to address the 
issues of access to water resources and sanitation services by introducing section 
24 of the Constitution, which provides for the right to an environment that is not 
harmful to one’s health or well-being. In addition, section 27 seeks to entrench the 
right of access to sufficient water. Consequently, the National Water Act 36 of 
1998 was introduced, which caters for the administration of water resources. The 
Water Services Act 108 of 1997, which seeks to ensure the provision of water and 
sanitation services completes the statutory framework.  
This framework provides for the state to be either the trustee or the custodian of 
our water resources. However, the terms ‘trustee’ and ‘custodian’ are not defined 
by either statutes. The legal framework nevertheless sets the parameters for state 
trusteeship and/or custodianship. This may be gleaned from the constitutional 
provisions, the National Water Act and the Water Services Act, as well as their 
accompanying regulations and policies. Despite oversights and inconsistencies, it 
is argued, the legislative framework very clearly provides the statutory content of 
trusteeship and custodianship. The state is expected to manage water in 
accordance with the prescribed constitutional mandate. 
The nature of the terminology used in the legislation has prompted a comparison 
by academic authors of modern trusteeship with the Roman and Roman-Dutch 
law classifications of res publicae. Alternatively, the public trust doctrine has 
been used as a comparator for evaluating the functioning of trusteeship. However, 
there are numerous problems with both of these comparisons. Neither facilitates a 
clear, meaningful understanding of trusteeship or custodianship. 
The thesis set out here is that, as trusteeship and custodianship are both statutory 
creatures, the nature of their content must be sought in the legal framework itself. 




duties of the state. The Strategy aims to give effect to this legal framework, and 
provides that there are three values that water management aims to achieve: 
sustainability, equity and efficiency.  
In an attempt to ensure compliance with these values, Integrated Water Resource 
Management and Adaptive Management have been implemented. These are 
methods of water management which incorporate a systems-approach to water 
resources. They take an holistic approach to water resources within a catchment 
management area. In addition, decision-making is flexible, with an emphasis on 
facilitating a learning process, in order to actively manage the resource as new 
information becomes available. 
The thesis demonstrates that, despite the detailed nature of the legal framework, 
the state is still failing to administer water in a manner that prevents the 
deterioration of the resource or that provides adequate water resources to promote 
the values of dignity and equality. A number of remedies exist in respect of which 
the state can be held accountable. What is apparent, however, is that the high costs 
of litigation, as well as the time required for a litigious matter to unfold, make 
these remedies entirely inaccessible to the most vulnerable in society. 
What is needed in the context of the management of water is a synergy between 
the relatively sound theoretical framework and its practical implementation. The 
sad reality in South Africa is that the state is aware of the challenges it faces, chief 
amongst which is inefficiency caused by incompetence, a lack of skill and 
inadequate financing. While long-term plans have been proposed to attend to the 
shortcomings of the current system, a more drastic approach is required. The state 
is currently not able to meet the duties of trusteeship, as envisaged by the 
legislative framework, and it is the most vulnerable in our society who pay the 
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Chapter One:  
INTRODUCTION 
1. Introduction 
Water is an essential but limited commodity which is increasingly in demand, as 
the world’s population and industry grows. It therefore requires regulation and 
protection by the State.1 As quality of life and the pace of development around the 
world increase, so too does the demand for water.2 It has been said that the ‘ability 
of nations and societies to develop and prosper is linked directly to their ability to 
develop, utilise, and protect their water resources’.3 As a result, the combination 
of a degradation of the quality of water and a decrease in the quantity of water 
available per capita ‘represents the most serious and tangible single threat to the 
flows of various goods and services required by society’.4 This threat holds true in 
South Africa. The degradation and decrease of water quality and quantity 
respectively occurs amidst rapid demographic and economic shifts, adding to the 
complexity of water management in our country.5 
                                                     
1 P Lawn Sustainable Development in Ecological Economics (2006) 191; H Thompson Water 
Law: A Practical Approach to Resource Management and the Provision of Services (2006) 7; P 
Ashton, D Love, H Mahachi et al An Overview of the Impact of Mining and Mineral Processing 
Operations on Water Resources and Water Quality in the Zambezi, Limpopo and Olifants 
Catchments in Southern Africa (2001) xxvii - xxviii.  
2 P Ashton, D Love, H Mahachi (note 1 above) xxvii; B Schreiner, G Pegram and C von der 
Heyden ‘Reality check on water resources management: Are we doing the right things in the best 
possible way?’ (2009) 11 Development Planning Division (Working Paper Series) 6; M 
Falkenmark ‘Water scarcity – challenges for the future’ in E H P Brans et al (eds) The Scarcity of 
Water (1997) 21. 
3 R D Walmsley, J J Walmsley and C Walmsley ‘Testing and development of catchment 
sustainability indicators’ (2004) Report to the Water Research Commission 1; J J Walmsley 
‘Framework for measuring sustainable development in catchment systems’ (2002) 29 
Environmental Management 198; G Jewitt ‘Can Integrated Water Resources Management sustain 
the provision of ecosystem goods and services?’ (2002) 27 Physics and Chemistry of the Earth 
887; D Reed and M de Wit (eds) Towards a Just South Africa: The Political Economy of Natural 
Resource Wealth (2003) 13. 
4 P Ashton, D Love, H Mahachi et al (note 1 above) xxx.  
5 B Schreiner, G Pegram and C von der Heyden (note 2 above) 7. 





The certainty of South Africa’s water supply is in a compromised state, not only 
in relation to the scarcity of water,6 but also its quality. It is estimated that South 
Africa will ‘reach the limits of its economically useable land-based fresh water 
resources’ in the next 40 years, which demonstrates the urgent need for the 
implementation of effective strategies.7 
The pace at which solutions for water crises can be properly implemented, 
however, is often very slow.8 This is exacerbated by the fact that water 
management is a highly complex, multi-faceted process involving multiple role 
players and considerations. A water crisis ‘is much slower in developing, like a 
motor accident viewed in slow motion, or a large ship bearing down on an 
iceberg, with lots of time to contemplate the approaching collision’.9 It is thus 
imperative that government reacts appropriately, sufficiently and timeously, to 
steer clear of these metaphorical icebergs. 
Against the backdrop of the importance of water to society, this thesis aims to 
evaluate the legislative requirements of water management and governance in 
South Africa. The contemporary legislative regime regulating water provides that 
the state is the trustee of this resource.10 Particularly, therefore, this thesis seeks to 
ascertain and assess the parameters and content of trusteeship in the context of 
water management. 
                                                     
6 A Allan ‘A comparison between the water law reforms in South Africa and Scotland: Can a 
generic national water law model be developed from these examples’ (2003) 43 Natural Resources 
Journal 426; UNEP Vital Water Graphics: An Overview of the State of the World’s Fresh and 
Marine Waters 2ed (2008); P Ashton, D Love, H Mahachi et al (note 1 above) xxix. Mazibuko and 
others v City of Johannesburg and others 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) [hereafter ‘Mazibuko (CC)’] para 3. 
7 H Thompson (note 1 above) 13; P Ashton, D Love, H Mahachi et al (note 1 above) xxviii; See 
also C Sullivan ‘Calculating a water poverty index’ (2002) World Development 1195; SAPA 
‘Water shortage in SA possible – Molewa’ News24 20 May 2013.  
8 For example, the Director-General of Water Affairs released a statement that there was likely to 
be a water supply shortage in the Gauteng area by 2013. However, even though this crisis was 
foreseen in 2009, the earliest a remedy can be implemented by is 2019. C E Herold ‘Des Midgley 
memorial lecture: The water crisis in South Africa’ (14th Sanciahs Symposium, 21-23 September 
2009) 3. 
9 C E Herold (note 8 above) 3. 
10 S 3 of the National Water Act 36 of 1998. 





2. Trusteeship of Water: Background 
From the outset trusteeship can be defined broadly, in terms of the Constitution, 
or more narrowly, in terms of the statutory framework. Trusteeship, in its broadest 
sense applies not only to the duties incumbent on the state, but also those of the 
courts and society more generally.11 At this point in the development of a South 
African law on state trusteeship of natural resources, it would be overambitious to 
attempt to give more specific content to such a broad, vague notion of the core 
concept. Instead, the focus here is on developing the content of state trusteeship in 
its narrower sense, as espoused by section 3 of the National Water Act 36 of 1998 
(the ‘Water Act’). This provision does not expressly define the concept of state 
trusteeship, but provides that the duties of the government as trustee are to protect, 
use, develop, conserve, manage and control water.12 It further provides that these 
duties are to be undertaken so that sustainability and equity are furthered, that 
constitutional obligations are satisfied, and decisions are taken in the public 
interest.13 However, these concepts are broad and are not defined by the Act.14  
The Water Services Act 108 of 1997 (the ‘Services Act’), on the other hand, 
describes the role of the state as the custodian of water resources, but also fails to 
define what this entails. The duties of Water Services Authorities in terms of the 
provision of access to water are to ‘progressively ensure efficient, affordable, 
economical and sustainable access to water services’.15 This thesis will evaluate 
these concepts together, and they will be referred to generally as trusteeship.16 
                                                     
11 See below at Chap 3 (note 62). 
12 S 3 of the National Water Act. 
13 S 3 of the National Water Act. 
14 L Ferris ‘The public trust doctrine and liability for historic water pollution in South Africa’ 
(2012) 8/1 Law, Environment and Development Journal 3. 
15 Preamble read together with s 11(1) of the Water Services Act 108 of 1997. 
16 E van der Schyff notes that these terms have been used interchangeably throughout the various 
legislative enactments that utilise the concept of trusteeship. She, however, argues that trusteeship 
and custodianship both fall within the larger terminology of ‘stewardship’. See E van der Schyff 
‘Stewardship doctrines of public trust: Has the eagle of public trust landed on South African soil? 
(2013) 130 South African Law Journal 388.  





The motivation for this research question is therefore to discuss the aspects of 
trusteeship in the context of water law, both from a wide and narrow perspective, 
in order to determine how this notion is to operate in practice. This is necessary 
particularly in light of the plethora of governance issues that permeate water 
management. 
The majority of South Africans currently enjoy access to clean, safe water for 
consumption and sanitation and this access is a fundamental right entrenched in 
our Constitution.17 Prior to 1994, this most basic right was not afforded to 
everyone, and for many people the procurement of water, simply for drinking 
purposes, presented a daily struggle.18 Between 12 and 14 million people - 
approximately 43% of South Africa’s black population - did not have access to 
safe drinking water in 1994.19 In addition to this, over 20 million people did not 
have any form of infrastructure in place for sanitation.20 As part of the 
government’s commitment to overhauling the approach to socio-economic rights 
that prevailed in South Africa at the termination of Apartheid, a new system of 
water rights was implemented and the government was made ‘trustee’ of this 
resource.21 
However, the fact that access to water is now protected as a right in the 
Constitution does not necessarily mean that the reliable provision of sufficient and 
                                                     
17 S 27(1)(b) of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. Mazibuko (CC) para 2; H Thompson (note 
1 above) 1; B Van Koppen, N Jha and D J Merrey ‘Redressing racial inequities through water law 
in South Africa: Revisiting old contradictions?’ (2002) Comprehensive Assessment Reseach Paper 
9. G Morrison, OS Fatoki, E Zinn et al ‘Sustainable development indicators for urban water 
systems: A case study evaluation of King William’s Town, South Africa, and the applied 
indicators’ (2001) 27 Water SA 228. 
18 Mazibuko (CC) para 2; C de Coning ‘Overview of the water policy process in South Africa’ 
(2006) 8 Water Policy 510 discusses how this came to be at the top of the agenda in the National 
Water Policy. See also A Kok and M Langford et al ‘Water’ in S Woolman, T Roux et al (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (revised 2012) 56B-22.  
19 Mazibuko (CC) para 2; H Thompson (note 1 above) 9; B Van Koppen, N Jha and D J Merrey 
(note 17 above) 3 Another statistic which is at odds with this one is that in 1996 there were 16 
million people without drinking water and 21 million without access to sanitation – see in this 
regard G J Pienaar and E van der Schyff ‘The reform of water rights in South Africa’ (2007) 3/2 
Law, Environment and Development Journal 1; M Muller ‘Free basic water – a sustainable 
instrument for a sustainable future in South Africa’ (2008) 20 Environment and Urbanization 69.  
20 H Thompson (note 1 above) 9; B Van Koppen, N Jha and D J Merrey (note 17 above) 3.  
21 S 3 of the National Water Act. 





safe water to all households is a certainty. Nor does it mean that the quality and 
protection of water is practically guaranteed. The inability to access water is still 
one of the largest components associated with poverty, and the fight against 
poverty entails redressing this issue.22 Furthermore, food security, poverty and 
access to water are closely related.23 To this end, the government seeks not only to 
ensure access to water for domestic use, but also for commercial use.24 In terms of 
the Free Basic Water Policy, the state has committed itself to ensuring that every 
household is provided with 6000 litres of water per month, and that this water 
supply should be available within 200 metres of each person’s home.25 However, 
the provision of water to the remainder of the population who still do not have 
access thereto presents great infrastructural, administrative and financial 
difficulties, given the fact that those still without water typically live in remote, 
rural areas.26 Consequently, there are still approximately 5 million people, mostly 
in rural areas, who do not have a clean and reliable source of water for either 
personal or commercial purposes.27 
Reliable access to drinking water is not the only issue facing those seeking to 
ensure the efficient management of water. Globally, the quality and quantity of 
water is constantly under threat and the urgency for its proper management is 
amplified by the fact that water is essential not only for personal use, but also the 
                                                     
22 Mazibuko(CC) para 2. C Sullivan (note 7 above) 1195; B Van Koppen, N Jha and D J Merrey 
(note 17 above) 1-2; P Ashton, D Love, H Mahachi et al (note 1 above) xxvii. See also A Kok and 
M Langford et al (note 18 above) 56B-22. For a discussion on the relationship between poverty 
and development in the context of water, see T O Randhir and A G Hawes ‘Ecology and poverty 
in watershed management’ in J C Ingram, F De Clerck and C R del Rio (eds) Integrating Ecology 
and Poverty Reduction (2012) 113 – 126. See also F R Rijsberman ‘Water scarcity: Fact or 
fiction?’ (2006) 80 Agricultural Water Management 6. B Schreiner, G Pegram and C von der 
Heyden (note 2 above) 5. 
23 B Van Koppen, N Jha and D J Merrey (note 17 above) 8 – 9. 
24 B Van Koppen, N Jha and D J Merrey (note 17 above) 2. 
25 S 9 of the Water Services Act read with reg 3(b) of GNR 509 of 8 June 2001: Regulations 
relating to compulsory national standards and measures to conserve water. Mazibuko (CC) para 6; 
B Van Koppen, N Jha and D J Merrey (note 17 above) 10.  
26 H Thompson (note 1 above) 9. 
27 Water Research Commission ‘Water and society: Upscaling community-based partnerships in 
South Africa’ (2014) Technical Brief 1; S King ‘Academics look for solutions to provide clean 
drinking water’ Mail and Guardian 3 October 2012.  





functioning of the economy.28 Water is critical to industrial processes, as well as 
agricultural and mining activities.29 In South Africa, the latter activities constitute 
the biggest portion of the economy.30 While agricultural activities only constitute 
a small portion of the Gross Domestic Product (‘GDP’) per annum, if one factors 
in the secondary economic benefits (such as processing and marketing) the 
contribution rises to just under a third of the GDP.31 It also accounts for 
approximately 60% of the water used in the country.32 
Despite the necessity of agricultural and mining activities to the country’s 
economy,33 these sectors also cause many of the stresses on our water supply,34 
which presents something of a conundrum: On the one hand, agriculture is 
essential for the survival and prosperity of our nation, but on the other, it is 
draining our water supplies, whilst polluting water resources with fertilisers and 
other poisonous chemicals that find their way into streams and underground water 
through run-off.35 Agricultural water use presents the highest proportion of water 
use globally.36 There is also a direct correlation between the demand for water and 
the standard of living.37 The increase of the world’s population, coupled with the 
                                                     
28 C E Herold (note 8 above) 2. 
29 H Thompson (note 1 above) 9. Irrigation accounts for approximately 60% of our water use, 
while 8% is required for mining and other large industrial uses.  
30 G R Backeberg ‘Water institutional reforms in South Africa’ (2005) 7 Water Policy 108. 
31 G R Backeberg (note 30 above) 109. 
32 Department of Water Affairs National Water Resource Strategy 2ed (2013) [hereinafter 
‘Strategy (2013)’] 55; P Mukheibir and D Sparks ‘Water resource management and climate change 
in South Africa: Visions, driving factors and sustainable development indicators’ (2003) Report 
for Phase I of the Sustainable Development and Climate Change Project 2; Editorial ‘New water 
law won’t help much’ Business Day Live 5 September 2013.  
33 C Sullivan (note 7 above) 1195. 
34 W du Plessis and A A du Plessis ‘Striking the sustainability balance in South Africa’ in M Faure 
and W du Plessis (eds) The Balancing of Interests in Environmental Law in Africa (2011) 417. 
35 Department of Water Affairs National Water Resource Strategy 2ed (2013) [hereinafter 
‘Strategy (2013)’] 24; H Thompson (note 1 above) 6 - 7; M Hill Understanding Environmental 
Pollution 3ed (2010) 268; D Biello ‘Fertilizer runoff overwhelms streams and rivers’ (2008) 
Scientific American. See also C Sullivan (note 7 above) 1197, where she discusses the impacts of 
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ever-improving quality of life, results in an increased demand for food and 
consequently the demand for water.38 Sullivan argues that there is a need for water 
to be more carefully managed,39 by, for example, introducing technologies that 
use water more efficiently.  
A similar problem presents itself when one considers the impact that mining and 
other forms of pollution have on our water supply.40 For example, it is estimated 
that the combination of mining waste and human effluent is polluting the Olifants 
River catchment at a cost of R700 million per year. This cost, however, is not 
spent on cleaning up this water source, but rather treating consequential medical 
diseases, such as cholera and diarrhea, that are caused by this polluted water.41 As 
a result, the state is left chasing its tail, as the current approach is to treat the 
symptoms, rather than the cause.  
The state is not the only party involved in the management of water resources. 
Industries involved in the mining of natural resources, for example, are legally 
obliged to ensure that they do so sustainably;42 but, they often fail to meet these 
obligations, and as a result, the pressure of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
on businesses is mounting.43 It is imperative for these role players to become 
socially and environmentally more responsible; and it is the State that should 
enable such a development. It should take the rights and duties of communities 
affected, as well as key business entities involved, into account in developing a 
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holistic approach to the management of resources. The question is whether this is 
provided for by the legislation pertaining to water, and further, whether this 
legislation is properly implemented.44 
The issues facing the supply of clean and reliable water are not limited to 
economic factors.45 Global warming and climate change threaten the quantity of 
water available for human consumption in various parts of the world.46 In 
addition, over-population, high rates of evaporation as well as alien-invasive 
species that increase evapotranspiration rates are contributory factors that 
compromise water security.47 Human interference also causes additional stress in 
the form of pollution, waste and abstraction of water, thereby reducing available 
resources. There are, in addition, the added complications in the South African 
context, in that access to water resources is inherently unequal.48 All of the 
potential solutions to these issues are further impacted by physical, spatial and 
economic limitations, increasing the complexity of the management of water.49 
Other difficulties that are encountered in terms of water include the discrepancy 
between supply and demand; the theft of water; and the deterioration of water 
infrastructure (which is further exacerbated by poor management strategies).50 
The challenges of South Africa’s water supply, both in terms of quantity and 
quality, translate into management difficulties at an administrative level. These 
problems often result in a catch-22 situation for management institutions, where 
addressing one concern may exacerbate the extent or severity of other problems.51 
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This is made worse by the fact that there are insufficient technical and 
management skills in the industry.52 For example, the municipal sector has lost 
approximately 85% of its engineers over the last 15 years.53 The management of 
water is a difficult scientific issue that requires the collection, analysis and 
monitoring of data.54 This loss of human capital in this industry presents a 
massive hurdle for the state to overcome, as these skills cannot be easily replaced. 
Of the available water in the world, only 0.007% percent – approximately 90 000 
km3 – can be used for human purposes.55 In South Africa, percentages are even 
lower, due to the fact that it is a semi-arid country with a relatively low annual 
rainfall and a high evaporation rate.56 The country also experiences severe 
weather patterns, in the form of intense and prolonged droughts, extreme floods,57 
as well as variable climates.58 The functioning and well-being of an ecosystem is 
heavily dependent on sufficient water supply.59 In turn, if an ecosystem does not 
have sufficient water to sustain its needs, it is likely that this will have a direct 
impact on available water. As a result, decision-makers must be mindful of the 
quantity of water required to sustain an ecosystem.60 
Water is divided up into different categories, depending on its capacity for human 
consumption, as defined by the National Water Resource Strategy.61 Blue water is 
available for general usage and found in rivers, dams and groundwater. Not all 
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blue water is immediately available for consumption, as it may be polluted or 
alternatively, inaccessible.62 Green water consists of water vapour, and includes 
the moisture found in the soil which is important for agricultural purposes.63 Land 
use and the consequent degradation of the environment are intimately connected 
to the changes in the availability of both green and blue water.64 It is estimated 
that ‘18% of the natural land cover in South Africa has been transformed 
…through cultivation (10%), degradation (4.5%), urban land use (1.5%) and 
forestry (1.4%)’.65 The predominant source of South Africa’s water is surface 
water, or blue water, which is supplied by rivers, streams and ground water.66 
However, the quality and quantity of this water source is by no means nearly 
sufficient to provide for the many needs and purposes that water sustains.67 Other 
water sources include groundwater, re-used water and unconventional water 
sources such as desalinated seawater.68 
Given the variety of issues facing the supply of sufficient, clean water, questions 
are being asked of scientists and engineers as to how to remedy these problems.69 
These questions must necessarily also be asked by the legal profession. Is the 
current legislative framework adequate to address these issues? If the framework 
is sufficient, is the implementation thereof successful? This thesis aims to address 
these questions in the context of the state’s responsibility as trustee. This thesis 
also aims to address the nature of the relationship between the state, as 
administrator and the nation, as the user and beneficiary of water rights. 
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3. The Research Question 
It is the premise of this thesis that the parameters of the State’s duty to direct 
socially and environmentally responsible and sustainable development of our 
water resources is comprised of the constitutional and statutory imperative of 
public trusteeship of these natural resources. Effect is given to public trusteeship 
in section 3 of the Water Act, which provides for the framework of public 
trusteeship by making the State the trustee of water, which is to be managed for 
the benefit of all persons. The title of section 3 is ‘public trusteeship of nation’s 
water resources’. In particular, this section requires that ‘the National 
Government, acting through the Minister, must ensure that water is protected, 
used, developed, conserved, managed and controlled in a sustainable and 
equitable manner, for the benefit of all persons and in accordance with its 
constitutional mandate’. In addition, the Services Act confirms National 
Government’s role as the custodian of water resources.70  
Trusteeship as a legal construct, however, creates difficulties in the context of the 
management of water, given that it is not expressly defined by the legislative 
framework.71 Thus, whether it provides the basis for a sui generis environmental 
law doctrine that regulates state conduct in the context of environmental 
management, or whether it is purely a consequence of the administrative functions 
of the state, remains uncertain. In addition, it is unclear whether trusteeship 
necessitates a change to the way water is classified in terms of property law. This 
thesis therefore aims to address the nature and content of trusteeship, as well as 
the nature of the relationship between the state, as the manager of water rights, 
and society, as the water user. In addition, it will address the question of who is 
responsible for the implementation of trusteeship, as well as who is intended to 
benefit from the implementation of trusteeship.  
Given the complexity of water management in South Africa and the importance of 
this management being properly performed, it is imperative that the parameters of 
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trusteeship are defined properly, given that these duties form the source of the 
state’s obligations to manage water. As trusteeship is a new concept in the context 
of resource legislation, there is no assistance from the case law as to its 
application and interpretation; as such, section 3 has not yet been considered by 
the courts at all.72 The courts recently did have the opportunity to shed light on the 
notion of public trusteeship and custodianship, but chose not to do so, again 
highlighting the need for a proper evaluation of this concept.73 This is despite the 
fact that trusteeship forms the foundations upon which water management is 
established under the Act. Ascertaining the content of trusteeship is therefore 
central to properly interpreting the rest of the Act. 
The objective of this thesis is to ascertain and define the parameters and content of 
the duties of trusteeship, which will in turn define what trusteeship is and how it 
operates. This entails defining the constitutional and legislative framework within 
which trusteeship is required to operate. Specifically, the statutory duties of the 
trustee are to ensure that water is protected, used, developed, conserved, managed 
and controlled (the duties of water management).  
One of the questions which arises from the trusteeship provision is whether water 
should be classified as res publicae or res communes omnium, which are different 
categories of public property in Roman and Roman-Dutch law, and both may find 
application in respect of this provision.74 The Roman and Roman-Dutch law 
classifications of res publicae and res communes omnium will therefore be 
investigated to identify whether water, as public property, can be defined as either 
of these concepts. Another aspect of trusteeship which is discussed is whether the 
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public trust doctrine has been statutorily introduced.75 This doctrine finds 
application in the United States of America and the extent to which this doctrine is 
of comparative assistance will be investigated. 
The following objectives are required to be met when implementing the duties of 
trusteeship, namely, sustainability, equity, ensuring that use of water is beneficial 
and in the public interest, and finally that these duties comply with the 
Constitution. These objectives inform the substantive components and guiding 
principles of trusteeship. It is the purpose of this thesis to define these substantive 
principles and discuss them with reference to water management, both in terms of 
the theoretical requirements, as well as the practical implementation thereof. 
In addition, it will be shown that a key feature of water management at a practical 
level is the implementation of Integrated Water Resource Management and 
Adaptive Management. These are approaches to the management of water which 
provide the tools necessary to ensure flexible decision-making processes.76 
Flexibility has been identified as being critically important in the context of 
environmental management, where fast reactions are necessitated by the 
unpredictability and uncertainty of natural systems. In this respect, the research 
question will address these management concepts, as well as their weaknesses and 
the extent to which the legal framework requires their implementation. 
This thesis therefore aims to address the why, what, who, and how of trusteeship, 
namely: 
1. Why has trusteeship been implemented? 
2. What are the legal parameters of trusteeship? 
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3. Who is required to give effect to trusteeship and who are the intended 
beneficiaries of this system of trusteeship? 
4. What are the substantive principles that inform the operation of the 
state’s duties as trustee? 
5. How does trusteeship operate in practice, that is, what are the 
requirements for the management of water? 
6. How is trusteeship enforced? 
7. What are the shortcomings of the approach to trusteeship and water 
management?  
These questions will be addressed throughout the course of this thesis and 
summarised in the concluding chapter.  
4. Methodology 
The purpose of this thesis is to cast light on the meaning and content of public 
trusteeship in the context of water law. To achieve this purpose, it is useful first to 
provide an historical overview of water management in South Africa, as this will 
contextualise an evaluation of the goals of trusteeship. In particular, many of the 
modern water management issues are born from this historical development, 
namely, the inequality of access to water resources and the association between 
poverty and water access.  
To facilitate a better understanding of trusteeship, the procedural components and 
substantive principles in terms of the legal framework must be established. It will 
also be required to set out the practical methods of management which must be 
employed by the state in terms of the legal framework, namely, Integrated Water 
Resource Management and Adaptive Management. Once the requirements of 
trusteeship in terms of the legal framework, substantive principles and practical 
implementation have been discussed, the legal remedies and oversight 
mechanisms will be introduced, in order to show how the state can be held 
accountable in terms of fulfilling its duties.  





The methodology also entails an historical analysis and discussion of Roman and 
Roman-Dutch law, particularly the property law classifications of res publicae 
and res communes omnium. The purpose of this discussion is to evaluate whether 
the trusteeship provision, as outlined by the legal framework, entails that water is 
classified in accordance with these Roman law classifications. In addition, the 
value of defining water in accordance with either of these constructs will be 
discussed. 
As this thesis considers the research findings of investigations into the American 
public trust doctrine, some reliance is placed on the legal comparative method. 
The purpose of discussing American jurisprudence in this respect is that 
trusteeship, as defined in the Act, is comparable to this doctrine given the 
similarities of the requirements of both. The two key features of the public trust 
doctrine are that the State is made custodian of the resource, which results in a 
fiduciary duty to manage and protect the resource, together with a ‘bequest to the 
nation’.77 The doctrine’s origins and the manner in which it is implemented will 
be discussed. The comparative approach will provide a platform against which the 
notion of trusteeship can be evaluated in the South African context. The strengths 
and weaknesses of this doctrine will be analysed in order to extrapolate any 
lessons which may be learnt from this jurisdiction. 
5. Course of Inquiry 
The following is an outline of the proposed structure that will be followed in the 
course of the research. The aim is to address all of the research questions and 
underlying problems identified therein through this structure. 
The current chapter provides the context and motivation for the research question. 
To show the necessity of this question, it sets out the inherent difficulties and 
challenges facing government in the context of water management. In the last two 
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decades, there have been great changes to resource legislation. In terms of the 
contemporary legislative scheme, the duties of the state in relation to natural 
resources, particularly water, are unclear. This chapter lays the groundwork for 
the discussion of the research question, against the backdrop of these difficulties.  
Chapter 2 discusses the history and development of water management in South 
Africa. It commences with a discussion of the use of water by communities of 
South Africa, prior to the arrival of the Dutch settlers and proceeds to consider 
contemporary water law. It will be argued that there have been five shifts or 
phases in the legal approach to water. In each of the various phases, a different 
approach was taken to the ownership of and access to water. Each transition or 
phase in the legal approach to water affected the relationship between the state 
and the user. The inequality of access to water under the different systems will be 
highlighted. This discussion will culminate in establishing the key features of 
modern water management within the context of the primary goals of the 
reformed water management system under a constitutional dispensation.  
Chapter 3 discusses the legal framework that guides and informs water 
management. It sets out the nature of the rights created by the Constitution as well 
as the relevant constitutional obligations. It discusses the legislative framework 
that binds the state, in particular, the National Water Act and the Water Services 
Act. The relevant regulations enacted in terms of this legislation will also be 
introduced. Finally, the thesis will introduce the policies and strategies that 
provide the content of this legislative framework. 
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to investigate whether an historical analysis of South 
African law or, alternatively, a comparative analysis of foreign law can be of 
assistance to informing the meaning of trusteeship. It describes the concepts of res 
publicae and res communes omnium in South Africa. In this regard, the content of 
these categorisations in Roman and Roman-Dutch law is explained, in order to 
determine whether trusteeship as defined in the Act can be properly classed as res 
publicae or res communes omnium. The argument favours a classification in terms 
of the latter category, as the chapter explains. The chapter also introduces and 
discusses the public trust doctrine, with the intention of explaining its definition, 





content and function. Some authors suggest that the principles underlying the 
public trust doctrine are analogous to trusteeship, given the similarity of its 
requirements, and particularly in light of key wording included in recent resources 
legislation (particularly ‘trustee’, ‘benefit’ and ‘the people’). The two key features 
of the public trust doctrine are that the state is made custodian of the resource, 
which results in a fiduciary duty to manage and protect the resource, together with 
a ‘bequest to the nation’.78 
The purpose of Chapter 5 is to highlight and discuss the substantive principles of 
trusteeship which arise from the legal framework discussed in Chapter 3. These 
principles are considered in terms of the goals of water allocation reform, as set 
out in the National Water Resource Strategy, namely sustainability, equity and 
efficiency. In particular, sustainable development, the precautionary and 
preventative principle, as well as the polluter-pays principle are discussed in the 
context of sustainability. Under the general heading of equity, the principles of 
inter- and intra-general equity and equality, human dignity, access to water, and 
the beneficial use of water are addressed. Finally, the discussion on efficiency 
focuses on infrastructural requirements, cooperative governance as well as the 
relationship between the state and the private sector.  
As was stated above, the success of water management hinges on the 
implementation of flexibility in order to react appropriately to a constantly 
changing environment. In this respect, the principles of Integrated Water Resource 
Management and Adaptive Management may be key to ensuring that the 
management approach of the state is sufficiently resilient. The nature of these 
concepts as well as the problems identified with their implementation, are 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 7 then considers the nature of the checks and balances on the state’s 
powers and duties in the context of water management. In this respect, the chapter 
discusses the relevant democratic principles, namely access to information and 
public participation. Furthermore, this chapter introduces the relevant 
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constitutional organisations, created with the specific purpose of ensuring that 
state conduct complies with its constitutional duties. These organisations include 
the South African Human Rights Commission, the Gender Equality Commission, 
the Public Protector and the Auditor-General. The relevant administrative rights 
and duties are discussed within the context of judicial review and the context of 
the constitutional right to just administrative action. This chapter also discusses 
the functions of the Water Tribunal, a legislative body established with the 
express purpose of providing a right of recourse against the state in relevant 
circumstances. Finally, the remedies that can be sought pursuant to these judicial 
processes are also considered.  
Chapter 8 provides an analysis of the earlier chapters with the intention of 
highlighting the shortcomings of the current approach to water management. It 
will also identify possible solutions to address some of these practical issues.  









Chapter Two:  
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF WATER 
LAW 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of the development of 
the law governing water in South Africa from 1652 to the present. This will 
facilitate the discussion on water law generally and contextualise many of the 
changes that occurred in the legal system over this period.  
This thesis aims to address the nature and content of trusteeship. In order to do so, 
it must address the nature of the relationship between the state (as the 
administrator of water resources and the rights thereto) and society (as the water 
user). The historical discussion in this chapter highlights the variances in this 
relationship over the past four centuries under the different legal regimes. It will 
be shown that the changes in the water management regime have been intimately 
linked with the social and political changes of the time.1 This is significant in a 
country with both high water scarcity and huge social inequality, caused by years 
of political and social injustice. The role of the modern constitutional state is not 
only to remedy these injustices by making provision for equitable access to water, 
but also to ensure that the quality of water is maintained along with its associated 
ecosystems.2  
This thesis argues that five distinct phases contributed towards, and eventually 
culminated in, the present water regime, each phase intimately linked to the 
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political and social context of the time. The first phase is characterised by African 
customary law prior to colonisation.3 The second phase occurred after the arrival 
of the European settlers which resulted in the implementation of Roman-Dutch 
law. The third phase occurred once British rule over South Africa commenced. 
The economic and social separation of South Africans along racial lines resulted 
in a fourth phase of water management. Many of the infrastructural difficulties 
and issues of access present in water management today are attributable to the 
racial policies that eventually culminated in the Apartheid regime.4 When the 
Apartheid legal and political system was overturned, the rights associated with 
water use were transformed and access to water was placed high up on the agenda 
of social change, resulting in the fifth phase of water management. These five 
phases will now be discussed in more detail.5 
2. The Management of Water under African 
Customary Law 
African Customary Law was not a phase of law that had any dramatic starting or 
ending point, unlike that of the European and British colonial systems. Instead, it 
was, at different stages, tolerated to various degrees by the political powers in 
control. Prior to colonisation, water was managed as a common resource by the 
local rulers of a region and access to water was allowed for all members of the 
community.6 This access was regulated, where appropriate, in accordance with the 
interests of the entire community.7 Nevertheless, private ownership of water was 
permitted in circumstances where members of a community had expended their 
own resources to sink a borehole. Bennett notes that traditional authorities had the 
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4 D Reed and M de Wit (eds) Towards a Just South Africa: The Political Economy of Natural 
Resource Wealth (2003) 1. See also G J Pienaar and E van der Schyff ‘The reform of water rights 
in South Africa’(2007) 3/2 Law, Environment and Development Journal 5. 
5 For a more detailed discussion of this development, see generally D D Tewari (note 1 above) 693 
- 706. 
6 L Ferris ‘The public trust doctrine and liability for historic water pollution in South Africa’ 
(2012) 8/1 Law, Environment and Development Journal 11. 
7 T W Bennett Human Rights and African Customary Law (1995) 134. 






power to regulate protection of the environment and were quick to do so where 
‘resources were in danger of running out’.8 
The San and Khoi-Khoi communities were the only inhabitants of the Cape region 
before the arrival of the European settlers.9 The local San lived predominantly 
nomadic and hunter-gatherer lifestyles, and moved freely around the country.10 
The Khoi-Khoi also led a hunter-gatherer lifestyle, but kept domesticated animals, 
particularly cattle, which indicated status and wealth. Neither was limited in their 
movements, although the Khoi-Khoi, unlike the San, recognised principles akin to 
private ownership.11 These two groups would be the most dramatically affected by 
the arrival of the European settlers. 
After the arrival of the Nederlandse Oos-Indiese Kompanjie (hereinafter the 
“Kompanjie”) in 1652, communal practices of particularly the Khoi-Khoi initially 
continued unimpeded, although it was regarded as an inferior system by the 
European settlers.12 The settlers did not recognise the validity of the legal system 
of the Khoi-Khoi, nor did they recognise any rights or entitlements that they may 
have had, with the effect that land appropriation took place in most instances 
without consent or compensation.13 The settlers appropriated more and more land 
forcing the local inhabitants to work on Cape farms. In the process, local 
communities and their way of life, were destroyed.14 
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In 1806,15 the British were awarded control of the Cape ‘under cession of treaty 
with the Netherlands’ and the British assumed that Roman-Dutch law was the 
applicable law.16 In the Cape, customary law was, for the most part, no longer 
recognised or tolerated.17 The British, consistent with the move to conquer more 
land, progressed beyond the borders of the Cape, subjugating local Xhosa-
speaking communities and appropriating land and natural resources along the 
way.18 While the appropriation of land and resources took place by way of 
treaties, it is unlikely that a genuine consensus was reached between the British 
and indigenous communities.19 Often, the party who entered into these agreements 
did not have the authority to do so on behalf of the community. After 1847, the 
‘consensual’ appropriation of land was abandoned, and land was instead, in most 
instances, violently annexed by the British.20 
Similarly, in the Natal region, land was initially appropriated by the European 
settlers by way of unauthorised agreements. Following the infamous Battle of 
Blood River, the settlers of (mainly) Dutch origin – by that time known as the 
‘Boers’ - declared the Republic of Natalia, which would come to be annexed by 
the British a short while later.21 The regions of the Orange Free State and the 
Transvaal were similarly occupied by the Boer and British populations through a 
mixture of forced agreements, large-scale bloodshed and illegitimate annexations, 
leaving the remnants of the indigenous populations in tatters.22 In contrast to the 
approach adopted in the Cape, customary law was left intact in Natal and the 
Transvaal to the extent that it was not ‘repugnant to the general principles of 
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17 H Thompson (note 12 above) 126; T W Bennett (note 7 above) 19. For a full discussion on the 
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land – a history of dispossession’ (note 12 above) 65 – 68.  
18 T W Bennett (note 12 above) 69. 
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humanity recognised throughout the whole civilised world’.23 In the Free State, 
however, customary law would not be recognised at all.24 
In 1927, the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 was introduced, which applied 
throughout the country.25 This allowed certain courts the discretion to apply 
customary law in cases where both parties were black Africans.26 As a result, 
customary law had an extremely limited scope of application, but it was 
nevertheless applied in certain contexts.27 In reality, this Act formed part of the 
legislative scheme that would form the bedrock of Apartheid, as it gave the 
Governor-General wide powers to control the affairs of black communities.28 The 
system of racial segregation that culminated in Apartheid and its effects on water 
resources and rights are discussed below. Despite the political, legal and social 
changes that would occur over the four centuries after the arrival of the first 
European settlers, there is evidence to show that customary practices and norms 
developed independently of the various colonial and Apartheid governments.29 
Although customary practices continued despite a profoundly repressive 
government, traditional family structures were radically affected as a consequence 
of the flourishing mineral and industrial era.30 The system of racial and social 
oppression that occurred in South Africa corresponded closely with the discovery 
of mineral wealth in the country.31 African communities provided a rich source of 
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Africa: Revisiting old contradictions?’ (2002) Comprehensive Assessment Reseach Paper 6; T W 
Bennett (note 7 above) 20. 
30 T W Bennett Sourcebook of African Customary Law for Southern Africa (1991) 150. 
31 T W Bennett (note 30 above) 151 - 152. 






cheap labour that could be exploited to dig up the wealth buried deep 
underground, none of which enriched their own communities.32 The system of 
forced migrant labour that soon became entrenched effectively broke down the 
family unit under African Customary Law.33 The parties who were the most 
affected by this were women, who ordinarily found protection under the norms 
and rules of traditional African Customary Law.34 This system was deeply rooted 
in paternalism and women were regarded as perpetual minors.35 This 
notwithstanding, because of the family-oriented nature of traditional communities, 
women enjoyed greater protection in the pre-colonial society than today, even 
with constitutional protection.36 Once men were forced to leave their homes to 
work, the traditional structures and mechanisms of regulating legal relationships 
disintegrated and women and children paid a heavy price for this change.37 
Today, customary law is entrenched as a source of South African law and its 
importance is recognised by the Constitution.38 In the context of water in 
particular, the National Water Act 36 of 1998 recognises as a continuing, 
legitimate right any lawful use of water that occurred prior to the introduction of 
this Act.39 This is also intended to encompass lawful customary uses.40 However, 
the implementation of this right in the context of customary law has been difficult, 
as insufficient information exists in order to genuinely classify a water use in 
terms of this requirement. It has been suggested that this is one of the areas that 
must be remedied by an amendment to the current legislation or through the 
                                                     
32 T W Bennett (note 30 above) 151 - 152. 
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introduction of new legislation to give effect to the recognition of customary law 
in this sphere.41  
3. The Influence of Roman-Dutch law 
After the arrival of the Kompanjie in 1652, the earliest settlers relied on the laws 
of Holland, which were based on Roman-Dutch law, to settle any disputes.42 In 
terms of the legal system implemented in Holland, public streams that flowed 
perennially were the property of the state.43 Consequently, the streams flowing 
through what was then known as ‘Table Valley’ in the Cape were considered to be 
the property of the Kompanjie.44 The role of the state in relation to water was that 
of dominus fluminis, which has as its literal meaning ‘owner of the river’, 
although the state’s rights and duties were administrative in nature.45 This control 
pertained to the regulation and use of water by the public, who were afforded 
access to water found in navigable streams.46 In the context of water law, the 
classifications of res publicae and res communes omnium persisted in Roman-
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Dutch law, and therefore the Cape.47 These classifications are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 4.  
At first, disputes pertaining to water in the Cape were very few in number, as 
water was only necessary for irrigation on small subsistence farm-holdings.48 
However, as the population increased, and concomitantly the demands on water 
usage, the need for stricter control emerged. As a result, and because of the need 
to manage the available water more carefully, a more stringent regime of water 
management developed.49 This stricter control was asserted by a series of 
Placaaten that tried to balance the domestic and irrigation needs of different water 
users.50 The first was published on 10 April 1655 and was directed at the 
prevention of pollution of streams in the Table Valley region as this water was 
used for drinking purposes. The second was issued in 1661 and this prevented the 
use of water to the detriment of the Kompanjie, including their milling 
operations.51 
During this period, the Kompanjie retained its ownership of land and instead 
granted leases and freeholds to farmers and other individuals.52 While certain 
pieces of land were granted by freehold to well-connected individuals, the general 
trend was that the state retained ownership over the land, which was leased to 
farmers.53 The rights to water still had to be obtained separately and these were 
granted subject to there being sufficient water to furnish the Kompanjie gardens 
and mill.54 In rural areas, water entitlements were managed by the Court of the 
Landdroste (which was responsible for the administration of a region) assisted by 
a Board of Heemraden (appointed as representatives with undefined powers and 
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duties),55 who saw to apportioning water and resolving any disputes based on 
principles of fairness and equity.56 The Landdroste and Heemraden were not 
required to have legal knowledge in order to manage water disputes.57 
After 1761, when the Council of Policy restricted irrigation usage to four hours 
per day, tensions between garden owners and the governing Kompanjie arose.58 In 
1787, the Council of Policy established a commission to hold an enquiry into 
water usage in the Table Valley region. After consulting with the parties in the 
region, the Council of Policy extended the hours of irrigation to eight per day, 
subject to a rotational system of water use.59 Thus, the nature of the relationship 
between the governing body and users of water was that the state held the right to 
administer water to users, but was mindful of accommodating their grievances. 
The introduction of Roman-Dutch law principles in South Africa was potentially 
problematic because water rights regimes are modeled on, amongst other things, 
climatic and geographic considerations.60 The legal system particularly in Holland 
was premised on the fact that there was an abundance of water.61 However, this is 
not so in South Africa, where scarcity of water has always been of concern; as 
evidenced by the need to regulate water usage from as early as 1655 – only three 
years after the arrival of the Dutch.62 Nevertheless, as will be shown in the 
following chapters, practically-speaking, the approach to water management 
during the reign of the Dutch East Indian Company was very similar to the 
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approach today.63 Water could not be owned and entitlements to water were 
granted by the state.64 This control was managed according to supply and demand, 
and disputes were, for the most part, settled using principles of fairness and 
equity.65 However, the local Khoi-Khoi and San population had already started to 
experience the hardships caused by colonisation and their rights to water and land 
were similarly affected. 
At the turn of the 19th century, the growth of the population as well as the increase 
in industrial and agricultural processes had resulted in a more detailed legal 
approach to water management. This system of relatively well-established rules 
would face a rather severe shake-up with the occupation of the British in 1806 and 
the consequent changes to the legal system. 
4. The Influence of English law 
In 1806, British rule was implemented in the Cape and while, for the most part, 
Roman-Dutch law principles were retained, gradually certain aspects of the legal 
system were transformed in accordance with English law.66 One of the primary 
factors that drove the development of early water law under Dutch rule was 
ensuring that the Kompanjie had sufficient water for their operations.67 By 
contrast, the underlying factors that influenced the developments of water law 
under British rule were the economic and industrial changes occurring in South 
Africa, which were primarily agricultural in nature.68 Because agriculture was one 
of the most important economic activities under British rule, the development of 
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infrastructure dramatically favoured agricultural activities.69 The purpose of the 
legal changes implemented by the British was to protect and further the interests 
of farmers. For example, the dams built during this period were intended to 
service agricultural land, thus skewing land water storage patterns in favour of 
agricultural water use.70 As a result, a system of water rights that favoured the 
state shifted to a system that favoured particular water users. This was also 
strongly influenced by the change in the land ownership system that took place 
under British rule. 
Sir John Cradock’s proclamation of 1813 transformed the rights of lessee’s of 
state land, as provided for by the earlier Dutch approach, into rights of ownership 
thereof, in return for payment of an annual quitrent.71 The consequence of this 
was to erode the idea of the state being the dominus fluminis.72 The Landdroste 
and Heemraden were replaced with Magistrates in 1827, who did not have a broad 
scope to resolve water disputes in terms of English law.73 When the Supreme 
Court was created in 1828, it was given the sole jurisdiction to hear water-related 
disputes.74 Because it was largely the apex court who could deal with water cases, 
unnecessary and costly delays were caused.75 The State, at the time, preferred to 
appoint members to the bench who had worked as lawyers or judges in the British 
Isles.76 Their exposure to water law was exclusively anchored in British law. 
Consequently, the judges of the Supreme Court challenged the idea of the state’s 
                                                     
69 D D Tewari (note 1 above) 700; R Francis ‘Water justice in South Africa: natural resources 
policy at the intersection of human rights, economics and political power’ (2005-2006) 18 
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 6; M I Msibi and P Z Dlamini (note 1 
above) 4. 
70 D D Tewari (note 1 above) 700. 
71 J R Milton (note 66 above) 665; C G Hall and A P Burger (note 42 above) 3; H Thompson (note 
12 above) 37; D D Tewari (note 1 above) 697. 
72 C G Hall and A P Burger (note 42 above) 4; D D Tewari (note 1 above) 697. 
73 C G Hall and A P Burger (note 42 above) 3; H Thompson (note 12 above) 36. 
74 See Myburgh v Cloete 1847 3 Menz 564, where it was held that once the court realised that the 
matter was related to the rights of the parties to water, the Resident Magistrate should have found 
that the court did not have the requisite jurisdiction to hear the matter; D D Tewari (note 1 above) 
697; H Thompson (note 12 above) 36. 
75 C G Botha (note 55 above) 411. 
76 C G Hall and A P Burger (note 42 above) 3; H Thompson (note 12 above) 36; D D Tewari (note 
1 above) 697. 






role as dominus fluminis, instead placing emphasis on individual entitlements 
based on the principles of riparianism – a notion with which they were far more 
familiar.77 Disputes were therefore dealt with in terms of the ordinary principles 
of land rights, and not in relation to the Roman-Dutch law system where the state 
held the property rights to manage and administer water.78 In 1848, Resident 
Magistrates became competent to hear water-related disputes by virtue of 
Ordinance 5 of 1848. They were, however, not empowered to change existing 
water entitlements or ‘enforce any new distribution of water’.79  
In 1856, a riparian system80 of water ownership was formally implemented by the 
courts in the case of Retief v Louw81 rendering the state’s role as dominus fluminis 
nugatory.82 Generally, the riparian system did not afford holders thereof 
ownership of water, but rather a usufructuary right to take a portion of water that 
ran over or adjacent to their land.83 The introduction of a riparian system to South 
Africa was problematic as it was not well-suited to conditions where water was 
scarce.84 Rivers in the British Isles flow constantly, even if they are small rivers. 
This is not true of South Africa, where the flow of rivers is erratic and weather-
dependent and the unpredictability of the weather can result in droughts for many 
years.85 
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In the context of riparianism, the Chief Justice of the Cape Colony handed down a 
judgment in Hough v van der Merwe86 distinguishing between public and private 
streams. Some authors state that De Villiers CJ held that public streams are to be 
classified as res communes omnium.87 However, the judgment does not expressly 
refer to either res communes omnium88 or res publicae.89 Instead, the judgment 
finds that water: 90 
drawn from a river into vessels, or into ponds, becomes private property; but to 
admit of such property with respect to the river itself, considered as a complex 
body, would be inconsistent with the public interest, by putting it in the power of 
one man to lay waste a whole country. ‘A river may be considered as the 
common property of the whole nation; but the law declares against separate 
property of the whole or part’. 
It is unclear from this dictum whether De Villiers CJ is referencing the concept of 
res publicae or res communes omnium. The importance of this distinction will 
become apparent in Chapter 4. This notwithstanding, in terms of this 
classification, the use of water from public streams was not limited to riparian 
land owners only.91 In addition, water that flowed over an owner’s land was also 
public while water that arose on their land was essentially private in nature.92 
Running water was divided into perennially (flowing all year around) and non-
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perennially flowing water.93 Water which flowed all year around was subject to 
the system of riparian rights, while non-perennial water was privately owned and 
capable of complete control.94 The courts confirmed that in order for a river to be 
classed as perennial, it was not necessary for it to flow continuously, ‘provided 
that there was a usual flow throughout the length of the river’s course’.95 This 
principle was not consistently applied by the courts, with some courts rejecting 
the requirement that a water source be perennial, and instead requiring that the 
flow of a stream be ‘something more than a mere surface drainage’.96 It would 
later also become possible for water that flowed through a known and defined 
channel, even if man-made, to be classified as a public stream.97 
Under the Roman-Dutch notion of dominus fluminis, the state controlled and 
authorised use of perennial water. However, under British rule, the state had very 
little to do with the management and control of the water. Instead, riparian owners 
were entitled to use this water as a matter of law, and without state authorisation, 
subject to certain conditions such as reasonable use.98 Further, the rules that 
governed the use of water in this context were developed not by the state, but by 
the courts.99 
Further statutory introductions drove the development of the legal principles 
regulating water use. In 1894, the Transvaal departed from the common law 
through the enactment of Law 11 of 1894 by including non-perennial water within 
the scope of public water.100 The first specialist water courts to be created and 
provided with the jurisdiction to hear water-related disputes were introduced 
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following the implementation of Act 40 of 1899 in the Cape.101 The Cape later 
followed the changes made by the Transvaal by enacting Act 32 of 1906, which 
widened the scope of public streams to include non-perennial streams within the 
purview thereof, also legislatively confirming the riparian principle.102 
After the conclusion of the Anglo-Boer war between the British and the Boer 
population (1899 – 1902), the four colonies consisting of the Orange Free State, 
the Cape and Natal Colonies, and the Transvaal, formed a Union.103 The 
formation of the Union was significant in that the amalgamation of the four 
colonies represented the English and Afrikaans communities uniting to ‘protect 
their common economic interests’ by excluding black South Africans.104After the 
formation of the Union in 1910, the Irrigation and Conservation of Waters Act 
Act 8 of 1912 was introduced, which was the first legislation to govern the entire 
South African area.105 This Act further entrenched the distinction between private 
and public water.106 The Act also provided that non-perennial streams were to be 
considered public, contrary to the position before, provided that the water was 
commonly used by downstream users.107 
Specialist water courts were introduced throughout the country, consisting of a 
Judge and technical experts who could assist in the decision as to what constituted 
reasonable water use under the Act.108 A distinction between normal and surplus 
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flow was also introduced, which replaced the more complicated distinction made 
under the 1906 Act between perennial and intermittently flowing streams.109 
The common law defined perennial rivers as public, even if they were not 
navigable.110 The Act confirmed the limitation of a riparian owner’s usage of 
perennial water subject to the ‘natural rights of the public’.111 However, the Act 
went even further than the common law by providing that even non-perennial 
water could be public water provided the river had a defined channel and was 
‘capable of common use by the riparian owners for irrigation’.112 The distinctions 
drawn and the rules regulating public and private streams were still largely 
concerned with the agricultural use thereof as public streams were required to 
provide sufficient water for the production of crops ‘economically and 
regularly’.113 Further, where streams were technically classified as private but 
were found to be the sources of public streams, the owner’s use was limited 
insofar as they were not entitled to do with the water as they pleased,114 also with 
the intention of ensuring sufficient water was available for riparian users. 
One of the unintended negative effects of the system implemented under British 
rule was ironically felt in the agricultural sphere, despite the emphasis of legal 
developments to enable farming activities. The parameters of riparianism made 
storage of water difficult, as it was too expensive for an owner to justify the 
storage of only his proportionate share.115 As a result, plenty of useful fresh water 
flowed out to sea.116 In order to curtail this waste, a distinction was made between 
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surplus and normal flow water.117 Normal flow was the ordinary amount of water 
that was susceptible to reasonable use by the riparian owner.118 Surplus flow, by 
contrast, was any additional water that could be stored over and above the 
reasonable amount in times of flooding, and as much water could be used as was 
reasonable under the circumstances.119 
Another failure of the riparian system was that the apportionment of water rights 
came to be wholly regulated by the courts, resulting in a chaotic system that 
stymied development by the state.120 By the middle of the 20th century, the state 
was completely hamstrung and had been forced to enact over 40 pieces of 
legislation to circumvent court orders and allow water-related projects to 
continue.121 Furthermore, domestic and industrial water needs were placed after 
agricultural water needs, which was unacceptably out of touch with the modern 
requirements.122 To remedy these defects in the legislative scheme, the Water 
Laws Enquiry Commission was created, resulting in the introduction of the Water 
Act 54 of 1956.123 
The Water Act 54 of 1956 was introduced during the reign of the Apartheid 
government and returned the state to the position of dominus fluminis in respect of 
public water.124 The Minister of Water Affairs was given broad powers to 
administer the use of public water and private water could not be transferred 
                                                     
117 C G Hall and A P Burger (note 42 above) 14 who discusses Smartt Syndicate Ltd v Rischmond 
Municipality and others (1919) Krummeck’s Reports 284; H Thompson (note 12 above) 56. 
118 Smartt Syndicate Ltd v Richmond Municipality Krummeck’s Reports 285; W J De Vos (note 
115 above) 4 – 6.  
119 W J De Vos (note 115 above) 11 – 12; H Thompson (note 12 above) 56; H R Hahlo and E 
Kahn (note 9 above) 597.  
120 C G Hall and A P Burger (note 42 above) 83; D D Tewari (note 1 above) 699. 
121 H Thompson (note 12 above) 58 – 59; D D Tewari (note 1 above) 699. See for example – 
Hartbeespoort Irrigation Scheme (Crocodile River) Act 32 of 1914; Hartbeespoort Irrigation 
Scheme (Acquisition of Land) Act 23 of 1918; Riparian Land (Erven and Commonages) Act 11 of 
1919; Bedford Additional Water Supply (Private) Act 13 of 1919, Rand Mines Power Supply 
Company Water Supply (Private) Act 14 of 1919, Marico-Bosveld Irrigation Scheme Act 10 of 
1932, Durban Waterworks Consolidation (Private) Act 24 of 1921. 
122 C G Hall and A P Burger (note 42 above) 7. 
123 C G Hall and A P Burger (note 42 above) 7. 
124 C G Hall and A P Burger (note 42 above) 9; D D Tewari (note 1 above) 701.  






without authorisation from the Minister.125 The effect of rapid industrialisation 
and urbanisation highlighted the problems with the riparian system, which was 
better suited to purely agricultural purposes, in a country with regular water 
flow.126 As a result, there was a shift away from this system, although it was not 
immediately abolished,127 and the scope of water uses and users was increased.128 
The government could declare areas, in accordance with the public or national 
interest, over which it would have control.129 Water-stressed basins could also be 
declared Government Water Control Areas, in terms of which a water-use 
authorisation had to be granted prior to use.130 The nature of the right that was 
awarded did not amount to ownership, but was rather a usufruct.131 
The distinction between public and private water persisted in the Water Act132 and 
the rules relating to the use of public water were further defined according to 
agricultural, urban and industrial uses.133 Groundwater could be classified as 
either public or private by the Act, and where the Act was silent, it fell to be 
decided by the common law.134 The distinction between surplus and normal flow 
in the context of public water was also retained.135 The ownership of private water 
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was significantly regulated by the introduction of the 1956 Act, as the owner of 
land was no longer able to dispose freely of this water without first obtaining the 
consent of the Minister.136 These limitations also included a statutory restriction 
on the pollution of water by an owner.137 
Private water was defined by the Water Act as ‘all water which rises or falls 
naturally on any land’,138 which included spring water, rain water, drainage water 
(provided it did not join a public stream), underground water and the water from a 
private stream.139 Private water continued to fall outside the scope of government 
control, and if water arose on an owner’s land, they had the exclusive use and 
control there over, subject to the limitations mentioned above.140 
The definition of ‘public water’ in terms of the 1956 Act included all water in a 
known and defined channel, provided that the water could be used by common 
riparian landowners for the purposes of irrigation.141 Public streams continued to 
be incapable of being privately owned142 and were defined as ‘a natural stream of 
water which flows in a known and defined channel’.143 However, this water was 
freely available for use by the riparian landowner subject to the ordinary 
principles of this doctrine.144 The riparian landowner did not own this water and it 
still fell to be classified as public.145 Public water was defined as ‘any water 
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flowing or found in or derived from the bed of a public stream, whether visible or 
not’.146 
The rules relating to normal and surplus flow in the context of public water were 
further complicated by the distinction drawn between primary, secondary and 
tertiary uses in the context of normal flow of water.147 For normal water flow, the 
general rule was that primary water use entitlements allowed riparian owners to a 
reasonable amount of use for domestic needs.148 Any limitations to primary uses 
of water were published in the Government Gazette.149 A riparian owner would be 
entitled to use a reasonable share of water for secondary purposes, which 
consisted of irrigation and agricultural purposes, as well as urban uses, if this did 
not affect any downstream owner’s primary use of water.150 Tertiary uses were 
permissible if the downstream owner’s secondary use was not affected and these 
consisted of water use for mechanical or industrial use.151 When dealing with the 
surplus flow of water, a riparian owner did not have to take into account the 
downstream user’s needs in the context of primary and secondary uses, unless the 
downstream user could show that their rights were ‘adversely affected’.152 The 
storage of water was still regulated, and the storage of water from a normal flow 
water source was only permissible if it was temporary.153 An owner required 
permission from the court to store water for tertiary purposes.154 All of the 
aforementioned rights were afforded to riparian owners.155 
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Non-riparian water users, on the other hand, were limited to use of public water 
for ‘the support of human and animal life’ but could request permission from the 
water courts or the Minister of Water Affairs156 for access to water for other 
purposes.157 Permission could be granted, provided that it was in the public 
interest to do so, or that there was a ‘superabundance of water’ within a catchment 
area.158 
A number of remedies were available to a person with water rights to ensure that 
these rights were protected.159 Parties could apply to the court for the award of an 
interdict under specified circumstances.160 Aggrieved parties could also apply to 
the Water Court for relief relating to the declaration of rights or an apportionment 
thereof, which involved defining the water rights in question.161 Where a party 
suffered loss, a damages claim could be instituted, based on the ordinary Aquilian 
principles for liability.162 Furthermore, criminal sanctions could be imposed 
against those who unlawfully took more water than they were entitled to or who 
wasted public water.163 
5. The Effect of Social and Economic Racial 
Segregation on Water Infrastructure 
One of the more devastating consequences of the riparian system was the resultant 
inequality of access to water.164 Water rights were associated with land 
ownership, which entrenched this inequality after the Black Land Act of 1913 was 
implemented, when land came to be predominantly owned by the white minority 
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of the country.165 The effect of moving from what was essentially an 
administrative system under Roman-Dutch law to a riparian system under English 
law in this context was wholly to disenfranchise non-white people in terms of 
water rights.166 Over 91% of the country came to be owned by white people 
through this shift, resulting in the complete subjugation of the black majority 
throughout the country.167 
Prior to the introduction of democracy in 1994, two legal systems ensured the 
economic and social separation of the South African people as a consequence of 
the Apartheid government’s attempt to create a truly segregated society divided 
along racial lines.168 The policies aimed at the social separation of different races 
commenced long before the formal introduction of Apartheid.169 These legal 
systems also followed geographic boundaries, as the government created ten 
administrative regions called ‘Homelands’.170 The majority of South Africa’s 
black population was forcefully removed and arbitrarily squeezed into these 
comparatively small regions after the introduction of the Black Land Act of 
1913.171 The primary legal system consisted of the laws that governed the country, 
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many of which sought to entrench racial division and subjugation.172 The 
secondary legal system regulated the Homeland areas.173  
Legislation was used to entrench the social divide along racial lines, depriving 
non-white South Africans from access to resources, whilst at the same time 
forcing them into a system of cheap labour and poor education.174 The common 
law offered no respite to those being subjugated. The legal systems in Rome and 
Holland were premised on systems of entitlements based on wealth and status. As 
Liebenberg states, there was175 
[L]imited scope for challenging the systemic injustices of the apartheid era 
through the common law. The common law had no tradition of recognising 
entitlements to social and economic resources and services on the basis of need. 
The closest that the pre-constitutional common law comes to protecting people’s 
access to social benefits and resources is within the context of administrative law.  
Despite nearly 20 years of democracy, the institutional remnants of these two 
systems are still problematic.176 The infrastructural development under each of 
these systems was markedly different. The pre-1994 Department of Water Affairs 
served the former ‘white South Africa’, particularly the commercial sector, which 
was highly subsidised.177 Over a few decades, a well-established system of water 
rights was established for commercial farmers, mining companies and other 
industries, thereby ensuring access to water for these purposes.178 Access to all 
natural resources was regulated and restricted by the white government with the 
result that ‘the environment was seen to be a white, suburban issue of little 
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relevance to the anti-apartheid struggle. At worst, environmental policy was seen 
as an explicit toll of racially based oppression’.179 Environmental protection and 
policies were preservationist in nature with a focus on wildlife.180 The result of 
these policies and attitudes of the controlling elite gave rise to an ‘environmental 
racism’, where black people were viewed as destructive to the environment as 
compared to the conservationist white population.181  
Water management was vested in the Homeland governments in the Homeland 
regions, who were to a large extent, simply puppets of the Apartheid state.182 
Tribal councils and chiefs were the delegated authorities for managing water and 
some drinking water supply schemes were implemented in the rural areas.183 
Some state- and parastatal-funded enterprises were established with the intention 
of furthering irrigation schemes. However, many of these schemes collapsed after 
support was withdrawn by the various governments in 1990. The lack of 
bargaining power in these regions was also evident where mining companies, for 
example, would negotiate with community leaders for access to water for the 
purposes of mining projects. However, these companies would often completely 
disregard their contractual obligations by polluting a community’s water with no 
intention of remedying the situation.184 
These separate legal systems gave rise to wholly different infrastructural systems 
of water supply and management in different regions.185 One of the challenges of 
water management today is to acknowledge that these differences still exist. As a 
                                                     
179 D A McDonald Environmental Justice in South Africa (2002) 1. 
180 D A McDonald (note 179 above) 15 – 17. See also L Ferris ‘Environmental rights and locus 
standi’ in A Paterson and L Kotze (eds) Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South 
Africa (2009) 129 who notes the pre-constitutional approach where preservation of the 
environment at the cost of human rights resulted in hostility amongst the rural communities 
towards environmental goals. 
181 D A McDonald (note 179 above) 17 - 19. 
182 R Francis (note 69 above) 21; B Van Koppen, N Jha and D J Merrey (note 29 above) 5; S 
Liebenberg (note 165 above) 5. 
183 A R Turton ‘Water demand management: A case study from South Africa’ (1999) MEWREW 
Occasional Paper No. 4 6.  
184 B Van Koppen, N Jha and D J Merrey (note 29 above) 6. 
185 G J Pienaar and E van der Schyff (note 4 above) 4 – 5; B Van Koppen, N Jha and D J Merrey 
(note 29 above) 6. 






result, a uniform approach to water management is not necessarily appropriate.186 
Some of the problems that face more developed areas are concerns of pollution, 
flooding and soil erosion.187 However, in the less developed areas, mere access to 
water is of greatest concern.188 Consequently, the needs of large-scale and small-
scale water users, as well as urban and rural users will be vastly different.189 It is 
therefore vital that, against this historical background of systemic and entrenched 
inequality of access, the needs of all of various water users are taken into account 
using a flexible system when implementing an integrated approach to water 
management as required by the Act. 
6. Water Management After the Advent of the 
National Water Act and the Water Services Act 
After the African National Congress was voted into power in 1994, the political 
system anchored in parliamentary sovereignty was replaced with a constitutional 
democracy.190 An interim Constitution introduced in 1993 was replaced with the 
final Constitution in 1996, which included a fully justiciable Bill of Rights, 
including both civil and political rights, as well as socio-economic rights.191 
Included amongst these rights was an express recognition of the right to an 
environment that is not harmful to health or well-being as well as the right of 
access to water.192 This allows parties the requisite locus standi to challenge the 
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state in terms of environmental issues, including those related to the management 
of water.193 
The introduction of the National Water Act and the Water Services Act, in 
accordance with the constitutional directives, completely revolutionised South 
Africa’s approach to water governance, with the effect that South Africa now has 
arguably the most progressive legislation on water management in the world.194 
The changes implemented represent a shift away from the Roman-Dutch, English 
and Apartheid regimes that entrenched inequality.195 When the White Paper that 
informed the National Water Act was introduced, the Minister of Water Affairs 
and Forestry at the time captured the essence of the dilemma that faced the 
management of water as well as the required response: 196 
South Africa’s water law comes out of a history of conquest and expansion. The 
colonial law-makers tried to use the rules of the well-watered colonising 
countries of Europe in the dry and variable climate of Southern Africa. They 
harnessed the law, and the water, in the interests of a dominant class and group 
that had privileged access to land and economic power. It is for this reason that 
the new Government has been confronted with a situation in which not only have 
the majority of South Africa’s people been excluded from the land, but they have 
been denied either direct access to water for productive use or access to the 
benefits from the use of the nation’s water. The victory of our democracy now 
demands that national water use policy and the water law be reviewed. Our 
Constitution demands this review, on the basis of fairness and equity, values 
which are enshrined as cornerstones of our new society.  
The task of overhauling the legal system and facilitating basic rights of access to 
water was, and remains, a daunting task.197 The priorities of the new approach to 
water management were to facilitate access to water for all and for the water 
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systems in place to alleviate poverty and eradicate inequality, whilst recognising 
the need for economic growth and development, as well as the need to protect and 
preserve the environment.198 This was consistent with the broader approach 
adopted by the African National Congress, upon being democratically elected into 
power, who wanted to improve not only the political rights of the South African 
people, but also their standard of living and quality of life.199 
Ironically, the state is again the ‘dominus fluminis’ of water resources to the extent 
that it is legally entitled and required to manage and administer water rights.200 It 
does not own this water201 and the nature of the water right is a usufruct, similar to 
the system under Dutch rule.202 While the nature of the relationship between the 
state and the user of water, as well as the nature of the rights to water is similar, 
there are many substantive and procedural differences between these systems. 
In the context of water management over the past 400 years, the state has been the 
primary mechanism driving the entrenchment of political and social inequality 
along racial lines. In order to rectify this imbalance, the modern constitutional 
state has been designated the role of the trustee of water, the content of which 
trusteeship is to be interpreted consistently with the Constitution.203 Trusteeship 
was introduced by way of section 3 of the National Water Act, whereby the state 
has been tasked with the duty of ensuring the protection, use, development, 
conservation, management and control of water.204 Similarly, the Water Services 
Act makes the state the custodian of water in the context of the provision of water 
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services.205 The ownership of this collective water has been debated, with some 
commentators arguing that ownership vests in the nation.206 While many countries 
around the world debate whether privatisation of water resources may be a viable 
mechanism for the management and conservation of water, South Africa has very 
clearly and purposefully created a human right to water, which cannot be owned, 
and which is managed by the state for the benefit of the people.207 
As stated above, the distinction between private and public water has been 
abolished208 consistent with the introduction of a human right to water.209 The 
implications of this abolition, particularly in the context of poverty and land 
ownership, are important, as access to water is now no longer secured by land 
ownership.210 Furthermore, it is no longer possible to hold an exclusive 
entitlement to water.211 Instead, authority has to be granted by the relevant 
departmental official and this authorisation remains conditional on a number of 
factors,212 including that it is beneficial and in the public interest.213 This process 
must allow for public participation and decisions can be taken on review by 
aggrieved parties.214 This is consistent with the shift towards a strong focus on the 
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prevented equal access to water, and use of water resources’; H Mackay (note 84 above) 52; G J 
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utilisation of water such that it is preserved for ecological gains whilst promoting 
the goals of democracy.215 Water demand management is also more strongly 
recognised.216 
In addition to the removal of the distinction between public and private water, the 
unity and-interdependence of the water cycle has been recognised.217 The 
distinctions drawn between different types of water prior to the advent of the 
Act218 resulted in a rather complex approach to water use and management, which 
arbitrarily distinguished between different types of water. A distinction is no 
longer made between ground, surface and other kinds of water,219 and the 
differentiation between water based on the source and location thereof has been 
recognised as arbitrary.220 The water cycle is not only complex but also consists of 
many different systems and sources, which are affected by many different 
factors.221 The water cycle, with all its various stages, sources and stresses is 
referred to as the hydrological cycle.222 The complexity of this cycle is 
accordingly recognised by the Act,223 consistent with the principles that laid the 
foundations for the new water law.224 
The state recently reiterated the importance of treating water as a single entity, 
and further, appreciating the interdependence of water within the greater context 
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of the ecosystem and the various users dependent on this system.225 This 
sentiment is reflected in the National Water Policy, which aims to consolidate the 
National Water Act and Water Services Act to ‘enable the Minister, the 
department, water management and service institutions, and water users to have a 
clearer understanding of legislative aspirations and requirements regarding water 
across the entire water value chain, and will prevent the need for the cross-reading 
between the two acts’.226 
Due to the practices of the past, developmental goals did not take into account the 
effect on the environment, and consequently ecosystems, habitats and critical 
biodiversity have been damaged and destroyed.227 In order to mitigate the 
consequences of years of development at the expense of the environment as well 
as the social inequities caused by colonisation and Apartheid, several mechanisms 
have been introduced. For example, the Act introduces the ‘Reserve’, which 
stipulates the minimum amount of water required to sustain human and ecological 
health.228 In addition, the powers and duties of water management have been 
delineated to specific catchment management areas, in order to focus the 
management of water to the area in question. Pursuant to this, the state has also 
implemented Integrated Water Resource Management, which aims to integrate 
and coordinate the management of water, and Adaptive Management, which 
encourages a management approach to water that is flexible and can accommodate 
uncertainties.229 The Act binds all organs of state, and requires cooperative 
governance between the different entities.230 Public participation and community 
involvement is not only encouraged, but also demanded in certain contexts, in 
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terms of water management.231 These concepts will be discussed in the following 
chapters.  
The Water Services Act provides that everyone has the right of access to a basic 
water supply, which it defines as ‘the prescribed minimum standard of water 
supply services necessary for the reliable supply of a sufficient quantity and 
quality of water to households, including informal households, to support life and 
personal hygiene’.232 The Act places the onus on the relevant water service 
institution to realise this right of basic access to water supply, within the context 
of reasonableness (which is discussed in Chapter 3).233 The National Water Act 
and the Water Services Act are discussed more fully in Chapter 3.  
7. Concluding Remarks 
The purpose of this chapter has been to set out the historical development of the 
legal system pertaining to water and to highlight the inequalities that developed in 
the context of access to water as a result of the political imbalance in power 
between the state and the people. Prior to the colonisation of South Africa, water 
was governed by the independent African customary laws of each of the different 
tribes in a particular area.234 In accordance with modern day constitutional 
principles, African customary law is still a relevant consideration for water 
management, and therefore the state, as trustee, must take cognisance of this 
source of law.235 
The arrival of the European Settlers in the Cape saw the beginnings of the 
fracturing of South African society along racial lines.236 Following their arrival, 
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Roman-Dutch law was implemented in a piecemeal fashion.237 The Roman-Dutch 
law classifications, such as res publicae and res communes omnium, were 
received into South African law as a consequence.238 The state as dominus 
fluminis was responsible for the administration of water, and only very few water 
sources could be privately owned in accordance with the Roman-Dutch law 
rules.239 The development of water law was largely influenced by the needs of the 
Kompanjie at the time, as well as the agricultural requirements for water use.240 
Consequently, the nature of the relationship between the state and water users 
favoured the state. 
After the British took control over the Cape, a riparian system of water use was 
implemented, which catapulted land ownership to the forefront of water 
entitlements.241 The courts, rather than the state, came to be the party in control of 
determining the intricacies of water entitlements, in accordance with the principles 
of riparianism.242 The nature of the relationship between the state and the user 
therefore favoured particular water users, that is, riparian land owners. This 
system was extended to the rest of South Africa after the Union came into 
existence in 1910, and the first legislation dealing with water in the country was 
enacted.243 In the context of the burgeoning industrial and urban sectors, this state 
of affairs soon became untenable, with the result that the Water Act was 
implemented in 1956.244 
At the same time, the parallel political developments taking place saw the coming 
into power of the Apartheid government and the full-scale racial segregation of 
the population commenced.245 The Apartheid government restored itself to the 
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position of dominus fluminis and could therefore once again administer water 
rights.246 The distinction between public and private water was, however, 
maintained, and the system of riparianism persisted within the bounds of the 
Water Act.247 With the legislative introduction of the Homelands, most of the land 
in the country came to be owned by the white minority.248 Simultaneously, the 
development of water infrastructure favoured agricultural and industrial 
development in the hands of white people.249 Thus, while the nature of the 
relationship between the state and the user still favoured the user, the water users 
in question represented a fraction of the population. 
After the institution of democracy in South Africa and the abolition of Apartheid, 
addressing inequality of access to water is at the forefront of the government’s 
agenda.250 The Constitution, the National Water Act and the Water Services Act 
came into force, thereby abolishing the distinction between public and private 
water, and the associated riparian system.251 Land ownership is no longer a 
prerequisite for access to water.252 Instead, equitable access is a primary goal of 
water management.253 In addition, a key feature of modern water management is 
the recognition that water is a finite resource that is affected by multiple factors 
and stakeholders.254 The unity of the water cycle is now properly recognised and 
the party responsible for the management of water in the interests of the public is 
the state, in its capacity as public trustee.255 The nature of this relationship is 
intended to favour all water users equitably, efficiently and sustainably, and the 
state is responsible for ensuring that this occurs.256 The legal framework, as well 
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as the principles and philosophies that underlie this system, will be the focus of 
the discussion in the following chapters. The importance of the state as the party 
responsible for remedying the inequalities of the past 400 years and ensuring the 
environmental preservation of the resource will be discussed against the backdrop 





Chapter Three:  
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
REGULATION OF WATER 
1. Introduction 
South Africa’s political history is fraught with racial suppression and an 
inequality of access to natural resources.1 When the political transition to a 
constitutional democracy took place in 1994, the primary focus of the incumbent 
ANC state was to redress this inequality of access.2 With this in mind, and with 
the constitutional right of access to water entrenched in the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa in 1996 (hereinafter the ‘Constitution’), the National 
Water Act (hereinafter the ‘Water Act’) and the Water Services Act (hereinafter 
the ‘Services Act’) were implemented in quick succession. The implementation of 
the Water Act saw many complicated and unnecessary Acts and policies repealed, 
thereby simplifying the process of regulating water.3 A unified approach to water 
management was adopted, with its foundations anchored in the obligations created 
by the Constitution.4 At the helm of this water management is the state, newly 
appointed to its guardianship role as trustee. Similarly, the Services Act confirmed 
the role of the state as the custodian of water in the context of the provision of 
water services.5 
This unification has simplified water law by rationalising or abolishing the 
multitude of different rules and regulations that would previously have been 
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considered.6 However, the Water Act and the Services Act have created an 
interpretive difficulty: it left the concept of public trusteeship or custodianship 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘trusteeship’) open for speculation.7 The legislation 
prior to the Act did not employ the concept of trusteeship, and the legislation does 
not expressly define what is meant by this notion. 
Given that there is no express definition of trusteeship in either the Constitution or 
the legislation (that is, the Water Act and Services Act), a part of the purpose of 
this thesis is to establish what trusteeship entails. This chapter intends to provide 
an overview of the legal framework that governs domestic water management.8 
As will be shown below, the provisions of the Water Act that introduce 
trusteeship deal with the management of water resources. Consequently, it is 
argued in this thesis that the duties of trusteeship, in the narrow sense, are no more 
than the requirements as set out by the legal framework to manage and administer 
water resources. The parameters within which trusteeship must be viewed are 
clearly set out by the Constitution, legislation and associated regulations, as well 
the National Water Resources Strategy, which is published in accordance with the 
Water Act. The framework is hierarchical, consisting of three levels,9 and each of 
these different levels will be discussed below. The substantive components of 
trusteeship, that is, the principles that underlie water management, are informed 
by this legal framework and will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
Due to the scope of this thesis, this discussion is limited to domestic law. 
However, international law and regional water agreements also form an integral 
part of the framework of considerations in water management,10 and the Water 
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Act specifically provides that international obligations must be met.11 South 
Africa shares most of its largest water sources, amounting to almost 60% of the 
country’s water sources, with Botswana, Mozambique, Lesotho, Namibia, 
Swaziland and Zimbabwe.12 In this respect, shared water sources are very 
carefully governed by political agreements between these countries to ensure the 
cooperative management of these rivers.13 In the context of shared water sources, 
the development of these countries is intimately linked. Upstream users 
essentially hold the power in relation to downstream users’ water supply.14 Over-
use or pollution of water sources upstream will result in the deterioration and 
destruction of water ecosystems downstream.15 Consequently, it must be borne in 
mind that water management must take place within the context of these 
international obligations.16 
                                                                                                                                                 
compliance and enforcement’ in A Paterson and L Kotze (eds) Environmental Compliance and 
Enforcement in South Africa (2009) 47; J Glazewski Environmental Law in South Africa (2013) 
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Africa’ (2012) 8/1 Law, Environment and Development Journal 14 argues that public trusteeship 
requires respecting ‘water allocation for downstream users in shared river basins’. 
11 Under the old water regime, the riparian rights of users upstream (in this instance both South 
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managing water in the context of regional agreements. See also H Thompson Water Law: A 
Practical Approach to Resource Management and the Provision of Services (2006) 137, 151 – 
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12 G R Backeberg ‘Water institutional reforms in South Africa’ (2005) 7 Water Policy 110; 
Strategy (2013) 67 and 80. 
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way?’ (2009) 11 Development Planning Division (Working Paper Series) 7. 
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This chapter describes the existing legal mechanisms for water management. It 
commences with a consideration of relevant constitutional provisions. Thereafter, 
it deals with ordinary legislation and regulations. It also looks at the strategic and 
policy choices underpinning the existing framework. 
2. Legal Mechanisms for Water Management: The 
Constitution 
The basis for the hierarchy that guides and informs the framework of trusteeship 
consists of the obligations enumerated by the Constitution.17 The Constitution was 
introduced in 1996 with the intention of, amongst other things, drastically 
overhauling the legal approach to socio-economic rights.18 The inclusion of the 
right to water was a first internationally, and South Africa has been used as an 
example by the United Nations in its attempts to encourage other states to adopt a 
constitutional right to water.19 A water right, which is incorporeal in nature,20 has 
been defined by one author as ‘a right to a share in the resource defined by the 
holder’s priority of use, the amount that may be taken, a guarantee of the quality 
of the water, the source of the water to be used, and the right to change the place 
                                                                                                                                                 
Utilisation of the Water Resources of the Komati River Basin between Swaziland, Mozambique 
and South Africa, the Joint Water Commission between South Africa and Mozambique, the 
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See Strategy (2013) 67; H Mackay ‘Water policies and practices’ in D Reed and M de Wit (eds) 
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18 The Director: Mineral Development, Gauteng Region, and Another v Save The Vaal 
Environment and Others 1999 (2) SA 709 (SCA) para 20; see also J Glazewski ‘Environment’ in 
Cheadle et al South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2002) 409.  
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and manner of abstraction’.21 This right is not unlimited and its correlative 
obligation is that it is subject to regulation by the state in the public interest.22 
Trusteeship, therefore, must give effect to this right by balancing the needs of 
different water uses within the context of ensuring that water users are afforded 
access to a certain quantity and quality of water. 
Whilst there is concurrent competence between the national and provincial 
legislature in the context of management of the environment,23 the same cannot be 
said for water management. In this respect, the exclusive competency lies with the 
national sphere.24 This is consistent with the fact that the management of water is 
not allocated along artificial political lines, but rather in accordance with 
catchment management areas.25 In respect of water and sanitation services, the 
local government is competent to regulate ‘potable water supply systems and 
domestic waste-water and sewage disposal systems’.26 
Before discussing the rights created by the Constitution in more detail, it is 
germane to explain why the Constitution is binding. Not only is the Constitution 
the ‘cornerstone of our democracy’,27 but section 2 thereof also provides that it is 
the supreme law and any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution 
is invalid.28 The Constitution furthermore requires the state to ‘respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights’ and this obligation is binding on 
                                                     
21 F Soltau (note 20 above) 239. However, see specifically s 31 of the Act, which provides that the 
award of a licence does not guarantee the quality or quantity of water, as discussed below at note 
252. See also I T Winkler The Human Right to Water (2012) 8 – 11. 
22 H Klug (note 20 above) 6; M Kidd (note 8 above) 88. See also I Currie and J de Waal The Bill of 
Rights Handbook 6ed (2013) 34. 
23 See M Kidd (note 8 above) 31. Water and sanitation services fall within Sch 4 Part B and are 
therefore local government matters. 
24 See note 81 below; F Craigie, P Snijman and M Fourie (note 10 above) 67. 
25 See note 94 below. 
26 Sched 4 part B of the Constitution read with s 156 of the Constitution; Local Government: 
Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000; F Craigie, P Snijman and M Fourie (note 10 above) 68.  
27 S 7 of the Constitution. 
28 S 2 of the Constitution; BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, 
Environment and Land Affairs 2004 (5) SA 124 (W) 141. 






all levels and spheres of government.29 The consequence of this is that the 
Constitution requires the state, at all levels, to act consistently with the goals 
contained therein. Accordingly, these goals form the core of the values that must 
guide the objectives of water management. They operate at all times and must be 
borne in mind by decision-makers in all facets of water management.  
As was discussed in Chapter 2, the legacy of Apartheid ensured that poverty, land 
ownership and access to water are inextricably linked.30 As a result, the Bill of 
Rights includes specific provisions that have bearing both on the quality of 
environmental resources, as well as the right of access thereto. Section 24 and 27 
of the Constitution are pertinent in this regard, as they provide the guidelines that 
must inform all water management decisions.31 All management decisions must 
be consistent with these constitutional imperatives, an obligation reiterated by the 
Water Act and the Services Act. In terms of the Water Act, the Minister acting on 
behalf of the National Government, as public trustee, must facilitate this process 
by ensuring that all decisions are constitutionally compliant and further the 
constitutional mandate.32 The Services Act makes no reference to the Minister 
acting on behalf of the National Government. Instead, the National Government is 
the stipulated custodian.33 
2.1. Section 24 of the Constitution 
Section 2434 of the Constitution focuses on the right to protection of the quality of 
the environment. It provides that everyone has a right to an environment that is 
                                                     
29 S 7 and 8(1); Democratic Alliance and others v Acting NDPP and others [2012] 2 All SA 345 
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not harmful to their health or well-being.35 This right is not limited to citizens or 
persons who are legally entitled to be in South Africa, but is afforded to anyone 
physically present within the borders of the Republic.36  
The use of the term ‘well-being’ within the context of this clause creates a 
constitutional right that is ‘potentially limitless’.37 The court in HTF Developers 
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others38 (the 
‘HTF Developers’ case) described the use of this term as ‘critically important in 
that it defines for the environmental authorities the constitutional objectives of 
their task’.39 However, a ‘potentially limitless’ standard is not necessarily useful 
for authorities in carrying out their day-to-day administrative functions. This is 
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(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources  
while promoting justifiable economic and social development 
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even more the case in light of the criteria of the rule of law, which requires, inter 
alia, the law to provide certainty.40 
It is argued that this component of the right must be read in light of the 
requirement of ‘sustainable development’, also contained in section 24. 
Sustainable development requires the balancing of social, economic and 
environmental goals.41 It also requires the promotion of justifiable development. 
The weighing of these factors will assist in ensuring that legitimate economic and 
social development is not stymied by what could effectively amount to a trump 
card in favour of the environment. Consequently, this section of the Constitution 
requires the needs of society, particularly its well-being, to be evaluated in the 
context of environmental and economic goals. 
The second component of section 24 focuses on the protection and preservation of 
the environment42 to which everyone is similarly entitled.43 Not only must the 
environment be protected for the present generation, but also for future 
generations.44 In order for the state to meet its constitutional duties, section 24 
requires positive steps to be taken to ensure the fulfillment of the right.45 This 
requires the implementation of legislative and other measures. These measures 
must aim to ensure that pollution and ecological degradation are prevented.46 
Secondly, these measures are required to promote conservation of the 
environment.47 In Khabisi NO and Another v Aquarella Investment 83 (Pty) Ltd 
and Others48 the court held that this component of section 24 expressly requires 
                                                     
40 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and another: In Re Ex Parte 
President of the Republic of South Africa and others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) para 39; 
Democratic Alliance and others v Acting NDPP and others [2012] 2 All SA 345 (SCA) para 29. 
41 See at Ch 5 (note 4 below); W du Plessis and A A du Plessis (note 37 above) 429. 
42 S 24(b); M Kidd (note 8 above) 22; M Kidd (note 35 above) 112. 
43 I Currie and J de Waal (note 22 above) 34. 
44 S 24(b). 
45 S 24(b)(i – iii). See G R Backeberg (note 12 above) 1 – 2. See also discussion below (note 118) 
in the context of the decision of Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 
(1) SA 46 (CC). 
46 S 24(b)(i). 
47 S 24(b)(ii). 
48 2008 (4) SA 195 (T).  






the state to ‘promote conservation and protect the environment’.49 Finally, the 
third component requires the implementation of sustainable development, which 
entails the use of natural resources for development purposes, such that the need 
to protect the environment is balanced against the need to promote economic and 
social development.50 
In addition to sustainable development, this aspect of the constitutional right 
introduces a number of components to water management that must be complied 
with, including intra- and inter-generational equity, as well as the principles 
pertaining to the protection of the environment. These principles are discussed in 
Chapter 5 under the substantive aspects of trusteeship.51 
In the context of section 24, and more particularly, in the context of the discussion 
of trusteeship, the Constitutional Court has defined the role of the courts in 
fulfilling the goals of sustainable development. In particular, the Court stated as 
follows:52 
The role of the courts is especially important in the context of the protection of 
the environment and giving effect to the principle of sustainable development. 
The importance of the protection of the environment cannot be gainsaid. Its 
protection is vital to the enjoyment of the other rights contained in the Bill of 
Rights; indeed, it is vital to life itself. It must therefore be protected for the 
benefit of the present and future generations. The present generation holds the 
earth in trust for the next generation. This trusteeship position carries with it the 
responsibility to look after the environment. It is the duty of the court to ensure 
that this responsibility is carried out.  
A number of observations can be made from this dictum in the context of 
trusteeship. The courts have established that they, too, are charged with the duty 
to ensure that the responsibilities of trusteeship are properly carried out, thereby 
                                                     
49 Para 30; F Craigie, P Snijman and M Fourie (note 10 above) 46 – 47. 
50 S 24(b)(iii). 
51 See Ch 5 below. 
52 Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-General Environmental Management, 
Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga Province and Others 
2007 (10) BCLR 1059 (CC) para 102; MEC: Department of Agriculture, Conservation and 
Environment and another HTF Developers (Pty) Limited 2008 (4) BCLR 417 (CC) para 28. See 
also HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and others [2006] 
ZAGPHC 132 para 19 and E van der Schyff ‘Stewardship doctrines of public trust: Has the eagle 
of public trust landed on South African soil? (2013) 130 South African Law Journal 371. 






confirming the court’s responsibilities in terms of oversight of state conduct.53 In 
addition, the court acknowledges the critical interrelationship between the well-
being of society and the preservation of the environment. In this respect, the court 
also acknowledges that the future well-being of society is intimately linked to the 
availability of environmental resources, thus requiring the preservation and 
protection of natural resources. The court further indicates that trusteeship is key 
to furthering this aim, and to the success of sustainable development.  
The court establishes this position of trusteeship independently of any legislative 
provision. Instead, trusteeship, per this dictum, is a by-product of the recognition 
in the Bill of Rights of the importance of the environment to the preservation of 
humanity. In the HTF Developers case54 the court held that section 24 ‘confers 
upon the authorities a stewardship, whereby the present generation is constituted 
as the custodian or trustee of the environment’.55 Trusteeship, therefore, is all-
pervasive: it is a duty bestowed on the judiciary, the state and society. Arguably, 
therefore, trusteeship is a constitutional doctrine, even if only in the context of 
environmental protection of water resources. At this broad level, it is argued that 
trusteeship operates in a wide sense, independently of the statutory framework.  
This approach was confirmed in BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for 
Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs (‘BP’),56 where the 
court held that the state’s administrative functions are intertwined with its 
constitutional obligations.57 The supremacy of the Constitution required the state 
to comply with its constitutional obligations in performing its duties, failing which 
its actions would be invalid.58 Consequently, the state is obliged to consider 
environmental factors in its administrative functions, such as the award of 
licences; it is insufficient for the state merely to comply with the procedural 
requirements for the award of licences. 
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In the context of the state’s administrative duties, the court in the BP case held 
that the goal of sustainable development required that measures must be 
implemented by the state for the purposes of achieving these goals.59 Secondly, 
the state must consider all relevant factors when exercising these administrative 
duties, which include the nature of the harm that will be suffered by the 
environment, and the extent to which this can be minimised or avoided 
altogether.60 
The court in the BP case also found that the decision-making process regarding 
natural resources must consider the potential impacts, not only on the 
environment, but also on socio-economic conditions as well as cultural factors.61 
As a result, the court highlighted the importance of incorporating cultural factors 
into the decision-making process. The National Environmental Management Act 
107 of 1998 also requires that ‘environmental management must place people and 
their needs at the forefront of its concern, and serve their physical, psychological, 
developmental, cultural and social interests equitably’.62 
The decision-making process, the court highlighted, had to take into account all 
relevant factors.63 Where the empowering provision is silent on what these 
relevant factors are, the administrator must be guided by the nature of the power 
that is being exercised. In the context of decisions pertaining to water, the legal 
framework will provide the specific requirements that have to be considered. The 
court did however point out that the weight of these different factors, unless 
expressly stated by legislation, was discretionary and the court could not interfere 
in this regard.64 
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The Supreme Court of Appeal expressed similar views in the case of The 
Director: Mineral Development, Gauteng Region, and Another v Save the Vaal 
Environment and Others.65 The court in its discussion of section 24 stated: 66 
Our Constitution, by including environmental rights as fundamental, justiciable 
human rights, by necessary implication requires that environmental 
considerations be accorded appropriate recognition and respect in the 
administrative processes in our country. Together with the change in the 
ideological climate must also come a change in our legal and administrative 
approach to environmental concerns. 
The court thus expressed the view that with the advent of the Constitution, the 
legal approach to environmental issues had changed, and the administrative 
approach had to follow accordingly.67 
2.2. Section 27 of the Constitution 
Whilst section 24 focuses on the quality of environmental resources, section 2768 
aims to ensure access to these resources. This provision directs the state to ensure 
that persons are afforded access to sufficient water,69 and a duty is created in 
terms of how this access is to be ensured by the government thereby creating 
tangible goals that must be satisfied by the state. Similarly to section 24, 
reasonable legislative and other measures must be introduced by the state. Section 
27, however, goes further than section 24 by not only requiring the 
implementation of reasonable legislative and other measures, but also by requiring 
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68 (1) Everyone has the right to have access to-  
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care;  
(b) sufficient food and water; and  
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their 
dependants, appropriate social assistance.  
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
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this right to be progressively realised.70 The onerous nature of the duty to give 
effect to the right of access to water is limited, however, by the fact that the state’s 
duties only need be fulfilled to the extent that the available resources exist to meet 
these goals.71 By contrast, section 24 does not have this same safeguard in terms 
of indemnifying the state where there are no available resources. 
The Constitutional Court has had occasion to consider the meaning and content of 
section 27, but refrained from defining a minimum core to the right, which would 
entail setting an objective minimum standard against which the state’s compliance 
with the duty can be measured.72 There are various reasons why the Constitutional 
Court has refrained from detailing the minimum core of the section 27 right, 
including judicial respect for the legislature and the executive, and an inability to 
define the exact content of what each right entails, given the vast needs of the 
different rights-holders.73 Though the court has refrained from defining the 
content of the right, it has commented on the reasonableness of state policies.74 
Further, where the state has itself defined the content of the right, the courts have 
                                                     
70 S 27(2); H Thompson (note 11 above) 147. S 27 is therefore said to impose both negative and 
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Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC) [hereinafter Mazibuko (CC)] para 48 - 68, Minister of 
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BCLR 1169 (CC) (hereinafter ‘Grootboom’) para 32; I Currie and J de Waal (note 22 above) 591; 
H Thompson (note 11 above) 150 – 151. See also Manqele v Durban Transitional Metropolitan 
Council 2002 (6) SA 423 (D) 427. However, see D Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights 
(2007) 141 – 149 and S Liebenberg (note 70 above) 148 – 151 who criticise the court’s decision to 
avoid defining a minimum content to socio-economic rights. I T Winkler The Human Right to 
Water (2012) 250; T Humby and M Grandbois ‘Human right to water in South Africa and the 
Mazibuko decisions’ (2010) 51 Les Cahiers de Droit 536. 
73 S Liebenberg (note 70 above) 149 – 151, discussing the reasons that militate against the 
minimum core as discussed by the Court in the Grootboom and Treatment Action Campaign cases.  
74 I Currie and J de Waal (note 22 above) 592; S Liebenberg (note 70 above) 151. 






been willing to engage with whether or not the state’s actions fall short of what is 
reasonable as measured against their own definition.75 
In the most controversial constitutional decision to evaluate the right of access to 
water as contained in section 27, namely Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg,76 the 
Constitutional Court was first required to evaluate whether the provision of six 
kilolitres of water, as prescribed by the Free Basic Water Policy and the Water 
Services Act, was consistent with the requirements of section 27 of the 
Constitution.77 Secondly, the court had to consider the lawfulness of the state’s 
actions to regulate water use.78  
The residents of a poverty-stricken settlement in Johannesburg brought the action 
after the state, in an attempt to reduce water loss and non-payment for water 
services, implemented more stringent water provisions.79 In terms of this 
initiative, residents of the area could choose between the installation of a prepaid 
meter or a yard tap with restricted water flow.80 These particular residents had a 
pre-paid metering system installed which resulted in water services being shut off 
when the meter ran out of credit.81 
The implementation of this policy was challenged on the basis that it infringed the 
constitutional right of access to water.82 Each of the systems dispensed six 
kilolitres of free water per month, in accordance with the allocated amount as set 
                                                     
75 I Currie and J de Waal (note 22 above) 579. 
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by the state.83 The applicants sought an order from the court declaring that the 
provision of six kilolitres per household in accordance with the state’s Free Basic 
Water Policy was insufficient under the circumstances.84 They further requested 
that the court declare that the amount of free water provided to each household 
should be increased to 50 kilolitres.85  
As will be discussed below, the standard of evaluation of a state policy in the 
context of socio-economic rights is whether the policy positively and 
progressively furthers the right, against an assessment of reasonableness under the 
circumstances.86 The court had to investigate whether the policy implemented by 
Johannesburg Water progressively furthered the satisfaction of section 27(1)(b) of 
the Constitution, and further whether the implementation of this policy was 
reasonable under the circumstances. 
The Court undertook an enquiry into the relationship between section 27(1)(b), 
which requires that everyone has the right of access to sufficient water, and 
section 27(2), which stipulates that ‘the state must take reasonable legislative and 
other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive 
realisation of these rights’. The court, on the basis of its own jurisprudence, held 
that section 27(2) limits the scope of section 27(1)(b) and the constitutional right 
does not therefore create a duty on the state to provide unlimited access to water 
to all immediately.87 Instead, it creates an obligation on the state to continue to 
adapt its policies and programmes to ensure the progressive realisation of the 
right.88 Further, the court held that it would be inappropriate to fix a minimum 
standard as this would vitiate the benefits of an enquiry based on 
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reasonableness.89 If a fixed standard was implemented by the courts, it would 
eliminate the flexibility afforded to the judicial forum to evaluate the 
reasonableness of state conduct depending on the circumstances of the matter.90 
In the second instance, the court argued that it would be inappropriate for it to 
comment on the exact nature of the policies that should be implemented to attain 
the fulfillment of this right, as this was a task better suited to the legislature and 
the executive.91 The court consequently adopted a deferential approach by 
pointing out that the legislature and the executive, as democratically appointed 
bodies with the necessary institutional resources, were best placed to evaluate the 
needs of the public.92 The court was of the view that the City had made out a case 
that highlighted the intricacies and difficulties of providing free water services to 
a variety of different water users.93 
One of the arguments put forward by the applicants was that the City’s policy was 
inflexible and could not cater for the provision of water services to households 
with more occupants on an equitable basis.94 The court, after an investigation of 
the evidence, stated that though the policy that was introduced in 2001 seemed 
inflexible, the actions of the municipality over the years showed that they 
continuously revised the policy in an attempt to provide an additional allocation of 
water to indigent households.95 Under the circumstances, therefore, the state had 
acted progressively and had shown an intention to realise the right.96 The 
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abovementioned factors resulted in a finding that the Free Basic Water policy and 
its implementation were not unreasonable under the circumstances.97 
Liebenberg argues that the court incorrectly dealt with the assertions of the 
applicants in terms of the jurisprudence of the court relating to minimum core 
arguments. According to Liebenberg, by dealing with the right of access to water 
as set out in section 27(1)(b) in terms of the reasonableness enquiry, established in 
terms of section 27(2), the court fails to evaluate the obligations set out in section 
27(1)(b) as a self-standing clause.98 She further argues that the court should have 
substantively evaluated whether the amount of water provided was sufficient to 
meet the daily needs of the community, such that their dignity was not infringed. 
The ‘impact’ of the restriction ‘on their life, health and dignity’ had to be 
considered in addition to whether the City had the resources to make more water 
available.99 The earlier decision of the court a quo shows a far greater appreciation 
of the concept of dignity by stating the following:100 
To deny the applicants the right to water is to deny them the right to lead a 
dignified human existence, to live a South African dream: to live in a democratic, 
open, caring, responsive and equal society that affirms the values of human 
dignity, equality and freedom. The denial would perpetuate the decades-long 
poverty, deprivation, want and undignified existence of the recent past. The Bill 
of Rights guaranteed in the Constitution would, as a result of the denial, remain a 
distant mirage of unfulfilled dreams. The denial is unconstitutional and therefore 
unlawful. 
The decisions of the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal (the ‘SCA’)101 
favour the applicants’ case and show that dignity played a central role in this 
enquiry, recognising that without giving effect to the right of access to water, 
other rights in the Bill of Rights could not be fulfilled.102 The SCA, in particular, 
was mindful that the responsibilities of the state are limited by its available 
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102 City of Johannesburg and others v Mazibuko and others (Centre on Housing and Evictions as 
amicus curiae) [2009] 3 All SA 202 (SCA) [hereinafter ‘Mazibuko (SCA)’] para 17. See also S 
Liebenberg (note 70 above) 181. 






resources.103 However, as the court pointed out, the City had not argued that it had 
insufficient resources to provide more water to the residents of Phiri.104 Rather, 
the City argued that it had no obligation to provide free water to these residents.105 
In order to make the reasonableness enquiry meaningful, Liebenberg argues that 
the court must give content to the ‘normative standards underpinning socio-
economic rights’.106 Without doing this, she argues that the ‘criteria of reasonable 
review amount to little more than a list of ‘good governance’ standards for the 
State as opposed to fundamental human rights analysis’.107 
Section 27 creates a duty that is placed on the state to take positive steps to create 
reasonable legislative and other measures to attain the fulfillment of these 
constitutional rights.108 This aspect of the right requires the state to take positive 
steps to ensure compliance with section 27.109 Within the context of the duty, two 
types of state conduct can be distinguished: positive state conduct which ‘deprives 
people of their existing access to socio-economic rights’, which is assessed in 
terms of the general limitations clause; and state conduct which allegedly fails to 
progressively realise the right, which is assessed in terms of section 27(2) and 
may be justifiable on the basis of resource constraints.110 Whilst section 24 does 
not require the state to realise the right progressively, it requires the state to 
implement reasonable legislative and other measures to achieve this right. 
Consequently, the test set out for establishing whether the state is achieving its 
obligations in terms of section 27 is equally applicable to section 24, insofar as it 
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questions the conduct of the state’s measures. The locus classicus of the 
interpretation of this provision is found in the judgment of Government of the 
Republic of South Africa v Grootboom.111 
In MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs v Sasol Oil 
(Pty) Ltd and Another112 the court held that section 24(b) imposed a positive 
obligation on the state to ensure compliance with the right to a healthy 
environment through the implementation of reasonable legislative and other 
measures.113 This is in accordance with Government of the Republic of South 
Africa v Grootboom, which held that the constitutional directive requires that it is 
not sufficient simply to introduce legislation to satisfy the right.114 The right goes 
further by requiring that the state must also introduce reasonable policies and 
programs, appropriate to the circumstances.115 In addition, these policies and 
programs must be reasonably implemented by the state.116 Finally, the court held 
that these policies must be both ‘balanced and flexible’.117 
With reference to the nature of the language used in the Constitution, specifically 
in the context of socio-economic rights, the court in Grootboom held that the state 
would not meet its constitutional obligations by simply enacting legislation.118 
The duty to take positive steps to fulfill these rights required more than this.119 In 
this respect, ‘the [s]tate is obliged to act to achieve the intended result, and the 
legislative measures will invariably have to be supported by appropriate, well-
directed policies and programs implemented by the executive’.120 These policies 
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are furthermore required to cater for, and favour, the most vulnerable in society; 
where they fail to take account of the vulnerable adequately or at all, these 
policies must be declared to be unreasonable.121 
As a result of this decision, socio-economic rights now impose upon the state the 
duty to act in accordance with a standard of reasonableness. This entails not only 
that reasonable legislation and associated policy is created that aims to fulfill the 
right, but also the reasonable implementation thereof.122 As a result, a failure to 
implement legislation and policies reasonably provides a legitimate ground for a 
court to find that the state has violated its duties.123 An assessment of 
reasonableness will be evaluated by the court in light of the context of the case 
and each appraisal of state conduct will be undertaken on a case-by-case basis.124 
It is also a requirement that the programmes implemented by the state ‘clearly 
allocate responsibilities and tasks to the different spheres of government and 
ensure that the appropriate financial and human resources are available’.125 While 
the court in Grootboom directed the state to revise its housing policy, it did not go 
so far as to prescribe the content of the amended policies, evidencing judicial 
restraint to give effect to the separation of powers doctrine.126 
The court is not limited to evaluating only the reasonableness of the state’s 
adopted measures and their implementation. There is nothing, in theory, 
preventing the court from evaluating whether a budgetary allocation made by the 
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state is reasonable.127 For example, the Constitutional Court in City of 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) 
Ltd128 held that it was insufficient for the City to allege that it had not made 
provision in its budget for a necessary course of action, where it should in fact, 
under the circumstances have done so.129 Consequently, where it is appropriate to 
do so, the court may go further than simply evaluating the actions of the state in 
respect of legislative measures and policies. However, as was the case in 
Grootboom, the court must be mindful not to exceed its powers and stray into the 
terrain of the executive and legislature. 
It is clear from the Water Act and the Services Act, when read together with 
section 24 and 27, that the state effectively creates its own parameters by enacting 
the legislation and policies that will then govern its actions as trustee. However, 
the courts have been given the authority to hold the state accountable, by allowing 
them to evaluate the reasonableness of the state’s legislative and other measures, 
and their implementation thereof. If the state were to enact legislation or policies 
that fell short of the requirements set out in the Constitution, the courts would be 
able to set these aside. While the Constitutional Court has refrained from defining 
the content (or minimum core) of these rights, it has established that the litmus 
test for whether or not the state is satisfying its duties is whether its actions are 
reasonable under the circumstances.130 This approach does not unnecessarily step 
into the sphere of the government prerogative.131 Instead, it maintains the delicate 
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balance necessary for the judicial review of legislative and executive decisions, 
provided that the court refrains from overstepping its powers.132 
2.3. Other Relevant Provisions Contained in the Bill of 
Rights 
Section 24 and 27 of the Constitution, and the reasonableness of their 
implementation by the state, must also be considered in light of the other rights in 
the Bill of Rights as these are related to, and impact upon, one another.133 As a 
result, the infringement of one right, such as the right to water, may result in the 
infringement of others, such as the right to dignity or equality.134 In this respect 
there are a number of rights in the Bill of Rights that may directly and indirectly 
affect the operation of the bundle of rights related to water. These rights (the right 
to property, the rights to equality and dignity, access to justice and information, 
and the right to just administrative action)135 form part of the substantive 
principles or goals of trusteeship, and are discussed more fully in Chapter 5. They 
are cursorily set out below for the sake of completeness. 
As was discussed earlier in this thesis, historically the rights related to the access 
to water were linked to ownership of land. Despite the fact that all water is today 
considered to be public, the constitutional protection of property may still be 
relevant in the context of water.136 There is a debate as to whether expropriation is 
possible in the context of water rights,137 particularly where the state reduces a 
                                                     
132 I Currie and J de Waal (note 22 above) 583. 
133 Khosa v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) 44; I Currie and J de Waal 
(note 22 above) 578. See also L Ferris ‘Environmental rights and locus standi’ in A Paterson and L 
Kotzé (eds) Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa (2009) 143 – 145; S 
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Pejan, D du Toit and H Thompson ‘Norms for policy implementation lags in the South African 
water sector’ (2011) Report to the Water Research Commission 2. 
136 S 25 of the Constitution. 
137 For a discussion on this point see M Kidd (note 8 above) 88 – 90. The expropriation of property 
for any purpose consistent with the Act is regulated by s 64 – 65. For a discussion on expropriation 
generally see I Currie and J de Waal (note 22 above) 547 – 553 and also H Thompson (note 11 
above) 138 for a discussion on expropriation without compensation in the context of water. See 






water allocation. Expropriation is expressly permitted in terms of the Water 
Services Act, provided that it is authorised by the written consent of the Minister 
and complies with the Expropriation Act.138 However, in certain circumstances, 
such as a reduction in allocated water use rights, it is arguable that deprivation or 
expropriation in terms of section 25 has taken place. The focus of this thesis is on 
public, rather than private rights, and consequently this debate is not discussed.  
In the context of the violation of the right of access to water, particularly where 
vulnerable parties are involved, the rights to equality and dignity are likely to be 
infringed. Both of these concepts are founding values in the Constitution.139 
Dignity underlies all the rights in the Constitution, both as a right, and as a 
value.140 In the context of equality, the Constitutional Court has held that the 
Constitution employs the notion of substantive rather than formal equality.141 This 
entails the notion that not every person is entitled to exactly the same rights in 
exactly the same shape and form.142 Instead, substantive equality looks to the 
social and economic context to ascertain whether conduct is fair, and this is 
decided on a case-by-case basis.143 It will be argued that the right to dignity and 
equality are at the heart of the values that underlie water management.144 
The Constitution has created a right of access to information,145 to which effect is 
given by the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (‘the PAIA’).146 
                                                                                                                                                 
also S Movik and F de Jong ‘Licence to control: implications of introducing administrative water 
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Backeberg (note 12 above) 113; E van der Schyff ‘The concept of public trusteeship as embedded 
in the National Water Act, 1998’ (2011) Water Research Commission 86 – 87; L Ferris (note 10 
above) 15; G J Pienaar and E van der Schyff (note 185 above) 9 - 13. 
138 S 81 Water Services Act. 
139 S 1; I Currie and J de Waal (note 22 above) 250. 
140 S v Makwanyane1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) 144; I Currie and J de Waal (note 22 above) 251 – 253. 
141 President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) 41; I Currie and J de 
Waal (note 22 above) 213 – 214.  
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322. 
144 See Ch 5 (note 124 ff below). 
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This right allows anyone, (that is, both natural and juristic persons), to request 
information from the state as well as private parties when they can show cause.147 
This right is essential in the context of a democratic society as the accountability 
and transparency of the state cannot be achieved without the necessary 
information being made available or accessible to the public.148 One of the 
purposes of the PAIA is to promote good governance, which is a feature necessary 
for the proper functioning of water management.149 The extent to which good 
governance is essential for the successful management of water resources, both in 
terms of environmental protection and access, will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
The right of access to information can be a powerful tool in the environmental 
context, as it provides parties with a legal right to request information not only 
from the state, but also from private parties.150 While the Constitution does not 
give rise to a right to public participation, it does require participatory democracy. 
Public participation and access to information are complimentary rights: for 
citizens to participate in the affairs of the state, they must be properly informed.151 
Together, public participation and access to information promote participatory 
democracy, by involving the community in decision-making and ultimately, the 
governance of the country.152 
In addition to the right of access to information, the Constitution provides for the 
right of access to justice and establishes a list of persons or entities that may 
approach the appropriate competent court when any right contained in the 
Constitution is breached.153 This is not only limited to directly affected persons, 
but also persons or associations acting in the public interest or the interests of their 
                                                                                                                                                 
146 Act 2 of 2000. 
147 M Kidd (note 8 above) 27. 
148 I Currie and J de Waal (note 22 above) 692.  
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members.154 The right to just administrative action and its associated legislation, 
the Promotion of Administration of Justice Act 3 of 2000 (the ‘PAJA’),155 is also 
an important constitutional right in terms of the enforcement of the environmental 
rights.156 The relationship between trusteeship and administrative law is discussed 
in Chapter 7 below. 
The right of access to the courts is also essential for the functioning of a 
democratic society, as it affords the public a right to approach an independent and 
impartial forum, tribunal or court, where a justiciable dispute arises.157 However, 
it is not necessarily the case that where a right is limited, there has been a 
constitutional infringement. The Constitution provides in section 36 that there 
may be legitimate circumstances for the limitation of any of the rights contained 
in the Bill of Rights. It must be shown that any limitation is justifiable by 
evaluating such limitation against the test contained in the limitations clause in 
section 36.158 
In broader terms, the Constitution requires that the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Bill of Rights should be promoted by every court, tribunal or forum, in the 
context not only of the Constitution, but also legislation and the common law.159 
This provision is also important when one considers the objectives of modern 
environmental jurisprudence, as it allows the court to pronounce on the 
environmental compliance of any legislation or common law.160  
A remedy based on a constitutional infringement should only be sought where the 
common law and legislation cannot assist. This is consistent with the principle of 
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avoidance: this requires that the common law and legislation should be 
interpreted, applied and developed consistently with the Bill of Rights, prior to 
any action being brought which relies solely on a constitutional provision.161 
Similarly, the principle of subsidiarity requires that ‘norms of greater specificity 
should be applied to the resolution of disputes before resorting to norms of greater 
abstraction’.162 In this context, litigants should, for example, first rely on the 
Water Act or the Services Act to show that a cause of action lies, before 
attempting to show the breach of any other legislation or constitutional right.163 
The principle of subsidiarity has another application in the context of the 
decentralisation of power, whereby power should be devolved to the lowest 
appropriate level.164  
If any of the rights above are violated and a direct remedy is not available, a 
remedy can be sought from the Constitutional Court, which has the power to 
declare any law or conduct invalid in terms of the Constitution, or alternatively, 
order a declaration of rights.165 The court also has the power to award interdictory 
relief, in the form of an interim, final or structural interdict.166 Finally, the court 
can award damages if it finds that the damage has been caused by a violation of 
rights.167 
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3. Legal Mechanisms for Water Management: The 
Legislative Imperative 
In amplification of the constitutional mandate embodied by section 24 and 27, the 
Water Act and the Services Act serve to give effect to these rights.168 These Acts 
are meant to function holistically in order to ensure that sufficient, clean water is 
provided for both consumptive and sanitation purposes, and that water resources 
are conserved and protected in accordance with the constitutional mandate.169 
Whilst trusteeship has constitutional authority by virtue of section 24 of the 
Constitution,170 it is also expressly statutorily required.171 In this regard, the two 
Acts afford the state (particularly the Minister) as trustee, broad discretion to 
satisfy the goals of water management.172 The Department of Water Affairs 
announced on 30 August 2013, through the publication of the National Water 
Policy Review, that it intends consolidating the National Water Act and Water 
Services Act, in order to govern the ‘entire water value chain’.173 
The National Environmental Management Act (the ‘NEMA’), which gives effect 
to section 24 of the Constitution, also provides the framework for protection of the 
environment generally.174 The NEMA requires that sustainable development is 
implemented, and further that the interests and needs of society are placed and 
prioritised in the context of environmental management.175 However, it is 
uncertain to what extent the NEMA will find application in the context of water 
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law, particularly where there is an overlap between the legislation.176 The National 
Water Act and the Water Services Act should be looked to first when dealing with 
water issues in terms of the principle of subsidiarity.177 The focus of this thesis is 
to discuss trusteeship in the context of the Water Act and the Water Act. 
Consequently, any secondary legislation will only be discussed where relevant to 
furthering the understanding of trusteeship.178 
3.1. The National Water Act 
The National Water Act (the “Water Act”) was introduced after much public 
participation and debate, and is distinguishable from previous water management 
models in that it has implemented an integrated approach to water management.179 
The introduction of the Water Act heralded a new era in terms of water law, 
shifting the focus not only towards ensuring equitable access to water, but also the 
protection of this resource. The salient features of the goals of water management, 
as established by the National Water Resource Strategy published in accordance 
with the Water Act, are equity, sustainability and efficiency.180 The values that 
underlie water management, as envisaged by this legal system, will be discussed 
in Chapter 5.  
The discussion of the Water Act that follows aims to establish the structure of 
water management, including the powers and agencies involved, as well as the 
systems that must be implemented pursuant to the legislative requirements. To do 
so, the role of the state, as well as the different parties involved in the process of 
water management, is discussed. Secondly, the decentralisation of power from the 
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state to the various agencies that are established in terms of the Act are set out. 
The ownership of water, the nature of the rights to water and the system of 
entitlements to use water are discussed. In addition, the system of the 
establishment of the Reserve and the classification of water sources are 
considered. 
3.1.1. The State’s Role in the Governance of Water 
To achieve the constitutional mandate pertaining to water,181 the Water Act has 
introduced the statutory concept of trusteeship.182 This places the duty to manage 
water on the National Government.183 Section 3 of the National Water Act states 
as follows: 
(1) As the public trustee of the nation's water resources the National Government, acting 
through the Minister, must ensure that water is protected, used, developed, conserved, 
managed and controlled in a sustainable and equitable manner, for the benefit of 
all persons and in accordance with its constitutional mandate. 
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), the Minister is ultimately responsible to ensure that 
water is allocated equitably and used beneficially in the public interest, while promoting 
environmental values. 
(3) The National Government, acting through the Minister, has the power to regulate the 
use, flow and control of all water in the Republic. 
The Minister, therefore, is tasked with the role of representing the state as the 
trustee of water in the country, and hence is responsible for the management of 
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water as a resource.184 This provision is administrative in nature, as it establishes 
the powers and responsibilities of the state in relation to the management of water 
resources. The Act defines the general duties that the state must fulfill, namely 
that trusteeship consists of the protection, use, development, conservation, 
management and control of water.185 In the following discussion of water 
management more generally, it relies on the Act’s categorisation of the duties of 
trusteeship, namely, the protection, use, development, conservation, management 
and control of water. 
The Act establishes standards against which these duties are to be measured. In 
the first place, water management and its incumbent duties must be performed 
sustainably. Secondly, equity must be ensured. In addition, because all persons are 
the beneficiaries of this trusteeship relationship, the state must act in the beneficial 
interests of all persons. Finally, to satisfy the duties of trusteeship, the state must 
act consistently with its constitutional mandate. There are thus four requirements 
of trusteeship, namely, sustainability, equity, the beneficial interest of the public, 
and constitutionality. 
Section 3(2) of the Act prescribes that, in the context of the allocation of water 
rights, a balance must be struck between the equitable and beneficial use of water 
in the public interest, and the promotion of environment values. Section 3(3) 
provides that the use, flow and control of water is to be regulated by the state. 
Section 3 of the Act therefore establishes that at the very least trusteeship requires 
the protection, use, development, conservation, management and control of water 
(or more generally, the duties of water management) as measured against the 
requirements of sustainability (incorporating the recognition of environmental 
values), equity, in the beneficial interest of all persons, and finally, 
constitutionality. These aspects are more fully discussed in Chapter 5. 
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National Government has the exclusive competency in relation to the management 
of water.186 While the role of trustee is held by the Minister on behalf of the state, 
the governmental department responsible for the implementation of the Act, and 
the implementation of the duties of trusteeship, is the Department of Water 
Affairs (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Department’).187 Although one department 
is solely responsible for water management, the new scheme requires cooperative 
governance between all of the relevant departments, both on a vertical and a 
horizontal level.188 Vertically, this requires cooperation between national, 
provincial and local government, consistent with the constitutional requirement of 
cooperative governance.189 Horizontally, this requires cooperation within and 
between governmental departments: for example, the Department of Water 
Affairs and the Department of Environmental Affairs are required to work 
together to ensure that the goals of water management are achieved.190 
To effect a decentralisation of power as envisaged by the Act (and consistent with 
the principle of subsidiarity),191 the delegation and assignment of powers by the 
Minister to the lowest appropriate level is necessary.192 Subject to certain 
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exceptions,193 the Act expressly allows the Minister to delegate the power vested 
in her to a named official or a particular office within the Department, a water 
management institution,194 an advisory committee or a water board.195 The 
Director-General is also authorised to delegate powers to an official of a 
Department (by name), the holder of an office in a Department or a water 
management institution.196 Similarly, catchment management agencies can 
delegate their powers and duties to members of their governing bodies, an 
employee (in name) or holder of an office in a water management institution, or to 
a committee established by the agency.197 This is consistent with the constitutional 
entitlement afforded to an organ of state, which allows delegation, to the extent 
that it complies with the requirements of the legislation.198 
However, the nature of the duties capable of delegation and assignment is unclear. 
Pejan and Cogger argue that the lack of clarity in the Act as to the exact nature of 
the duties that are either assigned or delegated is hampering the efficient 
establishment of catchment management agencies.199 The Water Act does not 
clearly distinguish between delegation and assignment, and also fails adequately 
to define the nature and extent of the powers that are to be afforded to a catchment 
management agency.200 As will be discussed below, while the intention of the 
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legislation is to further the goals of decentralised government by establishing 
authorised, functioning catchment management agencies, the state has to a large 
extent failed to set up these institutions.201 
Delegation of powers entails that the ultimate control and responsibility remains 
with the party who is delegating the powers to another, and there is thus never a 
full severing of the powers and responsibilities from the primary source of 
authority.202 The Act specifically states that where delegation takes place, the 
powers being exercised ‘must be regarded as having been exercised or performed 
by the person making the delegation’.203 The ability to delegate a power includes a 
delegation of the responsibilities that are imposed on the Minister, which includes 
the duties of trusteeship.204 As a result, any action that amounts to the utilisation 
of the Minister’s power in accordance with the Act will attract the duties of 
trusteeship and the Minister will still be ultimately liable for the decision. 
Assignment, on the other hand, requires the final, irrevocable transfer of all 
powers to another person.205 Pejan and Cogger argue that in order for a true 
decentralisation of power to take place, as is envisioned by the Act, the Minister 
must assign rather than delegate his or her powers to a catchment management 
agency. The fact that the Act makes this entire process discretionary means that 
the Minister can retain too much power, thereby thwarting the purposes of 
decentralisation.206 However, given the nature of assignment, the question that 
arises is whether the duties of trusteeship, as vested in the Minister, are then 
conveyed to parties with assigned duties. 
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Due to the fact that the Act specifically vests the duties of trusteeship in the 
Minister, who is authorised to act on behalf of the state, when it comes to the 
assignment of duties, it is arguable that this severs the tie of responsibility of 
water management back to the Minister. As a result, while the party with the 
assigned powers will still need to act in accordance with the purposes of the Act, 
as established in section 2, they cannot be considered to be a trustee of water. It is 
also uncertain whether the Minister can still be held liable as trustee for these 
duties once they have been assigned. All water management is intended to be 
under the control of the various Catchment Management Agencies, with the state 
providing a supporting, regulatory role.207 Consequently, while the Minister will 
be required to facilitate the duties of trusteeship, the agencies who have been 
assigned powers may not be required to do the same. This surely could not have 
been the intention of the legislature. 
While Catchment Management Agencies with assigned powers and duties may 
not necessarily fall within the scope of section 3 of the Act, they will still be 
bound by section 2 thereof.208  
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In terms of the substantive guiding principles of trusteeship, the Constitution and 
the Water Act require that the duties of trusteeship must be satisfied in a manner 
that is sustainable, equitable, constitutional and beneficially furthers the public 
interest. The Purpose clause of the National Water Act does not specify that the 
management of water (that is, the protection, use, development, conservation, 
management and control of water) is limited only to National Government as 
trustee. Further, it requires that the management of water must take into account 
the factors of sustainability, equity, and the beneficial use of water in the public 
interest. While the Purpose clause does not expressly require that the 
considerations that must be taken into account should further the constitutional 
mandate of the state, any institution exercising these functions will necessarily be 
bound by any and all constitutional mandates, given the supremacy of the 
Constitution.209 Consequently, where the duties of trusteeship are assigned to a 
Catchment Management Agency, the agency will still be required to perform its 
duties in terms of the Purpose clause, which requires no less than that which is 
required in the Trusteeship clause in the Act.210 
3.1.2. The Ownership and Use of Water 
This section deals with the duties of trusteeship pertinent to the use and control of 
water resources. Water can no longer be owned211 and the riparian system has 
been abolished, thereby doing away with the distinction between public and 
private water.212 Instead, all water is classified as public in an effort to realise the 
right of access to water for drinking and sanitation for all - a classification which 
is more appropriate to the modern appreciation of the value and importance of 
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water to society.213 The decision to abolish the distinction between public and 
private water is particularly important in light of South Africa’s history, where 
access and use of water were necessitated by land ownership.214 Consequently, the 
link between access to water and poverty has been exacerbated by previous 
regimes that facilitated ownership of water.215  
Furthermore, all persons are the designated beneficiaries of the trusteeship 
provision.216 It is argued that the interpretation of this provision will follow that of 
the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of section 24: the right is not limited to 
citizens of South Africa, and consequently, anyone within the borders of South 
Africa is considered a beneficiary of the water management regime.217 
The fact that water use is now regulated and rights are awarded by the state results 
in a ‘state-user’ relationship. This is different from the riparian regime which was 
in place previously, in terms of which different water users were required to 
regulate themselves in terms of reasonableness, resulting in a ‘user-user’ 
relationship.218 Research shows that this shift has, in some circumstances, had the 
unintended consequence of increasing the quantity of water stolen.219 Where 
reasonableness of water use guided water users before, any additional water taken 
from a source effectively amounted to theft from a neighbour’s water supply. 
However, the alleged rationale behind the state-user system and the supposed 
thinking of water users in terms of this system is that all water is in a common 
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pool, and taking more water than is allowed is theft from the state rather than theft 
from a neighbour – the former being less of a moral ‘sin’ than the latter.220 
There are three instances in which a license is not required for use of water in 
terms of the Act.221 The first instance includes de minimus uses, that is, any use of 
water that would have little to no effect on the water source, as per the definition 
in Schedule 1 of the Act.222 These include reasonable domestic use, recreational 
use and release of water or waste to an authorised person or body, subject to their 
permission (for example, run-off water into storm water drains).223 The second 
instance pertains to the continuation of a pre-existing lawful use, provided that 
this lawful use existed two years prior to the Act coming into effect.224 This use 
will continue to be lawful until such time that the Act requires permission to be 
sought.225 The final exemption is when the relevant authority issues a general 
authorisation for a water source or geographical area.226 In all other instances of 
water use, a license is required, which must be issued by the relevant authority.227 
In the event that an activity falls outside the abovementioned permissible uses, an 
application for a water use license must be made to the Department.228 The 
Department has the authority to allocate water use licences in specified 
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circumstances, and water must be allocated in accordance with the principles of 
equity, efficiency and sustainability.229 The list of water uses that require 
authorisation has increased dramatically from what was initially defined as 
‘abstraction of water for offstream purposes’ at the introduction of the National 
Water Act, to eleven categories of water use under section 21 the Act.230 
This authorisation can either take the form of a licence or a general 
authorisation.231 However, substantive considerations must be evaluated before 
they are awarded.232 For example, prior to the award of a license or general 
authorisation for water use, the responsible authority must take into account the 
relevant catchment Strategy.233 The Strategy also requires that the conditions for 
the award of water authorisations should be informed and guided by the goals of 
water protection.234 More particularly, applicants must show how they intend to 
satisfy the goals of water conservation and water protection.235 To further these 
goals the Strategy aims to create a system of compulsory licensing in the context 
of stressed catchment areas.236 The Court has confirmed that section 24 of the 
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Constitution requires the state to consider environmental, social, cultural and 
economic factors when awarding licences.237 
The award of a license may not be for a period of more than forty years, and the 
license itself must be reviewed by the competent authority every five years.238 In 
addition to the responsible authority being capable of restricting, suspending and 
terminating a license, it can also extend the license period upon consideration of 
the relevant factors.239 The responsible authority is also entitled to make the 
license conditional, and can include restrictions pertaining to, inter alia, the 
protection of water, the return flow, discharge and disposal of water, and the way 
in which a controlled activity should be managed.240 The license can also 
prescribe the quantity of water permitted to be used, and when and how it can be 
abstracted and stored, and further, to what extent the water must be treated or 
rehabilitated prior to its return to the water cycle.241 
The provision of a license in this instance results in a personal right, rather than a 
real right, vesting in the applicant. Where the applicant is a land owner,242 the 
licence is awarded to a specific applicant and is not necessarily transferable to 
successors in title.243 The Act does make provision for the transfer of rights in 
certain circumstances, but this is still subject to approval by the relevant 
authority.244 The National Water Policy Review aims to introduce a ‘use-it or 
lose-it’ scheme, whereby persons who do not make use of an existing lawful use 
of water will lose their entitlement.245 Their rights will fall into the ‘public trust’ 
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and the Minister may then reallocate this water in accordance with the principles 
of social and economic equity.246 This approach may, however, amount to the 
expropriation of water rights and the state will have to show that the ‘use-it-or-
lose-it’ scheme does not violate section 25 of the Constitution.247 
Once a responsible authority has made a determination as to whether a license for 
water use should be awarded or not, it must notify the party (as well as any party 
that objected to the request), and provide written reasons where requested.248 This 
is a mandatory obligation, rather than a discretionary one.249 
While the award of a license does confer on the holder thereof certain rights, it by 
no means creates a right to expect a certain quality or quantity of water. The 
Minister may determine the quantity of water available for the purposes of water 
allocation generally (in respect of general authorisations and licences).250 The 
responsible authority in each management area is bound to comply with this 
determination.251 However, the Act expressly states that the award of a license to 
a party does not ensure that the quality and quantity of the water is guaranteed.252 
While the state cannot be compelled to provide a certain quantity and quality of 
water to holders of licences, the state can compel these holders to ensure that they 
meet the conditions of their water use. The Minister may appoint persons to 
perform routine inspections in respect of water use authorisations.253 An 
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appointed person may, in terms of the Act, enter any property to perform such an 
inspection, without prior notice.254 
One of the most important ways in which the state has control over the licensing 
system, and water resources in general, is that the state continues to have the 
discretion to amend, suspend and revoke licences, even after they have been 
awarded.255 A responsible authority may amend the conditions of a licence, 
although this may only be done during the time period stipulated by the licence.256 
To amend a licence, the responsible authority must undertake a general review 
process and may only amend the conditions of a licence for the following reasons: 
if it is deemed necessary in the context of the available water quantity; if it is 
necessary to prevent initial or further deterioration of the water quality; or if any 
other change in the socioeconomic conditions necessitates the amendment and it 
would be in the public interest to do so.257 Any amendments must be effected 
equitably and all other licences for the same water use must also be amended.258 
This flexibility in the decision-making process is both desirable and necessary for 
the purposes of effective management of water as a resource. This is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 6 below. 
One of the administrative controls available to the state to hold persons liable is in 
the form of a directive. Where a person contravenes the Act, a directive of the 
responsible authority or a condition of a licence, the responsible authority may 
issue a directive ordering the party to remedy the contravention.259 Failure to 
remedy any contravention within the stipulated time period entitles the 
responsible authority to take any action it deems necessary itself, recover its 
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reasonable costs, and apply to a competent court for relief.260 Directives are a 
useful tool to ensure compliance with the legal framework, whilst being cheaper 
and less severe than prosecution.261 Winstanley argues that, though the Act is 
silent on the procedural requirements for the issuing of a directive, the ordinary 
PAJA requirements will be applicable as well as the requirements of cooperative 
governance.262 
In addition to the powers to take active steps to remedy any contravention, the 
responsible authority may also suspend or withdraw a licence.263 This power 
extends to instances where parties have failed to pay any charge in terms of the 
Act.264 Suspension or withdrawal of a licence is only permissible after the party in 
question has been issued with a directive by the responsible authority, and has 
failed satisfactorily to take the necessary steps within the stipulated time period.265 
3.1.3. Delineation of Power to Catchment Management 
Agencies 
The previous section set out the nature of the rights and relationship between the 
state and water users. In addition, it set out how the control and use of water was 
to be administered in terms of the licensing process. The authority to award 
licences to use water is derived from the Act and is accordingly one of the duties 
of the state as trustee. While the process of administering rights to water is 
performed through a licensing system, the National Water Act creates different 
institutions to administer the task of allocating water use rights, as well as 
performing the other duties of trusteeship. The purpose of this section is to discuss 
the various institutions that aim to promote a decentralised government, by 
delineating power to the lowest, appropriate level. This is in accordance with the 
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Act and the Strategy’s goals to implement Integrated Water Resource 
Management.266 
The management of water according to administrative and political boundaries, 
particularly those established under Apartheid, has been reformed.267 Water is 
instead managed according to the boundaries of jurisdiction of the Water 
Management Agencies, which have been demarcated more naturally and 
according to the hydrological cycle.268 Catchment Management Agencies (or 
‘agencies’) are created as independent legal bodies to manage these areas and are 
run by a representative governing body.269 
The Strategy highlights the importance of understanding the ecological 
mechanisms in these catchment management areas for the purposes of protecting 
water resources.270 Water management can only be dealt with as a national issue 
as the provincial and local legislatures do not have the competencies to deal with 
it in terms of Schedule 4 and 5 of the Constitution.271 There is thus no need for 
water areas to be demarcated according to provincial boundaries, which in turn 
allows water to be managed more synergistically with natural boundaries.  
A catchment area is defined in the Act as ‘the area from which any rainfall will 
drain into the watercourse, watercourses or part of a watercourse, through surface 
flow to a common point or common points’.272 This catchment area consists of the 
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‘land, water, vegetation, structural habitats, biota, and the many physical, 
chemical, and biological processes that link these together’.273 The Act requires 
that the National Water Resource Strategy establish the boundaries of the 
management area, taking into account the watercourse catchment boundaries, the 
social and economic development patterns, communal interests in the area, as well 
as efficiency considerations.274 
The purpose of these agencies is to delineate some of the powers and 
responsibilities to water users.275 The end goal of the new water management 
structure is to implement a decentralised model with a focus on public 
participation and cooperative governance. The agencies are ultimately intended to 
have most of the decision-making responsibilities, with the Department serving as 
a technical support body.276 The approach of the state has been to establish the 
catchment management areas slowly, so that each new agency can learn from the 
mistakes of the previous pilot projects.277 However, this slow approach has been 
criticised.278 As at 2011, only three agencies were established, and none of them 
were fully able to authorise water uses on their own.279 In 2013, when the Strategy 
was published, only two agencies were operational, namely the Inkomati and 
Breede-Overberg agencies in Mmpumalanga and the Western Cape 
respectively.280 The decentralisation of power by providing authority to these 
agencies has not been facilitated by the Department, and instead, a ‘top-down, 
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cumbersome and resource-intensive system’ is in place, with the National 
Department at the helm.281 
Initially, nineteen water management areas were demarcated, and the relevant 
agencies were to be established with the goal of delineating management powers 
to facilitate a more participatory approach to water management.282 To remedy the 
fact that these agencies are taking too long to be developed, it was announced in 
2012 that only nine such agencies would be established.283 These areas still aim to 
give effect to the natural hydrological features rather than political boundaries. 
The natural boundaries of these areas and the location of aquifers were amongst 
the considerations for this demarcation. Other considerations include financial 
considerations, the interests of stakeholders, and concerns of equity. The benefits 
of consolidating these regions is, according to the Strategy, to strengthen the 
institutional and financial resources in the areas, to speed up the establishment of 
catchment management agencies, and to promote cooperative governance.284 The 
Strategy also aims to ensure that these agencies are created quickly and are given 
the necessary powers to function.285 
The first figure below sets out the nineteen areas that were initially established in 
1999.286 The second figure shows the latest demarcation of South Africa’s water 
sources into nine management areas.287 The third figure shows the overlap of the 
old and the new system. It is apparent from these images that the water 
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management areas do not follow the local and provincial boundaries. The Strategy 
has set the Department of Water Affairs a goal of completing the process of 
establishing the nine agencies by 2016. 
 
 Figure 1: Nineteen initial catchment management areas288  
  
 
Figure 2: Revised catchment management areas289 
                                                     
288 Image sourced from the Department of Water Affairs database. Available at 
http://www.dwa.gov.za/iwqs/wms/data/WMS_WMA_map.asp.  








Figure 3: Overlap of old and new water management areas290 
Some of the intended responsibilities of these agencies include the powers to 
authorise water uses as well as the monitoring and enforcement of water use.291 
The conservation and protection of water as well as the management of demand 
and water quality are also intended to be responsibility of agencies.292 The 
planning of water management, the establishment of water user associations and 
the collection and management of information will also be delegated to agencies 
in due course.293 The confusion created by the Act in terms of the delegation and 
assignment of powers may give rise to difficulties in this context.294  
Where an agency has not yet been established, is not functional, or has not yet 
been assigned the powers and duties in question, these powers and duties vest in 
the Minister.295 The Minister must assign the powers and duties to an agency after 
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considering a number of factors, including the capacity of the agency to exercise 
the power or duty.296 The purpose of the assignment and delegation of powers is 
to promote the management of this area in accordance with the purposes of the 
Act. However, the agency remains at all times under the control of the Minister, 
and, in this respect, the Minister may issue a directive to the agency, with which it 
must comply.297 
The Act provides for the Minister to intervene in the operations of an agency298 if, 
inter alia, the agency is being mismanaged or has failed to comply with the duties 
of the Act or a directive from the Minister.299 The Minister may issue a directive 
to the agency and withhold any financial assistance until the directive is 
followed.300 Failure to comply with a directive will result in the Minister 
assuming the powers and duties of the agency, but only after it has been given the 
opportunity to make submissions.301 This power extends to assigned powers and 
duties, as the Act provides that the ‘Minister may do anything which the 
catchment management agency might otherwise be empowered or required to do 
by or under this Act, to the exclusion of the catchment management agency’.302 
An agency can be disestablished where defunct or if it is no longer needed.303 It is 
also permissible for the purposes of reorganising the water management 
institutions in the area, provided it will serve the interests of effective water 
resource management.304 
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The Minister may direct a water management institution or agency to recover 
charges for water use from water users in the area.305 In terms of the Act, 
however, the agency is, together with the water users, jointly and severally liable 
for these charges, subject to the entitlement to recover them from the water 
users.306 This may be useful at a national level to compel an agency to comply 
with their financial responsibilities. 
There are two additional types of organisations that the Minister is empowered to 
create. The Act makes provision for the creation of localised water-user 
associations (‘WUA’), although these do not fulfill any management functions 
unless the requisite powers and duties are delegated to them.307 These associations 
are body corporates consisting of water users who undertake similar water-related 
activities for their mutual benefit.308 The rules regarding the disestablishment 
relating to catchment manage agencies, are equally applicable in the context of 
water user associations.309 
Water user associations took over the role of irrigation boards under the old water 
management regime.310 The transformation of the existing WUAs and 
establishment of new ones for the purposes of creating better gender and racial 
representation has been slow.311 The Strategy has consequently highlighted this as 
a problem area that requires strategic intervention in order to promote the goals of 
transformation.312 It is at this level that the Department aims to provide support 
and address inequitable access to water services for rural farmers.313 Many of the 
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existing lawful uses are held by commercial white farmers as a historical 
consequence of Apartheid, which further exacerbates the inequality of access to 
water in the context of agriculture.314 
The Minister can, in addition to the creation of water user associations, establish 
advisory bodies,315 as well as bodies for the purpose of implementing international 
agreements in the context of water.316 Advisory committees will typically not 
have any powers, although the Minister may delegate powers to them.317 The 
Minister is not obliged to create advisory committees, in all but one situation: an 
advisory committee must be established when the governing body of a Catchment 
Management Agency is being created.318 One of the types of advisory committees 
that may be created is called a Catchment Management Forum (‘CMF’). A CMF 
is intended to support a catchment management agency in the capacity of a 
representative forum to further public participation and as such, it is not 
envisioned that CMFs will be provided with any delegated authority.319 
3.1.4. Classification of Water Sources 
Thus far, the nature of the institutions that manage water resources, as well as the 
mechanisms used to award water rights have been discussed. This part of the 
chapter will discuss the novel measures implemented by the National Water Act 
to measure the quality and quantity of water resources, and to facilitate proper 
decision-making processes and further the protection of water resources. 
Renewable resources must be used in such a manner that their ‘integrity is not 
jeopardised’.320 This necessarily requires an ongoing assessment of the status of 
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the resource. In this respect, the South African Water Quality Guidelines establish 
the parameters for water quality depending on the context of its use.321 In 
addition, the approach to water management as required by the Act may assist in 
this process. This is discussed at Chapter 6. The Act introduces a number of 
mechanisms aimed at the protection of water resources, including the 
establishment of a classification system and the Reserve.322 As per the Strategy, 
the different water sources are required to be classified and gazetted over the next 
five years to properly protect these sources.323 The classification system is 
prescribed by the Minister, as well as the definition of the class and resource 
quality objectives of every significant water resource in the country.324 There are 
three possible water classes, depending on how much water is used and to what 
extent the ecological state of the water is changed from its original condition.325 
This process, therefore, allows for a differentiation between water sources (which 
can be a watercourse, surface water, estuary or aquifer),326 where some may be 
classified as requiring a higher degree of protection. Where a certain water class 
requires more protection, the available water for use (that is, the Reserve) will be 
affected accordingly.327 
The quantity and quality of water found in a water resource is termed the 
‘Reserve’ as per the Act. The Reserve must be determined once water resources 
have been classified, as discussed above. The Reserve consists of an ecological 
component, aimed at ensuring sufficient water remains in an environment to 
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preserve a water source.328 This commitment of water to being preserved for 
ecological purposes evidences an understanding of the integral relationship that 
exists between humans and the environment, and the necessity to preserve the 
latter for the well-being of the former.329 The second component is dedicated to 
ensuring that the basic needs of human requirements are satisfied.330 At present, 
this has been established as 25 litres per person per day.331 
The Strategy must set out the principles for establishing the Reserve.332 The 
Strategy is, in terms of the requirements laid down by the Act, also required to 
state the quantity of water available in each management area, as well as the 
surpluses and deficits in each.333 The Strategy should also provide for the transfer 
of water between areas with surpluses to those areas experiencing deficits.334 In 
respect of the quality of water, the Strategy must set out the objectives in relation 
thereto, and not the actual quality of the water as is required in terms of 
quantity.335 
Once the Reserve has been established, the Minister, Director-General, organ of 
state or other water management institution is bound by this determination, and 
must give effect thereto in the exercise of its powers and duties.336 Similarly, the 
Reserve must be factored into the decision-making process upon issuing an 
authorisation or license for water use.337 In addition, the class and resource quality 
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objectives must be taken into account by the relevant authority prior to the award 
of an authorisation or license for water use.338 The Minister has the discretion to 
determine the content of the resource quality objectives, and can include factors 
such as the water level, the status of the ecosystem and the regulation of any 
activity that may affect the quantity or quality of the resource.339 The importance 
of the classification process has been reiterated by defining it as a key principle in 
water protection.340 
3.2. The Water Services Act 
The Water Services Act (the ‘Services Act’) provides that the National 
Government is the custodian of water resources.341 It is argued that even though 
the terminology used is different, trusteeship and custodianship require the same 
obligations to be satisfied by the state – that is, to act at all times in the public 
interest, in accordance with the established constitutional mandate. Both 
trusteeship and custodianship pertain to the duties of the state in relation to the 
same resource, that is, water. While the Services Act requires custodianship, it 
does not stipulate what this entails. However, given that water is to be treated as 
part of a unitary system, it is argued that custodianship and trusteeship of water 
entail the same thing, and therefore require the same duties. Moreover, the 
constitutional right of access to water must be read together with the constitutional 
right to an environment that is not harmful to health or well-being as set out in 
section 24. 
The objectives of the Services Act are consistent with the purposes of the National 
Water Act as well as section 27 of the Constitution.342 The Services Act confirms 
the right of access to a basic water supply and sanitation.343 While the National 
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Water Act is concerned with the management of water, the Services Act has a 
different focus – namely the provision of a safe and reliable water supply and 
sanitation. The Services Act requires, inter alia, standards and norms for the 
provision of water services.344 It also requires that information be collected in a 
national database as well as distributed accordingly.345 The Services Act provides 
for water service providers to be held accountable and the promotion of effective 
management and conservation strategies.346 
The Services Act requires the establishment of conditions of use to be created by 
water service providers, relating to the structuring and payment of tariffs, as well 
the circumstances under which the discontinuation of water services is permitted, 
and the manner in which this is to be effected.347 These conditions must also 
promote conservation and demand management by implementing the appropriate 
measures.348 The Minister may implement prescribed national standards to 
regulate, inter alia, the quality of water as well as the sustainable and efficient use 
of water.349 In particular, the Minister must consider the impact of water services 
on the environment, the goals of equitable access to water, and the duties of the 
National Government as custodian.350 It is permissible for the Minister to 
differentiate between types of users on the basis of socio-economic factors and the 
physical and geographical attributes of an area.351 
A number of institutions are created by the Services Act to ensure the proper 
implementation of the Act352 and compliance with the constitutional duties of 
providing access to water. For example, the Act allows for the establishment of 
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water boards which are responsible for the delivery of water services.353 However, 
there are institutional difficulties with these water boards, and the Strategy has 
suggested the creation of Regional Water Utilities to manage water services at a 
regional level. The intention of this is to consolidate power into a simplified and 
clearer system, and to strengthen the functioning of service delivery at a 
municipal level to remedy weak performance in this respect.354 The Strategy has 
set a goal for the establishment of nine such institutions by 2015.355 
The Services Act also creates water services authorities at a municipal level for 
the provision of water supply and sanitation.356 Water service authorities are 
required to apply for a water use license from either the Department of Water 
Affairs or a catchment management agency where appropriate for the abstraction 
and discharge of water. These water services authorities are in this respect treated 
as an ordinary water user and must comply with the same requirements, including 
the use of water, subject to any restrictions contained in the license.357 
Furthermore, a wastewater treatment work will fall within the ambit of the 
‘owner, controller or occupier of land’ for purposes of the National Water Act, 
and therefore has a duty to mitigate and prevent pollution in terms of section 
19.358 Water service providers are parties that enter into a contract with a water 
services authority to render the service of supplying water services.359 Similarly, 
these bodies fall within the purview of the National Water Act and are subject to 
the same restrictions as users of water.360 
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Both water service authorities and water service providers are required to ensure 
that the functioning of their institutions is consistent with the national goals of 
water management.361 They are required to engage with catchment management 
strategies pertinent to their jurisdiction.362 Water conservation and water demand 
management must be central to the planning process to ensure that conservation 
and demand management is achieved.363 Finally, the Strategy requires these 
institutions to implement Integrated Water Resource Management to ensure that 
plans are coordinated and aligned between the various levels of government.364 
Integrated Water Resource Management is more comprehensively discussed in 
Chapter 6.365 
Water service authorities are required to update their development plans in terms 
of the requirements and intervals prescribed by the Minister.366 This development 
plan must include details of water users and usage in the area and indicate the 
time frame for the implementation thereof.367 The plan is also required to set out 
the number of persons who do not have a basic water and sanitation supply, and 
where it is not possible to provide the aforementioned persons with the necessary 
services within the next 5 years, the reasons therefore must be stated, as well as a 
reasonable time frame for implementing such services.368 With respect to 
environmental concerns, the measures aimed at the protection and conservation of 
the environment must be set out by the developmental plan.369 
The Water Services Act provides a list of offences for which contravention can 
result in imprisonment and/or a fine.370 In addition, the offence is extended to an 
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employer both where express or implied consent was provided, or if the employer 
is vicariously liable.371 The types of offences include failure to stop wasting water 
after notice from the relevant authority, failing to provide the relevant information 
when lawfully instructed to do so, and any other use of water or disposal of 
effluent in contravention of the Act.372 
4. Legal Mechanisms for Water Management: Water 
Regulations 
In the context of the National Water Act, any reference to ‘the Act’ specifically 
includes any regulations made in accordance therewith.373 Contravention of these 
regulations could result in a fine or imprisonment for a period of up to 5 years.374 
The Minister has the power to make regulations for the purpose of giving effect to 
the Act,375 which must be approved by both the National Assembly and the 
National Council of Provinces.376 The Minister is similarly entitled to make 
regulations to further guide the functioning of catchment management agencies,377 
as well as regulations to guide advisory bodies.378 The Minister may also make 
regulations to guide the management, use and charges for any government 
waterworks.379 It is permissible for regulations to be made that guide the 
collection of data and monitoring of information systems.380 
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The National Water Act requires that the class of a water resource, as well as its 
quantity and quality, must be established.381 The mechanism through which this is 
done is the determination of the Reserve. Regulations provide the procedures 
required to determine a class of water, the Reserve, as well as resource quality 
objectives.382 They are to be used by decision-makers in accordance with the Act. 
Again, the Act makes it clear that the Minister must give effect to the 
determination of a water resource, the Reserve as well as the resource quality 
objectives as defined by the Act and set out by the Regulations.383 
The Water Services Act384 allows the Minister to make regulations relating to the 
policy statements, business plans, financial statements, annual reports and other 
aspects of the functioning of a water board.385 These regulations may differ 
between the water boards and there is no requirement for consistency between 
these regulations.386 The Minister is required to take into account inter alia the 
principles of accountability, transparency and good governance,387 as well as the 
purposes of the Act and the interests of consumers.388 
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5. Legal Mechanisms for Water Management: The 
National Water Resource Strategy and 
Catchment Management Strategy 
The National Water Resource Strategy (the ‘Strategy’) gives content to the day-
to-day functioning of trusteeship.389 It is established in accordance with the 
Constitution and the Water Act, but is far more detailed in respect of how it aims 
to achieve the goals that are established by both. In the context of trusteeship (that 
is, the duties of protection, use, development, conservation, management and 
control of water resources), the Strategy must set out the strategies, objectives, 
plans, guidelines and procedures of both the Minister and the institutional 
arrangements.390 In this respect, the purposes of the Water Act and the objectives 
established by the Water Services Act must be taken into account, as well as 
existing government policy.391 The Strategy must be implemented when any 
power or duty is exercised in terms of the Water Act.392 Accordingly, the 
Minister, Director-General, organ of state or other water management body must 
exercise their powers and functions in accordance with the Strategy.393 The state 
recently reiterated the importance of water to our quality of life in the latest 
National Water Resource Strategy.394 However, the current approach is flawed to 
the extent that the Strategy is not required to incorporate aspects relating to water 
services and sanitation.395 
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Section 5 of the National Water Act requires the establishment of a Strategy that 
must be reviewed at least every five years.396 The Act provides a detailed list of 
requirements for the content of the Strategy, including the establishment of the 
Reserve,397 mechanisms to promote cooperative governance398 and principles 
relating to water conservation and demand management.399 These aspects of the 
Strategy are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 below. 
The first Strategy was introduced in 2004 and was described by the Department as 
‘the “blueprint” for water resources management in the country’.400 This Strategy 
highlighted the need for equitable access to water, water conservation and demand 
management, and the development of both institutions and regulations for the 
purposes of water management.401 However, the 2013 Strategy shows that little 
progress has been made in the implementation of these goals. Consequently, the 
Strategy Implementation Plan aims to prioritise key programmes that further these 
goals.402 The vision of the latest Strategy is ‘sustainable, equitable and secure 
water for a better life and environment for all’, echoing the broad goals of the 
Act.403 
The latest Strategy was approved in July 2013,404 and it aims, amongst other 
things, to405 
facilitate the proper management of the nation’s water resources, provide a 
framework for the protection, use, development, conservation, management and 
control of water resources for the country as a whole, provide a framework within 
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which water will be managed at regional or catchment level, provide information 
about all aspects of water resource management and identify water-related 
development opportunities and constraints.  
Equitable access is again a priority, and the Strategy aims to fulfill this goal by 
better utilising the powers of licensing and water allocation.406 
The Strategy states that the three goals of water management are equity, 
sustainability and efficiency.407 In terms of the requirement of equity, the Strategy 
aims to create equity in terms of the access, use and benefits of water. This second 
requirement, namely sustainability in terms of use of water, is important in the 
context of management. It requires the sustainable use and protection of water by 
‘striking a balance between water availability and legitimate water requirements’. 
The third component requires the ‘efficient and effective water use for optimum 
social and economic benefit’.408 
The 2013 Strategy states that South Africa is not yet facing a water crisis.409 
However, it is clear that this is inevitable if a number of issues facing water 
management are not addressed. The weaknesses highlighted include water 
conservation and reform (including access), outstanding infrastructure 
maintenance and improving technical and management skills in the sector.410 In 
addition, the challenges faced include the poor governance of water resources, 
lack of access to water, loss of water due to pollution and poor infrastructure, as 
well as a skills’ deficit in the sector.411 Many of the biggest challenges facing the 
management of water require both time and intensive financial investment to 
remedy.  
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Individual catchment management strategies412 must also be created which 
coincide with the catchment management areas.413 The catchment strategies are 
required to be consistent with the national Strategy.414 Similar to the national 
Strategy, it must set out the strategies, objectives, plans, guidelines and 
procedures for the particular agency, to facilitate the satisfaction of the 
requirements of trusteeship.415 The catchment strategies are also required to take 
into account the national and regional plans enacted in terms of other legislation, 
including the Water Services Act.416 Further, they must take into account the class 
of the water resource, the Reserve, and where appropriate, international 
obligations.417 
6. Policies in Terms of the Act 
Policies are not legally enforceable, and thus if the state is to be held accountable 
for its management of resources, this must be done on the basis of an infringement 
of the Act.418 However, as per the Grootboom case,419 one can evaluate whether 
the policies and strategies that have been implemented satisfy the required 
constitutional obligations.420 The question is then whether the policies themselves 
are reasonable, and further, whether they are being reasonably implemented.421 As 
was stated above, if it is shown that these policies do not take cognisance of the 
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most vulnerable in society, they will be found to be unreasonable.422 However, as 
the Mazibuko case423 evidences, the court will have to entertain a delicate 
balancing exercise, particularly where the managing institution can show that 
genuine attempts have been made towards addressing socio-economic issues.  
To redress the inequalities of access to water, the Water Allocation Reform 
Programme was implemented in 2001.424 This programme aims to address the 
goals of ensuring equitable access to water by promoting the needs and ensuring 
the participation of historically disadvantaged persons and the poor.425 In this 
respect, water may be specifically set aside within a catchment management area 
in order to be allocated to certain groups of persons. Alternatively, general 
authorisations may be granted for specific areas where there is a concentration of 
persons that will benefit from the allocation in terms of redressing inequality and 
poverty.426 
As stated above, the National Water Policy Review was introduced in August 
2013, with the intention of facilitating the process to introduce new legislation 
that combines the National Water Act and the Water Services Act.427 The focus of 
this consolidated approach will be on developmental water management. The 
purpose of this amendment is to promote the goals of equity, access and 
transformation, managing water in the whole water value chain rather than 
separating it into the management of the resource and the provision of water 
services, and finally, establishing a single Strategy that focuses the goals of both 
components.428 To do this, this policy aims to initiate the process for unifying the 
National Water Act and Water Services Act. This approach has been criticised as 
the failings in water management to date do not necessarily arise from difficulties 
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with the legislative framework, but rather as a consequence of poor 
implementation by the administration.429 
7. Concluding Remarks 
The purpose of this chapter has been to set out the legislative framework within 
which water management must operate. It discussed this hierarchical framework 
consisting of the Constitution, legislation and regulations, and finally the policies 
and strategies enacted in accordance therewith. 
The Constitution as the source of authority for water management was 
discussed,430 including an explanation of the rights to a healthy environment,431 as 
well as the rights of access to water.432 In this respect, the Constitutional Court has 
stated that trusteeship is a by-product of these rights as contained in the Bill of 
Rights, with the result that trusteeship should be viewed as both a constitutional 
and legislative doctrine.433 The National Water Act and the Water Services Act 
have legislatively made the state the trustee of water resources.434 
It was also established that the test against which the courts measure state action is 
to use a standard of reasonableness for the assessment of the state’s duties as 
established in the Grootboom case and confirmed in the Mazibuko case.435 Further 
rights that are connected to sections 24 and 27 are the rights to property, the right 
to dignity and equality, the right to information, the right to just administrative 
action and the right of access to courts.436 In addition, the constitutional clause 
that requires the Bill of Rights to be interpreted in a manner that promotes the 
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spirit, purport and objects thereof will also be relevant, as well as the limitations 
clause, as discussed above.437  
The National Water Act is the primary legislative vehicle for the management of 
water and it aims to promote equity, sustainability and efficiency.438 It has been 
created in accordance with the constitutional goals as set out above. The state has 
been made the trustee of the protection, use, development, conservation, 
management and control of water.439 The Act further requires that these duties of 
water management must be fulfilled in accordance with the goals of sustainability, 
equity, in the beneficial interest of all persons, and finally, constitutionally.440 In 
this respect, the Minister, as the nominated trustee, is unable to perform each and 
every aspect of water management herself and is permitted to delegate and assign 
her duties in certain circumstances.441 However, the confusion between delegation 
and assignment created by the Act may result in the duties of trusteeship being 
thwarted.442 This notwithstanding, assigned powers will still have to be exercised 
in accordance with the purposes of the Act, which more than sufficiently cover the 
requirements of trusteeship as set out in section 3.443 
In terms of the Act, water is no longer capable of private ownership and is instead 
viewed as a collective resource.444 Different permissible uses are established by 
the Act which requires licences for certain uses to be obtained from the licensing 
authority.445 While this process is intended to further the goals of equitable access, 
administrative backlogs have seen huge delays in these applications, and some 
                                                     
437 Note 159 above. 
438 Note 180 above. 
439 Note 183 above. 
440 Note 185 above. 
441 Note 192 above. 
442 Note 199 above. 
443 Note 210 above. 
444 Note 211 above. 
445 Note 228 above. 






authors point out that this system of administrative discretion is too susceptible to 
corruption and maladministration.446 
To further the goals of water management that encourages public participation, a 
number of different types of water institutions are created by the Act to ensure the 
decentralisation of power to the lowest appropriate level.447 These institutions 
include catchment management agencies, water user associations, water boards 
and water service providers.448 The various mechanisms for the classification and 
classing of water resources, as well as the establishment of the Reserve were 
introduced.449 In addition, this chapter discussed the entitlements of the Minister 
to create regulations,450 as well as the relevance of the National Water Resource 
Strategy and policies to water management.451 
While the framework within which trusteeship operates has been established, the 
guiding principles that inform trusteeship and consequently decision-makers, has 
not yet been addressed. The purpose of the following chapter is to evaluate 
whether a historical or comparative investigation can be of assistance in 
understanding the content of trusteeship. 
 
  
                                                     
446 See Ch 8 (note 101 below). 
447 Note 266 above. 
448 Note 269 ff above. 
449 Note 328 above. 
450 Note 373 above. 






Chapter Four:  
EXISTING ATTEMPTS AT 
CONCEPTUALISING THE NOTION OF 
TRUSTEESHIP IN WATER LAW 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapters set out the historical overview of water law in South Africa 
and the current legal framework implemented after the advent of the Constitution. 
These chapters have demonstrated that the core concept of trusteeship is in need 
of explanation and proper definition. The nature of the relationship between the 
state and those entitled to water rights by virtue of the legal framework is not 
clearly established. As a result, much hinges on the understanding attached to 
trusteeship. Due to the inadequate definition of trusteeship, it is unclear if the 
legal framework simply requires that the state perform its administrative 
functions, or whether trusteeship requires something more than this. It is also 
uncertain whether ownership of this resource is possible and whether it is the 
nation, as a collective entity, that owns water resources.1  
Ever since the concept of trusteeship was introduced into South African water 
law, scholars have attempted to give content to it. Some of these attempts are 
rooted in an historical analysis of the categorisation of property types to which 
water may belong. Other attempts look to comparative law to find answers. The 
purpose of this chapter is to evaluate both these sets of attempts, to determine 
whether the historical roots of South African common law can be of any further 
assistance in shedding light on the concept of trusteeship; and whether a 
comparative evaluation of foreign law can assist in an interpretation of 
trusteeship. 
                                                     
1 However, see below at note 118. 






2. Reliance on South African Legal History and 
Theory 
Whilst trusteeship has both a constitutional and statutory basis,2 it is helpful to 
evaluate whether it is also anchored in the common law. To the extent that 
trusteeship has common law roots, this may assist in providing content to the 
duties of trusteeship. The purpose of this section is to discuss the common law 
that may be of relevance to trusteeship. 
 
2.1. Water as Public Property and the Notion of Trusteeship 
in Common Law 
Already in ancient Rome, public aqueducts and the provision of water were 
important. So important, in fact, that officials – the hydrophylacas- were 
appointed as water custodians and entrusted with the management of city water.3 
Scholars have seen a reflection of the requirements of the ancient property law 
classifications of public property in the modern statutory requirements of 
trusteeship.4 The trusteeship provision in the National Water Act requires the state 
to act as trustee of water for the public benefit,5 which, as will be explained in this 
chapter, mirrors the Roman and Roman-Dutch concept of public things called res 
publicae.6 As a result, some commentators have stated that water should be 
                                                     
2 See Ch 3 (note 171 above).  
3 C. 11. 42. 10, as translated by E F Ware Roman Water Law (1905) §169. 
4 E Van der Schyff ‘Who “owns” the country’s mineral resources? The possible incorporation of 
the public trust doctrine through section 3(1) of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act 28 of 2002’ (2008) 4 TSAR 757; L V Noeth Common law perspectives on the 
concept of public trusteeship (Unpublished LLM thesis, North-West University, 2011) 5. 
5 The National Water Act in s 3 provides the following: (1) As the public trustee of the nation’s 
water resources the National Government, acting through the Minister, must ensure that water is 
protected, used, developed, conserved, managed, and controlled in a sustainable and equitable 
manner, for the benefit of all persons and in accordance with its constitutional mandate. (2) 
Without limiting subsection (1), the Minister is ultimately responsible to ensure that water is 
allocated equitably and used beneficially in the public interest, while promoting environmental 
values. (3) The National Government, acting through the Minister, has the power to regulate the 
use, flow and control of all water in the Republic. 
6 The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 introduces a similar 
legislative scheme for the management of mineral resources. By extension, therefore, it is possible 






classified as res publicae.7 On the other hand, water as a resource has been 
characterised as res omnium communes (hereinafter ‘res communes’) or common 
property, by both scholars and the Supreme Court of Appeal.8 The purpose of this 
section is to examine these propositions and the varying characteristics of each 
category. 
To understand the conflicting approaches to water as a resource today, it is useful 
to look to the origins of the classification of public and common property. The 
distinctions created by Roman and Roman-Dutch law between different categories 
of things are discussed below.9 By way of introduction, res communes were 
things, such as running water, air and the ocean that belonged to all.10 Res 
publicae were things that are deemed to be public property: they collectively 
belonged to a civil community and were intended for the use of this civil 
community.11 For example, rivers with perennial flow, public streets and squares, 
harbours and highways were classified as res publicae.12 Finally, res universitatis 
were the body of things that belonged to a corporate body, such as a city, and 
included theatres, race courses, markets, guilds and churches.13 Against this 
                                                                                                                                                 
to argue that minerals and water should be classified in the same manner and afforded the same 
protective mechanisms. 
7 See, inter alia, E van der Schyff and G Viljoen ‘Water and the public trust doctrine – a South 
African perspective’ (2008) 4 TD: The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa 
343; A Burger ‘Roman water law (part 2)’ (2007) TSAR 318. However, cf H Thompson Water 
Law: A Practical Approach to Resource Management and the Provision of Services (2006) 153. 
8 Mostert Snr and another v S [2010] 2 All SA 482 (SCA) para 22; H Thompson (note 7 above) 
152 – 155. 
9 See 124 ff below. See also J Glazewski Environmental Law in South Africa (2013) 16-9 – 16-10; 
G J Pienaar and E van der Schyff ‘The public management of water resources in South Africa’ 
(2008) Forum on Public Policy 1. 
10 Justinian The Institutes of Justinian – Book II: The Law of Property § 146; R W Lee The 
Elements of Roman Law 4ed (1956) 35, 43; R W Leage Roman Private Law Founded on the 
‘Institutes’ of Gaius and Justinian 2ed (1909) 122; E Poste Elements of Roman Law by Gaius 3ed 
(1890) 152; P J Badenhorst, J M Pienaar and H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of 
Property 5ed (2006) 33; T C Sanders The Institutes of Justinian 7ed (1934) xlviii. However, see J 
Glazewski (note 9 above) 16-10 who states that res communes omnium entailed ownership by the 
state. 
11 See note 29 below. 
12 Inst 2. 1. 2.; D 1. 8. 4. 1.; P J Badenhorst, J M Pienaar and H Mostert (note 10 above) 26; M 
Kaser Roman Private Law 4ed (1984) 101. 
13 Inst 2. 1. pr, 2. 1. 6.; D 1. 8. 6. 1.; P J Badenhorst, J M Pienaar and H Mostert (note 10 above) 
29. 






background, the positioning and development of res publicae, res communes and 
res universitatis in Roman law and Roman-Dutch law, as well as the overlap 
between the three classifications of public property will now be discussed. For the 
purposes of this thesis, the most important classifications are res communes and 
res publicae. For the sake of completeness, res universitatis is discussed to show 
how public property came to be finessed.  
2.1.1. Property Law Classifications Under Roman Law 
From the outset, all things in terms of the Roman private law of things were 
divided either into jus publicum (public law) or jus privatum (private law).14 The 
former was concerned with the constitution of the Roman State, administrative, 
criminal and procedural law as well as the jus sacrum (sacred law).15 The latter, 
that is, jus privatum, regulated legal relationships between individuals in relation 
to their rights to a thing.16 
Within the division of the private law of property, things could be appropriated 
and owned (that is, they belonged to a private person) or they were incapable of 
ownership.17 Things that were capable of being owned, or private property, were 
called either res intra commercium or res nostro patromonio (both bearing the 
same meaning) and were classified as such by the Romans if they held a monetary 
or commercial value,18 or if they had the ‘capacity to be assigned’.19  
                                                     
14 R W Lee (note 10 above) 35; R W Leage (note 10 above) 38; J Muirhead The Institutes of Gaius 
and Rules of Ulpian (1895) 77; C Salkowski (translated by E Whitfield) Institutes and History of 
Roman Private Law (1886) 333; J T Abdy and B Walker The Commentaries of Gaius and the 
Rules of Ulpian (1876) 71; E Poste (note 10 above) 147; A Borkowski and P du Plessis Textbook 
on Roman Law 3ed (2005) 154. 
15 C P Sherman Roman Law in the Modern World Vol II (1922) 15 – 16.  
16 The Institutes of Justinian Book I Title I Of Justice and Law § 54; R W Lee (note 10 above) 35, 
43; J T Abdy and Bryan Walker (note 14 above) 71. This should be compared to the African 
Customary tradition of regulating relationships – see below at Ch 7 note 2. 
17 J A C Thomas The Institutes of Justinian (1975) 65. This discussion does not include the 
categories of things termed movable and immovable, corporeal and incorporeal, as they do not fall 
within the ambit of this paper. 
18 The Institutes of Justinian Book II The Law of Property § 146; R W Lee (note 10 above) 35, 43; 
D Nasmith Outline of Roman History from Romulus to Justinian (1890) 403; E Poste (note 10 
above) 152; J A C Thomas (note 17 above) 73; R W Leage (note 10 above) 122. 






By contrast, res extra commercium and res extra nostrum patrimonium (also 
bearing the same meaning) consisted of public property incapable of ownership 
(that is, they could not be privately owned).20 Classical Roman law distinguished 
between common and public property.21 While common and public property may 
have had inherent value, their classification resulted in them having no ‘legally 
guaranteeable’ worth.22 Gaius’ list of public things incapable of ownership was 
not comprehensive,23 and the clear distinctions drawn between res communes, res 
publicae and res universitatis were not yet present.24  
Over time, the distinction between common and public property became more 
finessed, and further categories of public property came into existence.25 Justinian 
distinguished between res divini iuris, which were things concerning the gods, 
and res humani iuris,26 which consisted of res communes, res publicae and res 
universitatis.27 The listed examples provided by the sources, as well as the reasons 
for particular classifications under each of these distinctions, remain unclear.28  
                                                                                                                                                 
19 A M Prichard (ed) Leage’s Roman Private Law 3ed (1967) 154.  
20 J A C Thomas (note 17 above) 75; E Poste (note 10 above) 153; D H Van Zyl History and 
Principles of Roman Private Law (1983) 128; The Institutes of Justinian Book II The Law of 
Property § 146; R W Lee (note 10 above) 35, 43; D Tamm Roman Law and European Legal 
History (1997) 70. 
21 T Mackenzie Studies in Roman Law (1886) 151; W Buckland (revised by P Stein) A Text-Book 
of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian 3ed (1963) 182; T C Sandars The Institutes of Justinian 
(1903) . 
22 T Mackenzie (note 21 above) 151. 
23 J Crook in H Scullard (ed) Law and Life of Rome (1978) 140. See also T Mommsen, P Krueger 
and A Watson The Digest of JustinianVol IV (1985) 487. 
24 J Crook (note 23 above) 140; E Poste (note 10 above) 147; J A C Thomas (note 17 above) 75. 
25 Insti Gaius 2.1., D. i. 8. 2. (Superiore libro de jure personarum exposuimus: modo videamus de 
rebus, quævel in nostro patrimonio vel extra nostrum patrimonium habentur. Quædam enim 
naturali jure communia sunt omnium, quædum publica, quædum universitatis, quædum nullius, 
pleraque singulorum, quæ variis ex causis cuique adquiruntur, sicut ex subjectis apparebit).T C 
Sandars The Institutes of Justinian (1903) 90. A Borkowski and P du Plessis (note 14 above) 154; 
T Mackenzie (note 21 above) 152; R W Lee (note 10 above) 113-114;  
26 T Sanders The Institutes of Justinian (1962) 90; J A C Thomas (note 17 above) 75. 
27 D H Van Zyl (note 20 above) 128; A Watson The Law of Property in the Later Roman Republic 
(1968) 1; J A C Thomas (note 17 above) 75; T C Sandars The Institutes of Justinian 7ed (1903) 
xlv – xlviii; J A C Thomas Textbook of Roman Law (1976) 129. 
28 See also L V Noeth (note 4 above) 6, who discusses the uncertainties in the sources on Roman 
law classifications. 






Common property, therefore, came to be referred to as res communes.29 The 
examples given for common property were the air, the ocean and light.30 Other 
authors include flowing rainwater and the water of rivers in this definition of 
common property.31 Public property, on the other hand was separated into res 
publicae and res universitatis by Justinian.32 Property, which could be of use 
and/or belong to the people was termed res publicae.33 Whether or not this 
property entailed ownership by the state or ownership by the people is unclear.34 
Schulz states that res publicae were owned by the state, in a form of public 
ownership, ‘subject to special rules which differed greatly from those applied in 
private law’.35 Res universitatis was defined as the ‘property of public bodies 
other than the people or the State’,36 and included things owned by a smaller 
community of people, or a collective body, such as a corporation or 
municipality.37 The examples that were commonly given were theatres and race-
                                                     
29 D. i. 8. 2. 1.; D. i. 8. 4. Et quidem naturali jure communia sunt omnium hæc: aer et aqua 
profluens et mare et per hoc litora maris. Nemoigitur ad litus maris accedere prohibetur, dum 
tamen villis et monumentis et ædificiis abstineat, quia non sunt juris gentium, sicut et mare. T 
Sanders The Institutes of Justinian (1962) 90. A Borkowski and P du Plessis (note 14 above) 154; 
D Nasmith (note 18 above) 403-404. 
30 E Poste (note 10 above) 152; D H Van Zyl (note 20 above) 128; D Tamm (note 20 above) 70 – 
71. 
31 Marcian D. 1. 8. 2 pr./1; M Kaser (note 12 above) 101; R W Leage (note 10 above) 122; M 
Habdas ‘Who needs a park or a city square? The notion of public real estate as res publicae’ 
(2011) 4 TSAR 627. 
32 See also A Borkowski and P du Plessis (note 14 above) 154 who state that prior to the 
distinction being made between res universitatis and res publicae both types of property were 
categorized simply as public property. 
33 D. i. 8. 4. 1.; D xlvii. 10. 13. 17. Flumina autem omnia et portus publica sunt: ideoque jus 
piscandi omnibus commune est in portibus fluminibusque. T Sanders The Institutes of Justinian 
(1962) 91; A M Prichard (note 19 above) 154; E Poste (note 10 above) 147; M Kaser (note 12 
above) 101; R W Leage (note 10 above) 122; D H Van Zyl (note 20 above) 128; A Borkowski and 
P du Plessis (note 14 above) 154; D Nasmith (note 18 above) 403-404; M Habdas (note 31 above) 
627. 
34 See however E Van der Schyff The Constitutionality of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act 28 of 2002 (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Potchefstroom, 2006) 92. T C 
Sandars The Institutes of Justinian 7ed (1903) xlviii suggests that the state owned things falling 
within the term res publicae. 
35 F Schulz Classical Roman Law (1951) 340; M Habdas (note 31 above) 627. 
36 D. i. 8. 6. 1. Universitatis sunt, non singulorum, veluti quæ in civitatibus sunt theatra, stadia et 
similia et si qua alia sunt communia civitatium. A M Prichard (note 19 above) 154; E Poste (note 
10 above) 147; T Sanders The Institutes of Justinian (1962) 92; C H Monro The Digest of 
Justinian Vol I (1904) 39; C Salkowski (note 14 above); J A C Thomas (note 17 above) 65. 
37 J A C Thomas (note 27 above) 129. 






courses.38 Van Zyl argues that given that both res publicae and res universitatis 
were susceptible to the use and enjoyment by the public, there is very little 
practical difference between them.39 For example, the town square and public 
streets could be classified as either res publicae40 or res universitatis.  
In the context of water specifically, many rules developed that governed the use 
and enjoyment of water. Marcianus wrote that nearly all rivers are to be 
considered public property.41 Public water and their banks were classified as res 
publicae42 and were the property of the whole community.43 A public river (or 
flumen publicum) was a river that flowed all year round (that is, perennial in 
nature), even if the river stopped flowing in times of drought.44 Perennial rivers 
were res publicae whilst rivers that only flowed seasonally were res communes.45  
                                                     
38 C H Monro (note 36 above) 40; W Hunter (revised by F H Lawson) Introduction to Roman Law 
9ed (1955) 66. Other authors cite these examples, namely, theatres and marketplaces, as examples 
of res publicae. See D Tamm (note 20 above) 71. 
39 D H Van Zyl (note 20 above) 128-9. 
40 M Kaser (note 12 above) 101.  
41 C H Monro (note 36 above) 40; Butgereit and Another v Transvaal Canoe Union and Another 
[1988] 2 All SA 84 (A) 86. 
42 Paulus D. 43.12.3 (Flumina publica quae fluunt ripaeque eorum publicae sunt) as discussed in 
Butgereit and Another v Transvaal Canoe Union and Another 87. 
43 Gaius D. 1.8.1 pr. (Quae publicae sunt, nullius in bonis esse creduntur, ipsius enim universitatis 
esse creduntur) and Ulpianus D. 50.16.5 (publica sunt, quae populi Romani sunt) as discussed in 
Butgereit and Another v Transvaal Canoe Union and Another 87. 
44 Ulpian D. 43. 12. 1. 3. ‘Some rivers are public; others not. Cassius defines a public river as a 
perennial river. This definition, approved by Celsus, appears correct’; Ulpian D 43.12.1.1. ‘Some 
rivers are perennial; some are torrential. A perennial river is one which flows continuously…If, 
however, a river which has flowed perennially dries up during a certain summer, it is none the less 
perennial’; Paulus D. 43. 12. 3. Van Heerden v Wiese (1880-1884) Buch AC 5 7. ‘Rivers which 
flow (perennially) are public, and their banks are also public’ as discussed in E F Ware (note 3 
above) 18, 19 and 41 respectively. See the dictum of Butgereit and Another v Transvaal Canoe 
Union and Another 86 – 87: 
‘In D. 43.12.3 it is said: ‘Publicum flumen esse Caius definit, quod perenne sit: haec 
sententia Cassii, quam et Celsus probat, videtur esse probabilis, i.e. Cassius defines a 
public river as one which is perennial: this opinion of Cassius, of which Celsus also 
approves, seems to be acceptable. A river was considered to be perennial even if it dried 
up during certain summers, but was otherwise perennial. 
(See D. 43.12.1.2: . . . si tamen aliqua aestate exaruerit, quod alioquin perenne fluebat, 
non ideo minus perenne est.) In Van Niekerk’s case, supra, at 372, Innes CJ said the 
following in this regard: ‘The civil law considered all perennial rivers to be public, and 
the fact that they ceased to flow for a time during exceptional seasons did not render them 
non-perennial (Digest, 43.12.1.2 and 3).’ 
45 D H Van Zyl (note 20 above) 128. 






The rights afforded to the public as a result of this entitlement were rights of use 
and access, principally to fish and navigate the harbours and rivers.46 Lakes, 
ponds and canals could also be considered public water.47 Ulpian stated that ‘the 
use of public streams is common to all, just the same as public roads and the 
shores of the sea’, indicating that public streams were regarded as res publicae.48 
Water contained in reservoirs was also considered public water. However, 
permission had to be granted by the ‘sovereign’ to be entitled to draw water from 
these sources.49 
Depending on the size of the water source, or the public opinion of residents in the 
area,50 a river (flumen) was distinguished in Roman law from a smaller stream or 
rivulet (rivus), the latter being a private water source.51  
There is some uncertainty as to whether the navigability of a water source was a 
prerequisite for its classification as res publica, although the weightier opinion 
was that it was not.52 Ulpian stated specifically that the interdict against using 
water from public rivers in such a manner that it caused damage to any 
neighbouring interests was not limited only to navigable waters.53 The Praetor, 
                                                     
46 Justinian’s Institutiones 2.1.2: Flumina autem omnia et portus publica sunt: ideoque ius 
piscandi omnibus commune est in portu fluminibusque– see Butgereit and Another v Transvaal 
Canoe Union and Another 88. 
47 Ulpian D.43. 14. 1. 2-6 as translated in E F Ware (note 3 above) § 59. 
48 Ulpian D. 39. 2. 24. as translated in E F Ware (note 3 above) § 74.  
49 Ulpian D. 43. 20. 1. 40-42 as translated in E F Ware (note 3 above) §183. 
50 Ulpian D.43.12.1.1 ‘A river is distinguished from a brook, either by its size or the opinions of 
those living along it’ as discussed in E F Ware (note 3 above) 17. 
51 D. 12.1.1 (Flumen a rivo magnitudin ediscernendum est aut existimatione circumcolentium) as 
discussed in Butgereit and Another v Transvaal Canoe Union and Another 86. 
52 The court here relied on D. 43.13.1.2 (Pertinet autem ad flumina publica, sive navigabilia sunt 
sive non sunt) stating that this interdict prevented activities that altered the flow of water in rivers 
during the summer months, irrespective of their navigability. See Butgereit and Another v 
Transvaal Canoe Union and Another 87. See also Van Niekerk and Union State (Minister of 
Lands) Appellants v Carter Respondent 1917 AD 359 at 373, where the court held that ‘Roman 
law drew no distinction in principle between navigable and non-navigable rivers, though they were 
in some respects separately dealt with by the Praetors’ Edicts.’ 
53 Ulpian D. 43. 13. 1. 1. read with D. 43. 13. 1. 2., which stated in particular that ‘the interdict 
pertains to public rivers, whether they are navigable or not’ as discussed in E F Ware (note 3 
above) § 44 and 45.  






however, was able to regulate its use and prevent water from being used in a 
manner that affected the navigability thereof.54  
While navigability may not have been a prerequisite for the classification of water 
as res publicae, one of the primary focuses of the texts in the context of rivers was 
to ensure that public rivers remained navigable and that their courses were not 
altered by human interference.55 Furthermore, emphasis was placed on ensuring 
that neighbouring interests were not harmed.56 Thus, the motivations for water 
law in Rome appear to be twofold: regulating and ensuring the commercial use of 
water particularly in terms of navigability as well as access; and regulating 
relationships between the users of water.  
While ownership of smaller water sources was possible, it is unknown whether 
this was because of the size, navigability or seasonality of the rivers.57 For 
example, some of the interpretations of the Roman law text provide that rivulets 
were private and some authors suggest that actual rivers were also private ‘at least 
in earlier classical law’.58 On the requirement that water be perennial in nature, 
very few rivers in South Africa would be considered to be public in character.59 
In addition, whether ownership of these water sources was possible and how such 
ownership would operate was not clearly defined. It would appear that res 
universitatis was the least controversial of the three forms, as small communities 
                                                     
54 Labeo D. 39.3.10.2 (Si flumen navigabile sit, non oportere praetorem concedere ductionem ex 
eo fieri Labeo ait, quae flumen minus navigabile efficiat, idemque est et si per hoc aliud flumen 
fiat navigabile) Butgereit and Another v Transvaal Canoe Union and Another 87. Ulpian 
D 39.3.19.2 and Pomponius D 43.12.2 as cited in Transvaal Canoe Union and Another v Butgereit 
and Another [1986] 4 All SA 472 (T) 475. See also Ulpian D. 43. 12. 1. 12. ‘Not everything done 
in a public river or on its banks does the Praetor’s interdict prohibit, but only that which makes the 
navigation or the landing worse. The interdict therefore applies only to navigable rivers and does 
not concern others’ as discussed in E F Ware (note 3 above) § 26. 
55 The Praetor’s Interdict D. 43. 12. 1., Ulpian D 43. 12. 1. 12., Ulpian D. 43. 12. 1. 15., Ulpian D. 
39. 3. 10.2., Labeo D 43. 12. 1. 18., Praetor D. 43. 12. 1. 19., Ulpian D. 43. 12. 1 21.,Pomponius 
D. 43. 12. 2., as translated by E F Ware (note 3 above) § 16, 26, 29, 30, 33, 34, 36, 38 respectively. 
56 See, for example, Pomponius D. 43. 20. 3. 1. and Ulpian D. 43. 13. 1. 2. , D. 43. 13. 1. 4. as 
translated by E F Ware (note 3 above) § 39, 44 and 47 respectively.  
57 A M Prichard (note 19 above) 154; Van Heerden v Wiese (1880-1884) Buch AC 5 8. 
58 W Buckland (note 21 above) 183; Brugi St Bonfante1, 361; 43.12.1.4. 
59 Van Niekerk and Union State Minister of Lands v Carter 1917 AD; A Watson The Evolution of 
Western Private Law (2003).  






(or corporations of a public nature) could own these resources.60 For example, the 
municipality would own the theatres and racehorses. By comparison, there is no 
certainty from the sources or their subsequent texts as to whether res publicae 
were owned by the state or the people. Some sources suggest that public property 
was owned by the people,61 whereas, other texts provide that this ownership 
vested instead in the state.62 In terms of Roman law, Justinian defines res publicae 
to be the property of the state, which implies ownership.63 However, Gaius states 
that public things cannot be owned by anyone, and instead are owned by the 
community.64 This idea of the community (with reference to the people of the 
nation) owning the particular thing is repeated in the sources.65 This is as 
compared to common property, which ostensibly belonged to no one.66 
2.1.2. Property Law Classifications Under Roman-Dutch 
Law 
Justinian’s distinctions between res communes, res publicae and res universitatis 
were carried through to Roman-Dutch law, including their inconsistencies.67 In 
                                                     
60 E van der Schyff ‘The concept of public trusteeship as embedded in the National Water Act, 
1998’ (2011) Water Research Commission 2.  
61 W Hunter (note 38 above) 65. 
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65 T Sanders The Institutes of Justinian (1962) 91; E van der Schyff (note 60 above) 23. 
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communes omnium entailed ownership by the state. 
67 This confusion appears to also have made its way to the United States of America. Trelease, in a 
discussion on American law, equates state ownership with public ownership of the water resources 






Roman-Dutch law examples of res communes included ‘running water which 
keeps a continuous flow’ as well as the sea and air,68 and the seashore in certain 
circumstances.69 Huber stated that public things either belonged to the state (that 
is, res publicae) or to a community (that is res universitatis).70 Public things 
included rivers, roads and harbours and specific emphasis was placed on their use 
for fishing and travel.71 The text stated specifically that these were the ‘peculiar 
property of the state’.72 Huber’s definition consequently entailed res publicae 
amounting to state ownership of the resource, with only public use thereof. 
Grotius treated res communes as the property of all men, therefore requiring 
ownership by everyone as opposed to ownership by no one.73 By contrast, res 
publicae and res universitatis were owned by ‘certain large societies of men’:74 
res publicae were owned by the state, whereas res universitatis were owned by a 
smaller society.75 Grotius provided that that all rivers, lakes and other navigable 
waters, as well as their beds, shores and banks belong to the united states of 
Holland and West-Vriesland.76 This confirmed state ownership of free-flowing 
                                                                                                                                                 
in the context of res publicae. In the western regions of the United States of America, the different 
legislative texts all differ as to ‘who is the owner and what it owned’. The problem following from 
this uncertainty is that the courts have in some instances interpreted the legislation to mean state 
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blurred the distinctions’. See in this regard F J Trelease ‘State ownership and trusteeship of water’ 
45 California Law Review 638 (1957) 642. 
68 Inst. 2. 1. 1; Dig. 1. 8. 2; A J Foord Van Leeuwen’s Censura Forensis (1884) 8.; R W Lee An 
Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law 5ed (1953) 123. 
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Grotius Vol I (1926) 66 - 67; R W Lee (note 68 above) 123. 
70 U Huber (translated by P Gane) The Jurisprudence of My TimeVol I (1939) 116. Huber stated 
that res publicae could either be used exclusively by the state (for example, tolls, taxes and 
national funds), or used by the general public. 
71 U Huber (note 70 above) 116. 
72 U Huber (note 70 above) 116. 
73 A F S Maasdorp The Introduction to Dutch Jurisprudence (1878) 62. See also E van der Schyff 
(note 60 above) 26 – 27. 
74 A F S Maasdorp (note 73 above) 62. 
75 A F S Maasdorp (note 73 above) 63. 
76 R W Lee (note 69 above) 68 – 69; A F S Maasdorp (note 73 above) 63.  






water and lakes within the boundaries of that area.77 The difficulty with ascribing 
the notion of ownership or dominium to the state is that the ‘sovereign state is by 
hypothesis in subjection to no superior’.78 Grotius, however, stated that the state’s 
role was administrative in nature, that is, to permit ‘strangers’ the use of the rivers 
and impose tolls and other charges for the conservation of this water.79  
Voet highlighted the confusion between public and common property among the 
various authors.80 He noted that Gaius, Justinian and Marcianus contradicted each 
other in their examples and explanations of things common or public.81 He further 
stated the following of the distinction between common and private property:82 
As for public things, that is to say those which belong by right to ownership to the 
whole people, they are to be distinguished from things common by the law of 
nations. Public things have already been taken by the people and have begun to be 
in their ownership; not so common things, which have still to be taken, as 
belonging to nobody... In these public things are classed perennial rivers... Since 
the use of these things is common, like that of public roads, shores and riverbanks, 
it is free therefore to anyone to sail and fish in them. 
Thus Voet clearly differentiated between common things, which are not owned, 
and public things, which are owned by the ‘whole people’. While this does not 
necessarily confirm that res publicae belonged to the people, it is more likely on 
the basis of this text, that res publicae belonged to the people than the state.  
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Union and Another v Butgereit and Another [1986] 4 All SA 472 (T) 475. 






Under Roman-Dutch law, harbours belonged to the regalia and as a result the 
right to fish had to be granted by the princeps.83 Voet stated that public rivers had 
also come to belong to the regalia, and subject to limitations imposed by the 
authorities,84 these public rivers were capable of use by the public, including the 
right to sail and fish.85 Similarly, use of the river was dependent on authorisation 
from the relevant persons and provided it did not affect navigability of the river.86 
In this respect, the praetor could grant a preventative interdict to cease any activity 
that affected the navigability of a public river.87 A beneficial interdict could also 
be awarded to a ‘tax-farmer’ prevented from fishing, and to stop force from being 
used to prevent cattle from being driven to a public river or a bank thereof.88 
Consequently, the nature of the state’s duties was administrative. 
The precise difference between common and public property is therefore difficult 
to discern given the overlap of the distinctions made between water resources. For 
example, flowing water is classified as res communes while perennially flowing 
rivers are considered to be res publicae. The question that arises is whether a 
principled basis exists to justify classification of different resources.  
It may be possible to justify this difference by looking to the intended beneficiary 
of the resource.89 Where one is looking at the nature of a thing classified as res 
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communes the resource will be common to ‘all the world’. By contrast, res 
publicae will be common to all the members of a state.90 In the context of res 
universitatis, the beneficiary of the public use is a smaller community. The 
distinction, therefore, appears to be a geographic one. Where the resource is 
designated along universal or global lines it is considered to belong to all whereas 
a resource capable of being bounded within a state is seen as belonging to the 
members within that state. For example, flowing water cannot be contained and in 
the context of South Africa, will flow downstream to other countries. 
Consequently, it is treated as res communes and belonging to no one. However, 
the water in a particular river at a particular place in South Africa will be treated 
as res publicae. While the water in the river cannot be contained or prevented 
from flowing, access to and use of the water at that particular site is possible. 
Further, Van der Schyff argues that res publicae were in theory capable of 
ownership, but were ‘reserved through the positive law for the benefit and general 
use by the citizens’.91 
As Lee so aptly puts it: ‘all this is very confused. The distinction between things 
common and things public is ill-defined, and has no practical value’.92 Given the 
overlap and lack of clarity as to the exact scope and nature of public and common 
property, it would seem that these distinctions were not significant to the social 
and legal issues of the time. This, too, may be the case today. Consequently, it is 
necessary to investigate the modern approach to these classifications to ascertain 
whether they are of any value. In order to do so, the case law in South Africa 
considering these classifications will be discussed. To reiterate, the purpose of this 
analysis is to investigate whether these classifications facilitate a more meaningful 
understanding of trusteeship. 
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2.2. Classification of Water as Property in South African 
Case Law 
The courts have had occasion to discuss the meaning and extent of res publicae 
and res communes in South Africa. What will be shown from these cases is the 
extent to which South African law has extended and developed Roman and 
Roman-Dutch law to accommodate contemporary South African circumstances. 
In 1917, the court appreciated the necessity for Roman and Roman-Dutch law to 
be brought in line with modern requirements. Even prior to the drastic changes 
made by the Constitution and the National Water Act, which completely revised 
the nature of the relationship between water resources and the state, the court held 
the following:93 
The elasticity of the civil and the Roman-Dutch systems has enabled South 
African Courts to develop our law of water rights along lines specially suited to 
the requirements of the country. The result has been a body of judicial decisions, 
which, though eminently favourable to our local circumstances, could hardly be 
reconciled in its entirety with the law either of Holland or Rome. 
Two cases that specifically discussed res publicae in South Africa are the 
Transvaal Canoe Union and Another v Butgereit and Another94 and the 
consequent appeal of this decision, namely Butgereit and Another v Transvaal 
Canoe Union and Another.95 These cases were heard before the introduction of 
the Constitution and the National Water Act, and thus applied principles 
consistent with the previous regime of water management.96 The court’s dictum 
with reference to res publicae is, nevertheless, relevant insofar as it discusses the 
traditional classifications in detail.  
In the court of first instance, the applicant called upon the court to consider 
whether the Crocodile River fell to be classified as a res publica.97 The applicant, 
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the Transvaal Canoe Union, sought the right to canoe on the Crocodile River 
across an owner’s section of the riverbed.98 The first respondent owned the 
portion of the riverbed up to the midsection of the river, in accordance with the 
rights of a riparian landowner. To prevent canoeists from accessing this portion of 
the river, the respondent had taken drastic measures, going so far as to put up an 
electric fence in the middle of the river and firing rubber bullets at ‘offending’ 
canoeists.99 
If the applicants were successful, the classification of the river as a res publica 
would afford them the right to access the river for recreational purposes. The 
respondent and owner of this portion of the riverbed argued against this 
classification on the basis that the river was not navigable, which, they contended, 
was a prerequisite for the classification of a river as res publica.100 
The court, in addressing the arguments put forward by the respondent, dealt with 
the requirements for the classification of a river as a res publica. The first 
requirement was that the river had to be perennial. However, the respondents did 
not object to the applicant’s contention that the river be classed as perennial, nor 
did the court find that there was insufficient water in the river for this not to be the 
case.101 The court held further that even if a river dried up in times of drought, it 
could still be classified as perennial, consistent with the Roman and Roman-Dutch 
law sources.102  
The second requirement the court investigated was whether it was necessary for 
the river to be navigable, highlighting the importance of navigability in Roman 
and Roman-Dutch law. However, the court reiterated the dictum of Innes CJ in 
Van Niekerk and Union State Minister of Lands v Carter:103 
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…the definition of a public stream has been extended far beyond its original 
limits. And the legislature has set its seal upon the work of the Courts. Every 
stream is now public, the water of which is capable of being applied to common 
riparian use, no matter how frequently it may run dry. The Union, therefore, 
though practically without navigable rivers, is covered with a network of public 
streams, the majority of quite small size. 
The court concluded that South Africa did not require rivers to be navigable to the 
same extent required by Roman and Roman-Dutch law.104 As a result, the 
perenniality and navigability of the river did not avail the applicants in this case. 
Consequently, the river was a res publica and the canoeists were entitled to access 
the portion of the river belonging to the respondent.105 
In the appeal, the appellant argued that while the river was perennial, it was not a 
river (or flumen) but rather a rivulet or stream, and as such, should be classified as 
private water.106 The appellants further contended that the court a quo erred in its 
findings on navigability, as it had not considered whether or not the river was 
navigable for commercial reasons.107 This, they argued, was necessary for the 
classification of water as res publicae.108 Consequently, none of the rivers in 
South Africa, save perhaps the Buffalo River, could be classified as res publicae, 
as none of them were capable of navigation for commercial purposes.109 
The court, however, disagreed with these assertions. With regard to the size of the 
Crocodile River, the court dismissed the argument that it was too small to be 
classified as a river.110 Further, on consideration of the sources, it held that the 
navigability of a river did not influence its public character and was not a 
consideration in terms of Roman and Roman-Dutch law, but rather a factor in the 
use of water and the restrictions imposed thereon.111 Accordingly, the appeal 
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failed and the Appellate Division confirmed the rights of the canoeists to use the 
Crocodile River for recreational purposes. The principles of relevance from this 
case, therefore, are that navigability of a river was not a precondition for water to 
be classified as res publicae, nor was the size or occasional drying up of the river.  
The Supreme Court of Appeal was afforded an opportunity to engage with these 
classifications in the context of the Constitution and the National Water Act in 
Mostert Snr and another v S.112 A farmer and his son had intentionally failed to 
register a second pump, as required by the Lomati Irrigation Board.113 In addition, 
they had tampered with the existing pump station meter to reflect a lower than 
actual water usage.114 This resulted in charges of theft, fraud and further criminal 
charges for contravention of section 151 (1)(e) and (5) of the National Water Act 
for unlawfully, intentionally or negligently tampering or interfering with the 
required pump and unlawfully, intentionally or negligently committing an act 
detrimentally affecting a water resource by illegally abstracting water from the 
Lomati River.115 
The court a quo held that common law charges could not be brought by the state, 
as the statutory penalties necessarily excluded common law remedies.116 
However, on appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal disagreed and found that the 
Act had not specifically excluded common law offences.117 Consequently, the 
court sought to establish whether the water contained in the Lomati River was of a 
public or a private character, to establish whether it was capable of theft in terms 
of the common law. 
The court made two important rulings in the context of both the classifications of 
things, as discussed above, and trusteeship. While failing to provide a thorough 
exposition of Roman and Roman-Dutch law to come to a conclusion (as 
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undertaken in the Butgereit cases), the court concluded that public water, whether 
running in a river or stream, is classified as res communes in terms of the sources. 
Specifically, the court states:118 
Roman law recognized certain things as being res extra patrimonium which were 
incapable of being owned, including those things classified as res 
communes being 'things of common enjoyment, available to all living persons by 
virtue of their existence'. Public water, running in a river or a stream, was 
recognized as being res communes and therefore incapable of being owned. 
These Roman law principles were adopted by Roman-Dutch law and 
subsequently recognized in South Africa. 
The court thus concludes that the water contained in rivers is res communes and 
therefore incapable of ownership.119 If it is not owned, then, logically, it cannot be 
stolen.120 
The state contended that the National Water Act completely changed the legal 
regime with the introduction of the idea of trusteeship, with the effect that the 
state owned water.121 However, the court concluded that trusteeship vested 
nothing more in the state than the requirement to administer and control water.122 
The court further observed that public water was already controlled and 
administered by the state under the previous water regime.123 As a result, the 
nature of the state’s role in relation to the water users had not changed. While the 
Act is silent in respect of the ownership of water, giving rise to a difficulty as to 
whether water remains unowned, or is owned by the state or the public, the court 
emphatically stated that the state did not own water resources. The court 
specifically stated that this water, being res communes, is incapable of ownership, 
consequently ending the debate as to whether ownership of water is possible.  
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However, it is possible that the common law classifications pertaining to 
ownership of private water persist in some limited circumstances, such as in 
relation to water contained in brooks or small streams, flowing over an owner’s 
land. Given that the Water Act specifically regulates the management and 
administration of water only, the common law classifications pertaining to 
ownership of water may have survived this regulatory change. In this respect, 
however, the ownership would be “bare” or “nude” dominium of the resource, as 
all the use and entitlements to the resource are heavily regulated by the statutory 
framework.124 As a result, private ownership of water in this regard would have 
very little practical value. The antithesis to this argument is that the Water Act 
specifically aims to redress the injustices and inequalities caused by the exclusion 
of access to resources as a result of land ownership patterns. As a result, there 
may be a philosophical justification for abandoning any argument or interpretation 
of the legal framework which allows for the possibility of any ownership of any 
type of water.  
This judgment can be criticised for failing to properly analyse the distinctions 
made between res publicae and res communes, as discussed above. It is also 
clearly wrong in respect of the dictum contained in the Butgereit cases, as ‘public 
water, running in a river or a stream’ is correctly classified as res publicae and not 
res communes. Had the court correctly found that this type of water was res 
publicae it may have been required to engage with the nature of ownership of 
water and whether it was owned by the public or the state. 
Burchell states that neither res publicae nor res communes is capable of theft as 
they are res extra commercium.125 This is based on the statement by the court in 
R v Laubscher126 that ‘public water … cannot be taken into private ownership’.127 
However, Van der Schyff and Van der Walt argue convincingly that water as res 
publicae is owned by the state, and given its importance in the modern context, 
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should be regarded as in commercio.128 Their conclusion is that water, if correctly 
classified as res publicae, should be regarded as a thing capable of theft. Such an 
amendment of the common law would be consistent with section 39 of the 
Constitution, which requires that the ‘spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights should be promoted’.129 
The court also fails to take account of the decisions in the Butgereit cases, despite 
the in-depth analyses that these decisions offer. The reasoning of the court is 
disappointing, to the extent that it does not provide any further clarity on the 
confusion that exists in the context of res publicae and res communes. That said, 
the court did note that factually the state would not have succeeded in proving a 
charge of theft, regardless of its finding.130 
Despite the shortcomings of this decision, this judgment was handed down by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in respect of the contemporary legal framework dealing 
with water. It very clearly states that public water, whether running in a stream or 
a river, is to be treated as res communes. The fact that it is historically inaccurate 
does not mean that it is not binding. Consequently, public water in terms of South 
Africa’s apex court131 is to be treated as res communes. Given that the distinction 
between public and private water has been done away with, and all water now 
forms part of the same hydrological cycle (which is considered public), it is 
argued that all water should be classified as res communes. The motivation for 
this assertion is dealt with below. 
2.3. A Critique of Proprietary Classifications in 
Contemporary Water Law 
It is argued that the finding of the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Mostert 
decision, that is, that water is res communes, is applicable to all water. The impact 
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of such a development would mean that water is incapable of ownership. 
However, if water is still capable of being divided into both res communes and res 
publicae, water may be owned by the state (or the public) in terms of the latter 
classification. It is therefore necessary to evaluate whether these classifications are 
of any practical significance in affording rights to parties in respect of the access, 
use and protection of the resource. The question is whether these classifications 
provide any further content to trusteeship. 
The Roman and Roman-Dutch law requirement for the classification of water as 
res publicae was that the river had to flow perennially. As has been stated above, 
res publicae entailed public property that was susceptible to use by all. As a 
result, this classification largely afforded access to the resource. It is clear that the 
state still regulated the use of the resource, especially in the context of navigable 
waters, where extraction of water was subject to limitations. In the context of 
perennial waters, these requirements are consistent with the trusteeship clause 
contained in the Act, as the state is required to facilitate access to water 
resources.132 Access to water resources via river banks is a separate issue and is 
not in dispute in the context of this thesis. It is apparent that the underlying 
motivations for the rules regulating res publicae in both Roman and Roman-
Dutch law were to ensure that the navigability of rivers was not interfered with, 
access to water resources remained open, and relationships between water users in 
this respect were regulated. 
In the context of the legislative framework, the National Water Act in particular 
sets out, in precise detail, the administrative requirements of water management. 
The use of water is regulated by the Act, and the state has the authority to control 
all aspects of water use.133 The Act requires that all persons must have access to 
water and mechanisms are put in place to ensure the beneficial and equitable 
distribution of water resources.134 The legislation goes further than the 
requirements of res publicae by implementing a number of legislative 
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requirements aimed at the protection and preservation of the resource.135 In 
addition, the use of water for recreational purposes is specifically provided for by 
the Act.136 Equal access to resources, environmental protection and sustainable 
development were not features of res publicae and the goals of trusteeship 
therefore require much more of the modern state. 
All water in terms of the Act is viewed as part of one hydrological cycle and is not 
differentiated in terms of whether the river is perennial, navigable (for commercial 
purposes, or otherwise), or a stream or other water source.137 Instead, all water 
must be allocated beneficially and equitably, and all water falls within the control 
of the National Government as trustee.138 The definition of water resources in the 
Act includes surface water, which ostensibly includes water contained in brooks 
and streams.139 All water is public property and subject to administrative control 
by the state, in terms of the trusteeship provision. This is compared to Roman and 
Roman-Dutch law, which clearly only held that certain types of rivers were 
classified as res publicae, namely perennial rivers and streams.140 As stated above, 
very few rivers would be found to be of public character in South Africa, if the 
requirements of perenniality were to be applied.141 However, as the court stated in 
Van Niekerk, the content of res publicae is capable of evolving to be consistent 
with modern requirements.142 Consequently, it may be possible to hold that this 
concept has evolved to the point where all water is classified as res publicae in 
order to be consistent with the constitutional requirements. 
The stumbling block in this respect is the court’s decision in Mostert Snr and 
another v S, which held that public water as found in rivers and streams is 
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classified as res communes.143 It is the assertion of this thesis that the court did not 
thoroughly engage with the traditional classifications, and it is possible that this 
decision may be set aside in the future.144 This decision is, however, irreconcilable 
with the proposition that water in rivers is classified as res publicae. It is hard to 
distinguish between these cases, as both dealt with the use of water resources, 
despite the fact that Butgereit was concerned with the use of water for recreational 
purposes while the Mostert case was concerned with the use of water for 
commercial purposes. The distinction between use of water for recreational 
purposes and use of water for commercial purposes was not a requirement of 
Roman or Roman-Dutch law, and both uses were treated within the category of 
res publicae. 
In terms of the traditional classifications, therefore, water should be classified as 
res communes, in the context of running water, and res publicae, in the context of 
perennial rivers. However, this separation is no longer possible in terms of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision, given that the Lomati River (which is the 
subject of the judgment) is perennial in nature. Instead, all water must be 
classified as res communes consistent with the court’s finding.145 This is clearly 
inconsistent with the traditional classifications.  
While the court could potentially have failed to engage properly with the sources 
in the Mostert case, it is possible that its decision is nevertheless the better 
decision. Res communes has as its basis an understanding that some resources are 
so important as to be incapable of ownership by anyone.146 If one analyses the 
shift in doctrinal views of the environment and natural resources, the approach to 
water as a resource today comprises a more global approach.147 For example, the 
principle of inter-generational equity requires planning into the future for 
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inhabitants of the planet that do not yet exist.148 The understanding of the 
hydrological cycle as a unitary feature that cannot be bounded also shows an 
appreciation of water as a global resource, common to all, rather than a municipal 
or state-owned resource.149  
By contrast, res publicae aims to regulate types of property that serve an 
economic function, such as roads, harbours and highways.150 As stated by Hadbas, 
goods such as military walls (and roads) ‘could be the object of private ownership, 
[but] it was accepted that risks of inefficient management, insufficient financing 
and inadequate communication were too great to allow private individuals to own 
such immovable property’.151 As a result, the classification of res publicae served 
a very different function to the classification of res communes.  
When evaluating any natural resource in property law, particularly a finite one, 
this must be undertaken in the social and legal context of modern law, which is 
markedly different to Roman and Roman-Dutch law. South Africa is guided by 
the Constitution, and this has to be the primary source of protection for natural 
resources and the promotion of human rights.152 The societal requirements of 
property law, as well as the need for consonance between private property and 
modern day practice, will shape the future content of property law.153 This quote, 
written almost four decades ago, accurately reflects this sentiment:154 
Fundamental remains the belief that the law is neither occult, arcane nor oracular 
but to the contrary dedicated to the rational solution of social conflicts through 
the legal process; that because law is only a means, not an end, it falls to be 
adjudged not by any internal standard peculiar to it as a closed system, but by the 
degree to which it furthers relevant social ends… 
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Given the Supreme Court of Appeal’s finding in the Mostert case that water 
contained in a river is to be treated as res communes, and given the paradigm shift 
in the approach to natural resources, this thesis has advanced the argument that 
water may very well be more appropriately classified today as res communes. 
This would more accurately reflect the social mores of the modern South African 
constitutional state and the importance of water to society. The inherent problem 
with this argument is that res communes cannot be considered res in commercio, 
under any circumstances, which would preclude a finding that water is capable of 
theft in terms of the common law.155 However, the statutory framework is capable 
of remedying this shortcoming by expressly providing for the theft of public 
water. 
2.4. Shortcomings of Common Law in Conceptualising 
the Statutory Notion of Trusteeship 
South African law provides authority for water to be treated as both res publicae 
and res communes.156 Both lines of cases on the subject, discussed above, dealt 
with the use of the resource and both dealt with perennial rivers.157 The difference 
is that the Butgereit cases were decided prior to the reform of water law, while the 
Mostert case was decided under the new constitutional and legislative regime.  
The question must then be asked as to whether it is more suitable to modern South 
African law and the needs of a constitutional society for water to be classified as 
res publicae or res communes? Water is no longer capable of being privately 
owned in terms of the Act and is comprehensively regulated as a public resource 
by the Act.158 For example, the Act expressly allows for the recreational use of 
rivers and, had the incidents that transpired in the Butgereit cases taken place after 
1998, the matter would never have made it to court. The use of water is heavily 
regulated by the Act and the classification of water as res publicae will not afford 
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complainants any more remedies than already exist in terms of this legislation, 
whether the cause of action is founded in constitutional or statutory law. In 
addition, some of the Roman remedies may be entirely inappropriate, if not 
unconstitutional, in modern South Africa.159 
However, the one instance where the Roman and Roman-Dutch law 
classifications may have assisted in providing modern day remedies is in the 
context of theft of water resources, as was in issue in the Mostert case. Had the 
court concluded that water was res publicae, an opportunity may have arisen for it 
to engage with whether water was either owned by the state or the public, as 
entailed by res publicae. Further, this may have provided the opportunity for the 
court to consider whether the common law crime of theft should be extended to 
the category of res publicae, as argued by Van der Schyff and Van der Walt.160 
Thus, ironically, the only instance in modern law where these classifications may 
have been of assistance in protecting water resources was not fully investigated by 
the courts.161  
Aside from this, it must be appreciated that in the context of the use of and access 
to water resources, as well as the protection and preservation thereof, these 
classifications do not further the legislative requirements. The legal framework 
not only caters for the modern requirements of water use, but goes beyond that 
which is contained in the classifications of res publicae and res communes. This 
notwithstanding, the huge losses of water per annum as a result of theft must be 
addressed by legislative amendments to remedy this situation, given the court’s 
findings in the Mostert case.162 
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In the context of modern South African law, it is clear that all water is perceived 
within the context of the hydrological cycle.163 It is no longer separated into 
different components, such as surface and groundwater. Instead, underground 
water, aquifers, surface water including rivers (whether navigable or non-
navigable) and lakes are all protected as a single resource.164 The legal framework 
attempts to cater for the fact that the use of water impacts not just a bounded 
portion thereof, but ultimately, the entire hydrological cycle. It also takes into 
account that water use affects not only downstream users in South Africa, but also 
users in other countries who share our water sources.165 Consequently, there has 
been a shift in the perception of water as something that can be bounded or 
confined, to an appreciation of its fluid, unbounded nature. This shift in thinking 
must reflect in the way that we classify water according to the Roman and 
Roman-Dutch law classifications discussed above. Given that Roman and Roman-
Dutch law distinguished between different types of water, it is problematic to 
classify water today in terms of res publicae, where the legislative intent is to treat 
water as one entity, which is free of the limitations and inherent inequalities that 
arise from land ownership.  
In addition, the distinction between public and private water has been done away 
with and consequently, it is argued, that no water should be capable of private 
ownership. This is contrary to the Roman and Roman-Dutch position where, in 
terms of these classifications, most South African water would be deemed to be 
private water. As a result, the historical classifications are not suitable to the 
modern constitutional context. 
3. Reliance on the Public Trust Doctrine: The 
Comparative Law Perspective 
Given that trusteeship is not expressly defined by the National Water Act or the 
Water Services Act, its content must be derived from the constitutional and 
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legislative framework. The nature of the language used in section 3 of the 
National Water Act has persuaded several scholars to argue that the public trust 
doctrine forms the basis for trusteeship as introduced by the new legislative 
framework.166 In the United States of America, which has arguably the most 
developed form of the doctrine,167 it is a mechanism initially introduced by the 
judiciary in which water and other natural resources are prevented from being 
alienated by the state, and instead, this property is to be held in trust for the 
benefit of the people.168 At its inception in American law, the public trust doctrine 
recognised that certain lands were so valuable to the public that they should be 
incapable of alienation to private parties.169 In its most basic form, the doctrine 
historically only afforded a right of access to navigable waterways and submerged 
lands, with the purpose of furthering commerce, navigation and fishing.170 In its 
original form, therefore, it mirrored the characteristics of res publicae.171  
The use of terminology such as ‘trusteeship’ and ‘public benefit’ in the provisions 
of the Water Act and the Services Act shows a similarity with the requirements of 
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the public trust doctrine, especially as it operates in United States of America 
(hereafter referred to as ‘America’).172 Other scholars have likened the operation 
of the public trust doctrine in America to the South African introduction of 
trusteeship.173 The manner in which it has been interpreted and applied in 
America can provide a useful comparative platform for the approach in South 
Africa. The goal of this discussion is to ascertain the advantages and 
disadvantages of the doctrine. This will form the basis of the discussion in 
Chapter 7, where the South African legal framework will be measured against 
these advantages and disadvantages. Consequently, the purpose of this chapter is 
to discuss and evaluate the public trust doctrine as it functions in America. 
It should be noted from the outset that, barring a few salient features, there is little 
agreement as to the origin, definition, nature and applicability of the doctrine.174 
On the one hand, the uncertainty and inconsistency of this doctrine has been 
widely criticised.175 On the other hand, courts and academics have welcomed the 
flexibility of the doctrine and its ability to adapt to the changing needs of 
society.176 These debates will be highlighted and discussed below.  
3.1. Origins and Tenets of the Public Trust Doctrine 
Academic commentary advances the proposition that the doctrine has its roots in 
the Roman law concepts of public and common property. 177 While Roman law is 
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probably the most doctrinally pure form of the public trust, the discussions of the 
origins thereof in relation to the specific classification confuse res publicae and 
res communes, echoing the confusion experienced in South African law.178 Sax, 
considered to be the father of the public trust doctrine,179 has reiterated Lee’s 
point as stated above, namely that the distinctions made between different types of 
common and public property were very confused.180 Given that the doctrine was 
primarily concerned with affording the public rights of access to water in the 
context of navigation and fishing, the doctrine is probably better classified as res 
publicae.181  
As with Roman law, the history and understanding of the origins of the doctrine in 
English law is problematic. Similar to Roman law, English law distinguished 
between jus publicum and jus privatum,182 and the Crown held the former in trust 
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for the benefit of the public.183 Over time, all land which fell into this category 
became part of a public trust held by the King.184 The King could alienate title to 
private individuals, subject to rights of access held by the public for the purpose 
of, amongst other things, navigation.185 This protection of public land and 
resources came to embody any right of use that was essential for the purposes of 
‘commerce, trade and navigation’, as well as fishing rights.186 The property that 
fell into the trust was owned by the state, which was capable of being transferred 
if certain conditions were met. These conditions primarily prevented private 
ownership of trust property from interfering with the public’s right to fish and 
navigate in the waters.187 
Prior to attaining independence in 1776, America was an English colony188 and 
the title to public trust lands was held by the Crown, in accordance with the 
principle of sovereignty.189 Thirteen independent states were founded, each 
adopting the English common law,190 and the Crown title to public lands 
consequently passed to these states.191 The public trust doctrine was not yet 
specifically acknowledged, and disagreement exists as to when it was expressly 
introduced by the judiciary.192 The existence of the public trust doctrine was 
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confirmed in 1892 by the Supreme Court in Illinois Central Railroad v Illinois193 
which is widely considered to be the founding case of this doctrine.194 The court 
held that the beds and water of navigable waterways were incapable of private 
ownership.195 In addition, the state was ‘neither free to alienate its navigable 
waters nor abdicate its public trust responsibilities over such waters in a manner 
inconsistent with its public trust duties’.196 This limitation existed independent of 
legislation and could not be circumvented through legislative measures.197 The 
effect of this case was to create a distinction between property that the state 
owned and of which it could freely dispose, and property which had to be 
carefully managed on behalf of all citizens and in the public interest.198 The state 
is only free to alienate trust property under circumstances where the transfer of 
this interest to a private individual would either prevent the impairment of the 
public interest or promote the public interest.199 In this respect, Deveney states:200 
[T]he Court articulated a principle that has become the central substantive 
thought in public trust litigation. When a state holds a resource which is available 
for the free use of the general public, a court will look with considerable 
skepticism upon any governmental conduct which is calculated either to 
reallocate that resource to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the 
self-interest of private parties. 
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Prior to the 1970s, the historical development of environmental legislation in 
America was piecemeal,201 and these developments were for the most part only 
induced by public pressure following environmental incidents.202 In the 1970s, 
Sax published an article that detailed how the public trust doctrine had been 
utilised and developed by the courts to create a public interest in public lands that 
created environmental obligations for the state.203 At a time when the public had 
no standing, the doctrine provided the public with a right to challenge the state on 
public trust issues. His discussion showed that the courts had responded to the 
need to fill a vacuum in the environmental legislation in American law, and this 
reactionary approach helped shaped the doctrine.204 
In his seminal work, Sax argued that in order for a broader theory in this context 
to be of any real use, it required three general tendencies. The first was that it 
should afford the public with a legal right. The second requirement was that this 
right would have to be enforceable against the state. The final criterion required 
that the doctrine be flexible enough to protect any modern environmental concern. 
He argued that the public trust doctrine contained these three features and should 
therefore be utilised as a mechanism for environmental protection.205 
There are three ways in which the doctrine has been invoked in litigation in 
America. Firstly, the state has utilised it to hold private parties accountable for 
violations of the doctrine. The second manner in which it has been utilised is the 
corollary, namely, when private bodies use the doctrine to hold the state 
accountable to its obligations. The third way is for private bodies to hold each 
other accountable for a violation of the doctrine.206  
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Sax also set out the nature of the restrictions that must be imposed on the state as 
a consequence of the operation of this doctrine. In the first instance, property that 
falls within the public trust must be accessible for public use and this use must 
serve a public purpose; secondly, property subject to the public trust is incapable 
of alienation (barring a few exceptions as discussed below); and finally, the public 
purpose assigned to the resource must be utilised for specific uses.207 These 
principles form the framework within which the doctrine operates. 
Through the developments of the courts and the writings of Sax, the doctrine that 
originally only afforded a right of access and a prohibition on the alienation of 
certain public land was developed into a mechanism of environmental 
protection.208 However, this development has not escaped criticism, and it has 
been argued that the doctrine should be returned to its original form, as a 
mechanism that only regulates access to the seashore and the beds of navigable 
waters.209 These arguments are discussed below.  
That the public trust doctrine is now a mechanism of environmental stewardship 
finds resonance in a number of cases, where it has been effectively used to protect 
natural resources.210 For example, the Supreme Court held that it was 
impermissible for the state to circumvent the doctrine by legislating out of its 
obligations.211 A similar approach was adopted in National Audubon Soc’y v 
Superior Court (Mono Lake)212 where the court held that the doctrine could not be 
abolished unless a public purpose to do so could be shown.213 It held that the 
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doctrine was a ‘state-level constitutional limitation on legislative power to give 
away trust resources’.214 The court recognised that the ‘public trust doctrine 
applied to inland, navigable lakes and required the state to take into account 
ecological and aesthetic interests in making water allocation decisions, even 
where state statutes did not appear to allow consideration of such concerns’.215 
The duty to act in the public interest does not necessarily entail an absolute 
prevention on the transfer of public lands to private entities or individuals. There 
may be instances where the state has to award the use of water for purposes that 
may detract from trust uses, in order to further economic interests.216 There is 
nothing barring the state from doing so, according to the above dictum, provided 
that such action is consistent with the state’s duties as trustee – that is, in the best 
interests of the beneficiaries.217 
Today, the doctrine represents the interface between public and private interests in 
land and resources, and the judiciary’s response to the increased competition for 
these diminishing resources.218 The doctrine is also at the centre of the conflict 
between furthering the notions of ownership and private property, versus the 
protection and management of finite resources for future generations.219 The 
absoluteness of ownership is constantly being eroded so that public interests in 
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resources can be ensured, presenting a tension between private and public 
interests.220 
3.2. Inadequacies of the Public Trust Doctrine 
The doctrine is predominantly procedural in nature and has been described as a 
mechanism by which to hold the state accountable.221 At its core, the doctrine 
affords the public access to navigable waterways and the seashore.222 However, 
that represents the sum of information upon which academics, the courts, and 
Congress have managed to agree.223 What follows is a descriptive account of the 
debates and disagreements that go to the heart of the nature and functioning of the 
doctrine. This discussion does not attempt to present a thorough account of the 
issues and discrepancies. Instead, a number of key issues that are relevant to this 
thesis will be discussed, highlighting the difficulties with the doctrine along the 
way. 
3.2.1. The Doctrine’s Amorphous Nature 
While some argue that the flexibility of the doctrine is a strength,224 its 
‘amorphous’ nature225 means that it is difficult to define and is inconsistently 
applied in the various states.226 This raises difficult questions,227 for example, to 
which resources does the doctrine apply and how are they differentiated?; is the 
content of the doctrine procedural or substantive?; who owns these resources and 
can they be owned by the public?228 Further criticism is that the doctrine is ‘truly 
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political/legal in content, and philosophical/social in context’,229 that is, the 
doctrine is fluid and shaped by the socio-political context of the time.230 Clear 
evidence of this exists, as the doctrine in its original form was inherently 
economic, catering to the needs of a society in the throes of industrialisation.231 In 
contemporary society, however, it is being used to further interests related to 
environmental concerns. While the focus of the modern doctrine is environmental 
protection, nothing in the underlying principles of the doctrine require that this 
should continue in the future - the doctrine simply requires that the state must 
further a public purpose, and not necessarily a public purpose favouring 
environmental protection.232 
Each American state is entitled to provide the content to the doctrine 
independently, which also results in difficulties in defining the doctrine, as 
application in the different states has been widely varied. These differences can be 
traced back to the ‘equal footing doctrine’, in terms of which each state is afforded 
the same rights and responsibilities, subject to their own interpretation thereof.233 
In accordance with this doctrine, the various states must utilise the public trust 
doctrine but each can apply this doctrine differently, resulting in a multitude of 
various interpretations.234 However, Bento notes that this lack of consistency can 
be advantageous, as it affords states the opportunity to create their own 
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framework within which to address the environmental concerns unique to the 
area.235 
3.2.2. Taxonomy and Hierarchical Functioning of the 
Doctrine 
The uncertainties of the doctrine are not limited to the nature thereof as the legal 
source and classification of the doctrine is also problematic.236 There is 
uncertainty as to whether the origin of the doctrine is the federal common law 
and, further, whether it is to be defined generally as a federal or state level 
doctrine.237 There is no express provision for the doctrine at a federal 
constitutional level. However, it has been argued that the doctrine is an implied 
constitutional doctrine and therefore originates from the constitution.238  
Given that no state may legislate out of its public trust duties, it seems appropriate 
to position it as a federal level doctrine.239 This notwithstanding, the Supreme 
Court has held that each state is entitled to establish the parameters and content 
thereof, indicating that the doctrine operates only at a state level.240 However, it is 
possible to reconcile these approaches by acknowledging that the doctrine creates 
a federal restriction on the alienation of trust resources, which states may not 
circumvent, but pursuant to this they are free to legislate the terms of this 
obligation provided its satisfies the minimum requirements thereof.241  
Over and above the confusion created by the unknown source of authority of the 
doctrine there is also uncertainty as to the classification of the doctrine within the 
legal system. The possibilities include, but are not limited to, administrative law, 
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constitutional law, property law or a combination of the above.242 Another 
possibility is that the doctrine is based in the ‘state exercise of police power’ and 
the doctrine is a consequence of these powers.243 There is also case law that 
indicates that the doctrine is classified in terms of the law of trusts244 and, 
consequently, it has been compared to an ordinary commercial trust and its 
associated requirements.245 However, the fiduciary duties placed on states as 
trustees of natural resources go beyond those of an ordinary trustee in the 
commercial realm.246 Huffman points out that the fundamental basis of a trust is a 
tripartite relationship between the creator of the trust, the trustee/s and the 
beneficiary/ies.247 In this tripartite relationship, the actions and intentions of the 
creator are paramount to the interpretation of the trust purposes.248 In the context 
of America and the doctrine, there is no discernible creator of the trust,249 and no 
apparent moment at which the intentions of this fictitious creator can be 
ascertained by the court.250 Consequently, the trust is an inappropriate 
characterisation of the doctrine.251 
In addition, it has been argued that the doctrine provides the substantive grounds 
for judicial review of administrative decisions and is therefore anchored in 
administrative law.252 Huffman, however, argues that the doctrine does not form 
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the basis of judicial review.253 Instead, he argues that the doctrine is properly 
anchored in property law,254 and the limitations placed on private ownership by 
the doctrine are akin to an easement (the equivalent of the servitude in South 
African law).255 This is consistent with the assertion that the origins of the 
doctrine are in the Roman law classification of res publicae, as discussed 
above.256  
3.2.3. Nature of the Rights Created by the Doctrine 
As set out above, the doctrine’s content is unclear because it does not have 
defined boundaries, the source of its authority is unclear, and it is uncertain as to 
how it is to be classified within the legal system. However, these problems are not 
the only issues with the doctrine in terms of the uncertainty it creates. In addition, 
the doctrine is unclear as to the nature of the rights it affords the public, the types 
of property that it protects, and the nature of this protection.  
From the outset, there are no clear categories of property specifically protected by 
the doctrine, given the varied protection offered from state to state.257 At its most 
basic level, the doctrine creates a beneficial interest in navigable water for the 
public, which facilitates the use of water for commercial, navigation and fishing 
purposes.258 Implicit in this first notion is surely that the state is obliged to 
maintain the ecological viability and sustainability of water for these purposes, a 
concept acknowledged by the courts in certain states.259 The state is the trustee of 
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water and this requires that the state ‘prevent[s] unnecessary harm to public trust 
uses’.260 Accordingly then, it may be appropriate for other resources to be 
protected to ensure that this right is upheld.261 In this respect, the courts have 
specifically acknowledged the interdependence between humans and the 
environment, and the importance of protecting the environment for future 
generations.262 However, a definitive guideline is not available to justify why 
other resources can be included within the scope of the doctrine.263 
The equal footing doctrine allows each state to interpret the functioning of the 
doctrine relative to its own requirements.264 The effect of this has been that 
different states have extended the protection of the doctrine to different types of 
resources. There have been three types of development of the doctrine in the 
various states. The first relates to the navigability of water, where some states 
include both navigable and non-navigable water within the protection of the 
doctrine.265 The second development has seen the purpose for which the water is 
used extended to include recreational activities in addition to the core features 
protected by the trust.266 Finally, the doctrine has been developed in some states to 
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include non-water resources such as wildlife, state parks, beaches and marine 
life.267  
However, the extension of the doctrine has not included all types of water, and 
most courts have not ‘extended the common law doctrine beyond tidal or 
navigable waters, thus leaving unprotected inland resources that are unconnected 
to navigable lakes or rivers’.268  
3.2.4. The Nature of the Public Interest / Purpose 
Requirement 
It is a requirement of the doctrine that the resource in question be used for a public 
purpose.269 This element is most often considered when a court is trying to 
ascertain whether private ownership of trust land should be allowed. However, 
this is problematic, particularly in the context of the democratic process.270 For 
example, in the context of public land, the original form of the doctrine only 
pertained to water.271 As a result, ascertaining a public purpose where access to 
water is not in issue is problematic.  
While the courts exercised judicial restraint in the context of public land, there 
was no duty that required them to do so. The ability of the courts to review state 
action allows a highly flexible standard of judicial review,272 which may 
undermine democratic processes. In the context of the public interest, the question 
arises as to whether it is appropriate for the courts to make this decision, and, if 
so, what parameters are in place for the courts to decide what necessitates a good 
or better public purpose.  
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The various states have interpreted the requirement of public interest quite 
differently. In some states, a public economic gain may constitute a valid public 
purpose, whereas in others, it would not. In this regard, the Supreme Court held 
that economic development can provide a valid public purpose.273 This line of 
reasoning was followed in a case where part of Lake Michigan was filled for the 
creation of a private university, evidencing that context is all-important.274 In this 
instance, the court held that the economic and social advantages of alienating trust 
land in these circumstances satisfied the requirements for a valid public 
purpose.275 
However, states such as Massachusetts276 and Wisconsin277 have held that the 
‘public use is an end in itself’ and an undertaking to weigh it against the potential 
economic gain is not permissible.278 The public purpose requirement has also been 
interpreted to include recreational activities in some states.279 The court in South 
Carolina deviated from the necessity that the public purpose be in the interests of 
commerce when it held that recreational public use of navigable waterways would 
be deemed a legitimate public purpose.280 
In Wisconsin, the court identified a number of considerations for the 
determination of a legitimate public purpose. These considerations involved the 
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extent and type of public purpose, as well as issues of access and control to the 
public lands. They also involved ascertaining whether the public use would be 
completely obliterated or only somewhat impaired. Finally, the court required a 
balancing act to be undertaken between the extent to which the original purpose 
would be undermined as compared to the public benefit gained from the new use. 
In establishing these requirements, the court implicitly recognised the polycentric 
nature of the enquiry on which the legislature and administrative agencies would 
have to embark, in order to take a decision concerning public lands.281 
A difficulty that the court will encounter is establishing the standard of care 
imposed on the state in the protection of resources.282 There is also no way to 
gauge the settled expectations of society or what is in the public interest.283 Some 
states have held that the doctrine imposes positive obligations on the state, whilst 
others have held that the obligations are instead either restrictive in nature, or are 
negative obligations.284 In the latter category, there are further differing 
interpretations as to the standards of these limitations. There is also a lack of 
clarity as to what duties are required by the doctrine. As a result, the courts are 
unable to ensure or enforce consistency. While it is clear that absolute 
preservation and protection is not possible, the extent to which this must be 
achieved is unknown. This presents great interpretive difficulties for the court as 
there is no fixed standard against which administrative bodies can be held to 
account.285 Often, specific bespoke legislation in the various different areas is 
clearer and easier to utilise than the public trust doctrine. As a result, statutory law 
is more often applied than the common law doctrine.286 
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3.2.5. Access to Resources or Resource Protection 
In some states, the modern public trust doctrine embraces the key principles of 
environmental protection, including sustainability, community involvement, inter-
generational equity and stewardship.287 Thus far, the doctrine has been utilised 
more often when issues of public access to land have arisen, rather than in the 
context of the protection of natural resources.288 The right of access itself raises a 
problem for environmental protection. Typically, the doctrine seeks to ensure 
access to the resources that fall within its scope. However, this runs contrary to 
contemporary environmental regulatory regimes, which are typically trying to 
limit public access thereto.289 As a result, the two key features of the modern 
doctrine, namely access and protection,290 may serve conflicting goals. 
Huffman argues that the doctrine is anchored in commerce, economic productivity 
and the exploitation of resources.291 This has been supported by Benn who asserts 
that the doctrine is not primarily concerned with environmental protection, but 
instead with the protection of economic development.292 In his analysis he 
proposes that there is no philanthropic ideology underlying the doctrine, and it is 
not intended for the public benefit in the sense that this entails any form of 
environmental preservation,293 except to the extent that this furthers the economic 
interests served by the doctrine.294 Sax himself has acknowledged that, though it is 
unlikely, it is possible that the trust purpose could again become commercial, 
rather than protective, in nature.295 It is not disputed that the types of resources 
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that would merit being classified as trust property are susceptible to common use 
and are also valuable.296 
3.2.6. Furthering Democratic Principles  
Public participation is a key feature of democracy and consequently, prior to the 
alienation of public trust property, the public must be informed and participation 
in the decision-making process must be ensured. However, public resources can 
be disposed of by administrative agencies with very little public knowledge by 
using what Sax terms ‘low-visibility decision-making’. The problem is that, in 
these instances, the state is often intentionally attempting to reduce the level of 
public participation. The state may also intentionally cause development to reach 
the point where a court would be hesitant to interfere, despite the lack of public 
participation, where a significant amount of resources had already been utilised on 
the project.297  
The public trust doctrine has been used as the basis for expressly requiring public 
participation in the context of trust property. In the Gould v. Greylock Reservation 
Commission,298 the court confirmed the existence of a right in favour of the 
public, wherein any discretionary decisions made by the state which would affect 
public trust property had to be explicitly confirmed by the public.299 The court 
further held that mere acquiescence would be insufficient.300 The court’s approach 
in these instances has not been to ‘make policy decisions concerning the proper 
use of public trust lands, but has instead developed a means for ensuring that 
those who do make the decisions do so in a publicly visible manner’.301 
A key question in the context of the public trust doctrine is which ‘democratic 
institutions are best suited for protecting public interests in ecological 
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resources’.302 There is wide criticism of the doctrine due to the difficulty in 
finding a foundational basis for its inception, with some referring to these sources 
as a ‘myth’ or ‘legal fiction’.303 This has resulted in critics arguing that the 
doctrine is merely a vehicle by which judges can risk making difficult decisions 
without anchoring their opinions in certain law.304 This difficulty is not 
experienced in South Africa, as trusteeship is a constitutional and statutory 
creature and judicial interference would be warranted where any of the duties of 
trusteeship in terms of the legal framework were breached.305 
In the context of judicial review on the basis of the doctrine, there are two 
competing positions as to whether it further enhances or obscures democracy. On 
the one hand, judicial review of administrative actions enhances democracy by 
ensuring sufficient protection of the public interest. However, this raises the issue 
of the counter-majoritarian dilemma in the context of the separation of powers.306 
The separation of powers requires a legal separation between the powers and 
duties of the legislature, executive and the judiciary, with each ensuring that the 
other’s powers are kept in check. In this way, the principles of democracy are 
furthered by ensuring that the powers of each institution are diluted. However, the 
judiciary, an unelected group of officials, is entitled to investigate the conduct of 
the legislature or the executive, both of which are democratically elected bodies 
representing the majority. Consequently, an unelected minority may impose its 
wishes on an elected body, which has been given the power to represent the 
wishes of the majority, giving rise to the problem known as the counter-
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majoritarian dilemma. The extent to which this interference is appropriate will be 
in issue as well as the extent to which judicial deference should be exercised.307 
In 1970, when Sax wrote an extensive article on the doctrine, he acknowledged 
that there were no clear outer limits for the scope of state authority. This lack of 
clear guidance meant that there was necessarily more interaction between the 
courts and the state.308 The foundations established in Illinois Central are so broad 
that it allowed the court to enquire into programs that have been legitimately 
introduced by democratic processes.309 The criticism is therefore that the judiciary 
can too easily interfere in the actions of the legislature and the executive, giving 
rise to the counter-majoritarian dilemma. Despite this, Sax has argued that the 
doctrine is a ‘medium for democratisation’.310 
In more recent articles, on the uncertainties discussed above, Sax has said the 
following:311 
[T]he doctrine which a court adopts is not very important; rather, the court’s 
attitudes and outlook are critical. The ‘public trust’ has no life of its own and no 
intrinsic content. It is no more – and no less – than a name courts give to their 
concerns about the insufficiencies of the democratic process. 
By contrast, however, it can be argued that the public trust doctrine affords the 
judiciary with an element of control over inherently public resources. Legislatures 
may be susceptible to intense pressure from special interest groups, especially 
when they are well-funded and organised, as compared to a ‘large and diffuse’ 
opposition.312 Dunning argues that the very nature of the doctrine and the fact that 
it aims to protect natural resources is exactly why the courts should be able to 
intervene and exercise powers of oversight over the decisions of the legislature.313 
                                                     
307 I Currie and J De Waal The New Constitutional and Administrative Law (2001) 35 – 36; A 
Reiser (note 185 above) 416. 
308 J L Sax (note 178 above) 486. 
309 J L Sax (note 178 above) 491. 
310 J L Sax (note 178 above) 509. 
311 J L Sax (note 178 above) 521. 
312 C Brown (note 196 above) 15; L Bento (note 178 above) 8. 
313 H C Dunning (note 170 above) 523. 






This is consistent with the separation of powers doctrine, which requires due 
deference and respect to be maintained between the executive, legislature and 
judiciary, whilst ensuring that oversight mechanisms are in place to balance the 
three institutions.314 
However, the question remains – is it desirable that the judiciary should adopt 
such an active role in the protection of resources, particularly where such activism 
is likely to interfere with legitimate state and legislative policies?315 Some authors 
argue that this level of judicial intervention is both inappropriate and 
unnecessary.316 As Lazarus states, ‘the doctrine…unduly relies on a pro-
environment judicial bias’.317 Huffman argues that the public trust doctrine and its 
proponents further their own ideas while at the same time destabilising democracy 
by allowing democratic decisions to be substituted by those made by a 
minority.318 It is not necessarily true that the judiciary will best serve the interests 
of the public by protecting the environment, nor is it necessarily best placed to do 
so.319 For one, the judiciary lacks the expertise, time and infrastructure to do so 
properly.320 
However, while judicial deference is used to temper the undemocratic nature of 
judicial review, it may also prevent administrative agencies from being held 
accountable to their duties. The courts may refuse to interfere purely to avoid 
offending the separation of powers. The courts may also defer to the expertise of 
the agency, as they presume agency actions to be valid and rational. The 
conditions that must be breached in order to give rise to judicial interference 
include an arbitrary, capricious or unlawful decision, or an abuse of discretion. 
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Given the array of factors that must be considered in making an administrative 
decision, as well as the human resources and skills required, courts are hesitant to 
interfere with these decisions, unless there is clear evidence that at least one of the 
duties has been breached. However, there are instances where these administrative 
requirements will fall short of protecting trust land, and consequently judicial 
intervention may be necessary.321 
An example of this problem is the implementation of the Multiple-Use Sustained-
Yield Act of 1960, which allows administrative agencies to allocate the 
percentages of resources to be dedicated to different purposes. The considerations 
that have to be taken into account require extensive investigation on the part of the 
relevant administrative agency. Accordingly, the courts may be unwilling to 
interfere, once these decisions have been taken unless there is clear evidence to 
suggest mala fides. In addition, this legislation prevents the courts from making a 
decision, once it has been ascertained that all relevant criteria were duly 
considered.322 
In some instances, the court might be the last bastion of hope when administrative 
agencies have made erroneous decisions.323 In most instances though, the 
legislature is best placed, both in terms of skills and capacity, to evaluate the 
public interest.324 Thus, the approach to be adopted requires a balancing act 
between the need for judicial interference, as opposed to judicial deference, and 
the circumstances of each case will be paramount to informing the necessary 
balance. This is the approach that has been adopted in South African law.325 In 
America, the Public Land Law Review Commission has confirmed this approach 
by offering some guidelines as to the nature and extent of judicial intervention 
required. The Commission stated that judicial review should ensure the proper use 
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of discretion, curtail arbitrary or discriminatory decisions, and ensure that statutes 
and regulations are properly followed.326 
3.3. Shortcomings of the Public Trust Doctrine as Model 
for Trusteeship in South African Water Law 
As observed by a number of authors, and confirmed by the courts, the value of the 
public trust doctrine lies in its inherent adaptability and flexibility.327 In this 
respect, the South African concept of trusteeship also embraces flexibility, but 
does so through the implementation of processes that facilitate flexible decision-
making.328 However, in both jurisdictions, this flexibility also gives rise to a 
number of difficulties, especially in terms of undermining legal certainty. 
The public trust doctrine is primarily concerned with ensuring that trust property 
is not alienated by the state unless it is in the beneficial interest to do so. In 
addition, it is concerned with the right of access to resources for the purposes of 
fishing and navigation. In some states, the doctrine has been developed to 
encompass modern concerns such as ‘recreation and aesthetic uses’.329 Although 
it originally afforded only rights of access to navigable waterways for commercial 
purposes, it has been developed in some states to create a right of environmental 
protection. In South Africa, however, the primary goals of trusteeship are to 
facilitate the equitable access of water to persons on the basis of substantive 
equality, and to ensure the protection and preservation of the environment.330 
These duties are universal and cannot be derogated from in different areas of the 
country. While each catchment management area is able to create its own 
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Strategy, this must nevertheless further the goals of trusteeship and be consistent 
with the national Strategy.331 
The implementation of the public trust doctrine as a tool for protecting 
environmental resources is limited for a number of reasons. These reasons include 
the fact that ‘the common law tends to operate retrospectively rather than 
prospectively; it is sporadic and case-specific; it develops slowly in multiple 
jurisdictions, making a national and more immediate solution to a problem nearly 
impossible’.332 However, trusteeship in South Africa is intended to facilitate the 
universal improvement of access to water resources, as well as the protection of 
the resource, throughout the country. The past two strategies have attempted to 
implement ambitious changes to the arena of water management.333 Thus, whilst 
the American approach is focused on slow development on a case-by-case basis, 
South Africa requires the implementation of strategies throughout the country that 
are continuously revised to ensure that they cater for contemporary 
requirements.334 This being said, South Africa has thus far inadequately 
implemented these plans owing to the infrastructural difficulties and lack of 
resources as outlined in Chapter 5.335 
In addition, the separation of powers doctrine and the counter-majoritarian 
dilemma present serious barriers to the proper implementation of the public trust 
doctrine as an environmental tool. This criticism is experienced in South Africa as 
well where the review of administrative decision-making processes is questioned 
for the same reasons. In order to temper this criticism, the courts have adopted a 
respectful approach to decision-making, only interfering where at least one of the 
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administrative grounds for review is present.336 This normally entails assessing 
the reasonableness, lawfulness or procedural fairness of the state’s policies.337 
The inconsistencies in the application of the public trust doctrine result in 
uncertainty, not only in the application of the doctrine, but also the nature of the 
rights created, the types of property protected and the classification of the doctrine 
within the legal sphere. Consequently:338 
the common law public trust doctrine is clearly nowhere near a global solution to 
advancing protection for natural resources and the environment, whether 
threatened by state action or private action. However, the public trust doctrine 
can still play an important role in ensuring judicial review of actions that threaten 
natural resources and the environment where an environmental statute does not 
apply or is not being enforced, or where state constitutional provisions to protect 
natural resources do not exist or are ineffective. 
Trusteeship, on the other hand, incorporates the most modern legal principles in 
the context of environmental management, including the principles of inter- and 
intra-generational equity, the precautionary principle and the polluter-pays 
principle.339 In terms of environmental protection the state, as trustee, has been 
tasked with ensuring that the environment is used and developed in a manner that 
is both sustainable and furthers the goals of the Constitution.340 The legal 
framework implemented in South Africa is by far one of the most progressive in 
the world.341 The problem does not lie with the existing law, but rather, with the 
fact that the state has failed to properly implement the law, thereby failing to 
satisfy its duties of trusteeship.342 The public trust doctrine does not provide any 
suggestions as to how this can be remedied. Instead, it is criticised by some 
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authors as being of little use in the context of environmental protection, given the 
straight-forward mechanisms that have been implemented via statutory law.343 
These critics argue that proper utilisation of these statutory and regulatory 
mechanisms, as well as increased public participation, will serve as a more 
meaningful tool in the protection and management of the environment.344 
In the context of South African law, the public trust doctrine does have 
similarities with the legislative notion of trusteeship. However, the South African 
legal framework deviates from the manner in which the doctrine operates, in a 
way that is suitable and favourable for the South African context.345 Many of the 
criticisms that are faced by the doctrine in America are not experienced in South 
African law. The most important similarity between the two is the presence of the 
counter-majoritarian dilemma. However, this issue is not unique to this area of 
law and will be experienced whenever the court is asked to pronounce upon the 
validity of any of the decisions undertaken by the state.  
4. Concluding Remarks 
The purpose of this chapter was to evaluate the current academic reactions to the 
trusteeship clause. Neither the historical or comparative discussions provide 
satisfactory explanations of what public trusteeship is in South Africa. It is clear 
that both of these responses provide more questions than answers. The Mostert 
decision provides that water as a resource is now classified as res communes, and 
it is the assertion of this thesis that this applies to all water.346 It has been argued 
that this classification, whilst historically inaccurate, may be better suited to the 
modern appreciation of water as a resource.347 However, this shift in ideology has 
created a massive flaw in the current legal regime: theft of water is not possible.348 
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As a result, the National Water Act requires immediate amendment in order to 
ensure that this loophole is closed. It is further advanced in this thesis that the 
ability to own water privately is not consistent with the broader statutory and 
constitutional goals. Ownership of water in any form should thus not be possible, 
even in the form of “bare” or “nude” ownership rights. 
The public trust doctrine, too, is not necessarily of assistance insofar as a more 
meaningful understanding of trusteeship is concerned. It will be shown that many 
of the defects in the American doctrine are, in fact, catered for and remedied in the 
South African context. This analysis will be undertaken in Chapter 8. 
Since this thesis is concerned mainly with the notion of state trusteeship in its 
narrower sense, its primary assertion is that statutory trusteeship did not change 
the nature of the state’s role as an administrator of water as a resource. The 
Mostert decision clearly confirms that this is correct by stating that ‘[e]ffectively, 
the 1998 Act does no more than place all water within the aegis of state control, 
which control the State had in any event exercised over public water before it 
came into operation’.349 However, the nature of these duties is completely 
different to that of the previous regime of water management. The National Water 
Resource Strategy provides that there are three primary goals of water 
management: sustainability, equity and efficiency.350 Consequently, the success 
and shortcomings of trusteeship should be measured according to these goals. The 
content of sustainability, equity and efficiency are the focus of the discussion in 
Chapter 5. 
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Chapter Five:  
SUBSTANTIVE COMPONENTS OF 
TRUSTEESHIP 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapters discussed the historical background to water management; 
the legal framework of water management, and the sources of law that determine 
this framework, namely the Constitution, the applicable legislation and 
regulations, and the policies and strategies enacted in accordance therewith; as 
well as the historical and comparative research approaches to trusteeship. This 
chapter will discuss the substantive principles that can be discerned from the 
current legal framework, which are ultimately required to inform water 
management.1  
Statutory trusteeship pertains to the protection, use, development, conservation, 
management and control of water, or more generally, the management of water. 
Further, the standards that water management must attain are required to ensure 
that the goals of sustainability and equity are met; that decisions are taken in the 
beneficial interest of all persons; and finally, that they are constitutionally 
compliant. 
The constitutional requirements pertaining to water management were dealt with 
in Chapter 3. This chapter therefore aims to deal with the remaining three 
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requirements, namely sustainability, equity and the beneficial interest component. 
However, given that the Strategy provides the content for water management, 
these requirements will be discussed in terms of the key features of water 
management as enumerated by the Strategy, namely, sustainability, equity and 
efficiency.2 These features aim to promote the Water Allocation Reform 
programme.3 
2. Sustainability 
Underlying the goals of water management is the principle of sustainability,4 
which entails a balancing act between the demands of environmental protection 
and the development and promotion of economic and social goals.5 In the South 
African context, sustainability is required to ‘secure ecologically sustainable 
development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic 
and social development’,6 and is expressly required by the Constitution.7  
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Sustainability is required by both the Constitution and the National Water Act, 
which establishes sustainable development as one of its primary goals.8 Not only 
is it an express purpose of the Act in terms of the Purposes clause set out in 
section 2, but it is also a requirement of statutory trusteeship, to the extent that the 
management of water must promote sustainable development.9 However, neither 
the National Water Act, nor the Water Services Act define sustainable 
development and in this respect, the definition contained in the National 
Environmental Management Act (the ‘NEMA’) may be useful.  
The NEMA requires the implementation of sustainable development, through the 
‘integration of social, economic and environmental factors into planning, 
implementation and decision-making so as to ensure that development serves 
present and future generations’.10 Sustainable development, as envisaged by 
section 24(b)(iii) of the NEMA, requires that natural resources must be used and 
developed in such a way that also takes into account ‘justifiable economic and 
social development’.11 The requirements of sustainable development allow for a 
balancing act between competing environmental goals and socio-economic 
considerations.12 However, the exact content of these competing considerations is 
left open to the discretion of decision-makers. 
The courts have had occasion to consider the importance of sustainable 
development in the South African legal sphere. The Supreme Court of Appeal 
held that sustainable development lies at the heart of the principles of 
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environmental governance in MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment 
and Land Affairs v Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd and Another.13 This was further reiterated 
by the Constitutional Court, where it posited that the future of environmental 
jurisprudence would be built on the concept of sustainable development, as this 
formed the bedrock of all modern environmental law.14 The importance of 
sustainable development has thus been recognised by the Courts. 
Sustainability requires that development must take place such that it ‘meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs’.15 Sustainability at its core, therefore, seeks to achieve two 
primary goals. The first is to provide for the ‘basic needs of humanity’.16 The 
second goal is to ensure that development takes place within this context based on 
the limits of society, technology and environmental capacity.17 Both these 
requirements highlight the anthropocentric approach of sustainability, that is, the 
fact that the needs of people are placed at the forefront of these considerations.18 
Development entails the modernisation of society – whereby a less developed 
nation or society seeks to progress to the state of a developed country, or an 
already developed country furthers its development. Development in this respect 
can be seen as the intentional ‘social and material’ improvement to the quality of 
life for people. From a philosophical perspective, development results in 
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improving society generally, and thus causing a shift towards a ‘good society’. 
Development can also be seen as something inevitable - the movement of human 
change along an unpredictable, indefinite timeline.19 Whilst these definitions 
allow for sustainability to be viewed from different perspectives, they do not 
really give an indication of what is practically required to give effect to the 
principle of sustainability. 
The rhetoric of sustainable development has been around for decades and many 
countries have adopted the terms in their policies.20 Despite this, it has been 
suggested that sustainability in practice is a ‘myth’ when the rate at which 
resources are being consumed, depleted and destroyed is taken into account.21 
Further, it has been argued that since its introduction by the Brundtland 
Commission in 1987, it has failed to be defined adequately,22 and has instead been 
adopted by corporations as a smoke-screen behind which to hide.23 The reality is 
that sustainability may be difficult to implement in practice because it consists of 
concepts that ‘are not properly defined and operationalised’ and there are no 
guidelines for the assessment of sustainability.24 
In South Africa, despite the importance of this concept being acknowledged by 
the courts, the practical implementation thereof is poor. The vagueness of 
sustainability can potentially be cured through the introduction of sustainability 
indicators, as required by Agenda 21, with the purpose of providing more user-
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Can Regain Ground (2006) 114 – 124.  
23 J Wilsenach (note 21 above) 18. 
24 C M Figuères, J Rockström, C Tortajada (note 20 above) 9. G F Maggio ‘Inter/intra-
generational equity: Current applications under international law for promoting the sustainable 
development of natural resources’ (1996 - 1997) 4 Buffalo Environmental Law Journal 171. 






friendly information to facilitate the decision-making process.25 The United 
Nations agreed to Agenda 21 in 1992, which is effectively an ‘action plan’ for the 
implementation of sustainable development.26 Agenda 21, as reinforced by the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development and adopted by South Africa,27 
specifically requires the development of ‘strong institutions’ as well as 
enforcement mechanisms, in order to ensure compliance with environmental 
obligations.28 These indicators must be based on scientific and internationally 
recognised methods.29 The information should be easily understood by the user 
and conveyed in a manner that is useful to a decision-maker, for example, by 
expressing a trend.30 Factors that would be appropriate to monitor in South Africa 
include access to water, availability of water, the distance to an available water 
supply and the costs to access water.31 
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Practically, Wilsenach has offered four suggestions as to how to ensure the 
sustainability of water.32 In the first instance, the quality of water must be 
maintained. This includes the management of both how water is supplied (to 
prevent its depletion) as well as how it is safe-guarded against depletion. The 
second factor entails reducing the pollution found in water, particularly nutrients 
that are harmful to water systems (causing eutrophication and other forms of 
catastrophic pollution).33 Eutrophication has been named as one of the biggest 
threats to South Africa’s water supply.34 The first two suggestions can be 
facilitated by repeated monitoring and acquiring current information pertaining to 
the quality and pollution levels of water sources.35 The third practical suggestion 
relates to the development of technology to manage water properly.36 The final 
suggestion is the development of skills in the industry.37 As will be seen below, all 
four of these suggestions have been highlighted by the Strategy as focus areas for 
improvement. 
Environmental protection does not require environmental preservation in its exact 
condition as the concept of sustainable development allows deviation where there 
are legitimate developmental goals.38 The deterioration of the quality of the 
environment may be justifiable in certain circumstances, and sustainable 
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eutrophication of surface waters: policy/research needs in South Africa’ (2000) Report to the 
Water Research Commission 4.  
35 See discussion below at Ch 6 (note 64 below).  
36 Wilsenach speaks specifically about the development of technology in the context of separating 
different types of water effluent. See J Wilsenach (note 21 above) 17; B Schreiner, G Pegram and 
C von der Heyden ‘Reality check on water resources management: Are we doing the right things 
in the best possible way?’ (2009) 11 Development Planning Division (Working Paper Series) 9. 
37 J Wilsenach (note 21 above) 22.  
38 S 24(b)(iii). Protection in the context of water is defined in the Act as the ‘maintenance of the 
quality of the water resource to the extent that the water resource may be used in an ecologically 
sustainable way; the prevention of the degradation of the water resource; and the rehabilitation of 
the water resource. 






development does not seek to ensure that the environment remains in a vacuum. 
For example, non-renewable resources such as petroleum are finite. Once 
petroleum resources are depleted, they cannot be replenished. However, in 
undertaking the cost-benefit analysis of such a process, the state may find that the 
cost to the environment in depleting petroleum reserves is outweighed by the 
benefits to society and the economy through the consequential financial and 
infrastructural gains. Thus, the key is to evaluate to what extent destruction, 
depletion and pollution of resources can be justified for social and economic 
goals.39 In this respect, it is important to view the status of natural resources 
within the context of ‘landscapes under constant change, emerging as the outcome 
of dynamic and variable ecological processes and disturbance events, in 
interaction with human use’.40 It is also important to recognise that there are a 
number of factors that influence not only environmental changes, but also societal 
changes, and that the two cannot be viewed in a linear relationship in isolation of 
each other.41 This is why a holistic, system-centric approach to decision-making is 
more appropriate in this context, as will be discussed in Chapter 6.42 
While a certain level of degradation of the environment may be necessary to 
further social and economic development, sustainability can only be achieved if 
there is an environment that can benefit society and the economy.43 If there are no 
resources to adequately satisfy the needs of society, the goals of sustainable 
development will fail. Consequently, the goals of development must function 
together with the goals of environmental protection and preservation.44 The 
                                                     
39 H Thompson Water Law: A Practical Approach to Resource Management and the Provision of 
Services (2006) 200 – 201. 
40 M Leach, R Yearns and I Scoones ‘Challenges to community-based sustainable development’ 
(1997) 28 IDS Bulletin 7. See also Ch 6 (note 66 below). 
41 M Leach, R Yearns and I Scoones (note 40 above) 7. 
42 See Ch 6 (note 14 below). 
43 G E Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) 326. 
44 G Jewitt (note 17 above) 888. 






interdependence of environmental preservation and social well-being has been 
acknowledged by the courts.45  
However, it does appear that where large-scale developments are planned that 
could impact the environment, a privileged, well-organised minority is able to 
resist these developments.46 There are a number of examples in South Africa 
where this has occurred with the result that the poor, who favour development, are 
seen as anti-environment, while those who resist development are perceived as 
‘anti-development, regardless of the cost to the poor’.47 The most recent arena 
where this battle has played out has been in the Karoo, where the multinational 
Shell has applied for the mining rights to commence fracking activities.48 While 
economic development is necessary in this region, the motivations of the state to 
award the licence have been called into question.49 
Within the context of sustainability, there are a number of principles that seek to 
protect the environment, promote conservation,50 and prevent, minimise and 
reverse the effects of pollution. The state, in particular, must ensure that the 
environment is preserved and protected, and environmental degradation and 
pollution are avoided, minimised and/or remedied.51 Environmental principles that 
                                                     
45Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-General Environmental Management, 
Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga Province and Others 
2007 (10) BCLR 1059 (CC) para 102; MEC: Department of Agriculture, Conservation and 
Environment and another HTF Developers (Pty) Limited 2008 (4) BCLR 417 (CC) para 60. 
46 D A McDonald (note 18 above) 38 – 39. 
47 D A McDonald (note 18 above) 39. 
48 E Cropley ‘Karoo fracking: Water, wealth and whites’ Mail and Guardian 28 October 2013; P 
Burkhardt ‘Fracking: Shell SA’s shale drive riles farmers’ Mail and Guardian 27 August 2013. 
Note also the comments of the Department of Mineral Resources Report on Investigation of 
Hydraulic Fracturing in the Karoo Basin of South Africa (2012) 53 - 55, which states that the 
economic impacts of hydraulic fracturing may have the unintended results of increasing property 
prices, forcing locals out of the market and exacerbating socio-economic conditions, particularly if 
the specialised skills required have to be sourced from labour sources. 
49 T Taylor ‘Fracking system “open to abuse”’ The Citizen 4 September 2013. 
50 S 2(c) of the Act. Conservation is defined in s 1 as the ‘efficient use and saving of water, 
achieved through measures such as water-saving devices, water efficient processes, water demand 
management and water rationing’. 
51 Pollution is defined in the Act as the ‘direct or indirect alteration of the physical, chemical or 
biological properties of a water resource so as to make it less fit for any beneficial purpose for 
which it may reasonable be expected to be used or; harmful or potentially harmful to the welfare, 






find application within the context of furthering sustainability include the 
precautionary principle, the preventative principle and the polluter-pays principle. 
These are discussed below. 
2.1. The Precautionary Principle 
The precautionary principle requires that a cautious approach to decision-making 
must be adopted, and this in turn requires an ongoing assessment of the 
situation.52 This risk-averse approach is expressly contained in the NEMA and, 
while not an express purpose of the National Water Act, this approach is required 
in terms of the Strategy.53A cautious approach must be adopted in particular 
where there is a scientific uncertainty which could result in environmental harm.54 
However, this principle has the potential to stymie development if administrators 
are never permitted to take risks. The principle, rather than being absolute, 
requires a balancing act to be undertaken, where the probabilities of the risk 
occurring need to be weighed against their potential costs.55 The court in BP 
Southern Africa (PTY) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment 
and Land Affairs (‘BP’),56 confirmed this principle by stating that administrators 
are required to take a ‘risk-averse and cautious approach about future 
consequences of decisions and actions taking account of the limits of current 
knowledge’.57 
In the Director, Mineral Development, Gauteng Region and Another v Save the 
Vaal Environment and Others58 case, the court also adopted a cautious approach 
                                                                                                                                                 
health or safety of human beings, to any aquatic or nonaquatic organisms, to the resource quality 
or to property’. 
52 E Fisher, J Jones and R von Schomberg Implementing the Precautionary Principle (2006) 115. 
53 S 4(a)(vii) of the NEMA.  
54 M Kidd (note 1 above) 9.See further at Ch 6 (note 86 below).  
55 M Kidd (note 1 above) 9. 
56 2004 (5) SA 124 (W). 
57 150 confirming s 2(4)(a)(vii) of the NEMA. See also MEC: Department Of Agriculture, 
Conservation And Environment And Another v HTF Developers (Pty) Limited 2008 (4) BCLR 417 
(CC) para 24. 
58 1999 (8) BCLR 845 (SCA). 






to environmentally sensitive issues. The state was challenged for the award of 
licences in the context of mineral rights, to which it argued that at the point at 
which licenses are awarded, no rights have yet to be infringed, as there has not 
been any negative effect on the environment.59 The argument the state put forward 
to support this was that the party applying for a license would still have to provide 
an acceptable Environmental Management Plan, and as such could acquire no 
rights prior to so doing.60 As a result, the state argued that the respondents were 
premature in their action against it.61 However, the court disagreed with this 
argument and held that the award of the license makes it possible for the party to 
mine upon successful completion of the Environmental Management Plan, 
thereby creating the possibility for ‘serious consequences’ in the future.62 
2.2. The Preventative Principle 
One of the main features of environmental protection is to avoid damage to the 
environment in the first place.63 This is termed the preventative principle which 
aims to prevent any environmental damage from occurring.64 However, as Kidd 
observes, this is more of a Utopian goal than a practical reality, as economic and 
social development will necessarily impact the environment.65 The scope of 
protection includes not just the water itself, but also the ‘aquatic and associated 
ecosystems and their biological diversity’ as per the Purposes clause of the Act.66 
In this respect, the state can declare certain activities that may be detrimental to a 
water source to be controlled activities.67 Once an activity has been declared as a 
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65 M Kidd (note 1 above) 9. 
66 S 2(g). 
67 S 37(1). Recently, the Minister of Water Affairs stated the government’s intention to have 
fracking declared a controlled activity and has issued a notice for public comment. See National 
Water Act GN 863 of 23 August 2013: Proposed declaration of the exploration for and or 
production of onshore unconventional oil or gas resources and any activities incidental thereto 






controlled activity, it may not be undertaken without the requisite authorisation in 
terms of the Act.68 
The Water Services Act plays an important role in the conservation of water. 
Regulations in accordance with the Water Services Act have been implemented 
which require municipalities to report annually on the available water balance, the 
quantity of water lost, as well as the nature of the demand management activities 
and measures undertaken.69 The Department of Water Affairs has undertaken a 
study to ascertain what targets to establish for the reduction in water loss and 
demand. This study has so far focused on the major metropolitan areas, such as 
Cape Town, where specific goals of reducing water demand by 20% have been 
established through the implementation of a long-term Strategy.70 The WSA also 
requires water service authorities to enact bylaws that prevent the unlawful use 
and waste of water.71 
                                                                                                                                                 
including but not limited to hydraulic fracturing as a controlled activity. F Parker ‘Frackers will 
need to apply for a water licence, says Molewa’ Mail and Guardian 3 September 2013.  
68 S 37(2). Controlled activities must be licenced in terms of National Water Act GN 519 of 6 May 
2009: Notice to register a water use in terms of s 21(e), (f), (h) and (j) of the Act (ie engaging in a 
controlled activity, discharging waste or water containing waste, disposal of water in a manner that 
could detrimentally impact on a water resource, disposing of water which contains waste from 
industrial/power generating process, and removal, discharge or disposal of underground water 
where necessary for safety of people). But see also National Water Act GN 399 of 26 March 2004: 
Revision of general authorisations in terms of section 39:  
1. Engaging in controlled activity, identified as such in s 37(1): Irrigation of any land 
with waste or any water containing waste generated through an industrial activity or 
by a waterwork, which exempts certain irrigation activities from the ordinary 
licencing requirements;  
2. Discharge of water or waste containing water into a water resource through a pipe, 
canal, sewer, or other conduit; and disposing in any manner of water which contains 
waste from, or which has been heated in, any industrial or power generating process, 
which exempts certain water discharge activities from the ordinary licencing 
requirements. 
3. Disposing of waste in a manner that may detrimentally impact on a water resource, 
which exempts the disposal of waste activities from ordinary licencing requirements. 
69 Reg 11 of GNR 509 of 8 June 2001: Regulations relating to compulsory national standards and 
measures to conserve water. Strategy (2013) 53. 
70 Strategy (2013) 54. 
71 S 21(g) of the Services Act. 






Where the possibility of the protection of the resource is not possible, this 
principle aims to reduce or mitigate the harm, and remedy any past harm.72 The 
National Water Act specifically requires the reduction and prevention of pollution 
and degradation of water resources.73 The rhetoric of these concepts is such that 
where the preservation of the resource is not possible, the effects of destruction or 
damage must, firstly, be minimised and secondly, be remedied.74 The legislation 
does not require that the effects are either minimised or remedied. Rather, it 
requires that both are fulfilled. These requirements apply to the preservation of 
ecosystems and biological diversity, the avoidance of pollution and degradation of 
the environment, as well as the protection of the nation’s cultural heritage.75 
There are a number of mechanisms in the Act that aim to facilitate the protection 
of the environment, and the prevention or minimisation of pollution. For example, 
a responsible authority can prescribe conditions for the award of a license for the 
use of water.76 These conditions can set out the requirements for the protection of 
the resource, impose monitoring criteria, and prescribe the ways in which the 
pollution of water is to be addressed.77 
Evidently, many municipalities are failing to ensure the protection and 
preservation of water. A recent study undertaken by the National Water Research 
Commission found that some of the rivers in South Africa, many of which are the 
primary source of water for irrigation of agricultural produce, contain E.coli 
bacteria 10 000 times higher than that allowed by the World Health Organisation, 
as well as the Department of Water Affairs’ own standards. The consequences of 
this could be catastrophic for South Africa’s export economy as this could result 
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75 For further information on the various models of pollution monitoring [Uniform Effluent 
Standards Approach (which monitors acceptable levels of effluent in water sources), the Receiving 
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in the suspension of international trade of fruit and vegetables. More alarming is 
the fact that contact with this water, even if accidental, could cause death.78 
The Strategy, however, does assert that the quality of drinking water and 
wastewater discharge at a municipal level has substantially improved since the 
implementation of the Blue and Green Drop Programmes.79 The Blue Drop 
Report is a compulsory certification programme aimed at incentivising the 
performance of municipalities by scoring them on a number of areas, including 
the quality of the available drinking water and the management performance of 
the municipality.80 Despite this, many areas still struggle to provide clean drinking 
water, often as a result of effluent pollution.81 
The cause of this pollution is twofold: a lack of proper sanitation in informal 
settlements results in faecal and other pollution landing up in rivers; and the poor 
management of water treatment plants results in raw sewage leaking into rivers.82 
The Strategy makes it clear that, at a national level, the state is aware of the 
impacts of malfunctioning and inadequate wastewater treatment works on water 
quality.83 Other threats posed to the water quality, as acknowledged by the 
Strategy include eutrophication, microbial contamination, salinisation, toxicants, 
altered flow regime, acid mine drainage, metal contamination, radioactivity, urban 
rivers and agro-chemicals.84 
The Strategy has highlighted the urgent need to address the pollution of water 
resources. In this respect, the Strategy aims to rehabilitate polluted catchment 
areas, clear invasive alien plants in water resources (which cause algae growth and 
                                                     
78 S Mouton ‘Human waste in rivers used to irrigate crops’ Times Live 12 August 2013. See also M 
Soloman ‘Farmers express fear over toxic water’ (2013) Daily Dispatch. 
79 Strategy 70. The latest available Blue Drop Report (2012) is for the January to December 2011 
period. See Department of Water Affairs Blue Drop Report 2012. 
80 See Department of Water Affairs Blue Drop Report 2012. 
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eutrophication) and treat mine water.85 Despite the legislative requirements and a 
number of programmes that have been implemented by the state to ensure the 
protection and preservation of water and water ecosystems, there has been a 
‘demonstrable drop in the aquatic ecosystem health across the country and 
increased stress on water resources’.86 The latest Strategy shows that 60% of 
South Africa’s river ecosystems are threatened.87 In addition, as many as 48% of 
wetland ecosystems are, as a result of pollution, critically endangered.88 The 
weakness in the approach to the protection of water resources is not in the 
mechanisms that have been adopted, but rather, the implementation of these 
mechanisms.89 This is clearly a breach of the duties of trusteeship, particularly the 
duty to prevent and minimise pollution and, more broadly, to ensure sustainable 
development of the resource. Not only does it not adequately protect the 
environment, but these statistics show that society is prejudiced by this state of 
affairs as a result of the dramatically impaired quality of the available water 
supply. Either the water used for crop production is essentially poisoned, or the 
polluted water requires great levels of treatment before it is safe for human 
consumption at great cost to the state and, ultimately, the taxpayer. 
At a national level, to curb the pollution and destruction of water resources, three 
areas have been highlighted by the Strategy. The first is the implementation of the 
National Freshwater Priority Areas, which aims to scientifically identify a 
proportion of ecosystems as priority areas, which are then all recorded in a central 
database.90 The purpose of this database is to assist decision-makers and planning 
processes.91 The second proposal is more clearly to ascertain and then enforce 
buffer zones around water sources.92 These buffer zones form an important barrier 
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between land use activities and water sources.93 Finally, the rehabilitation of 
ecosystems that have already suffered damage is a priority area in terms of the 
Strategy.94 This threefold approach is consistent with the precautionary principle. 
The renewal of these ecosystems has secondary benefits to the extent that the 
renewal projects create jobs in the region, and opportunities for cooperation 
between local communities and government.95 
In the context of future economic development goals, the Strategy highlights the 
importance of appreciating the value of water conservation, in all economic 
sectors, and demand reduction strategies for water use must be implemented 
accordingly.96 The Strategy aims to reduce water loss through the implementation 
of water demand reduction, more particularly, Water Conservation and Water 
Demand Management (WCWDM).97 This is focused not only on the state at a 
municipal level, but also on the private sector in the context of the agricultural, 
mining, industrial and energy sectors.98 
In the municipal sector, these targets have been fixed and the focus of the Strategy 
is to ensure that they are implemented. To this end, the Strategy requires 
municipalities to report on a quarterly basis, the content of which must relate to 
the management activities undertaken as well as the quantifiable reduction in 
water losses.99 In the mining, energy and industrial sectors, targets have not yet 
been established, as each different activity will have different water 
requirements.100 The focus of this Strategy is, therefore, to ascertain the targets for 
each type of activity.101 Finally, a reduction in the demands of the agricultural 
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sector will be addressed through the setting of targets and the priority in this 
regard is to measure the water uses in this sector.102 
2.3. The Polluter-Pays Principle 
The third principle aimed at promoting environmental protection and preservation 
within the context of sustainability is the polluter-pays principle.103 As discussed 
above, damage to the environment negatively affects the potential for 
development by depleting or diminishing the quality of an available resource. 
Pollution and overuse of water has consequences for sustainable development, in 
that there is ultimately less water available to promote other social and economic 
goals. The polluter-pays principle is relevant here, as it requires that the person 
responsible for environmental damage should also bear the financial 
consequences thereof.104 This principle is confirmed by the NEMA, as it requires 
that any pollution, environmental degradation or adverse effects on the health of 
parties is the financial obligation of the responsible party.105 This includes the 
financial expenses for either preventing and controlling or minimising these 
effects.106 The principle is thus comprised of both a preventative as well as a 
reactive component.107 
                                                     
102 Strategy (2013) 58. 
103 N de Sadeleer Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (2005) 21; L 
Ferris ‘The public trust doctrine and liability for historic water pollution in South Africa’ (2012) 
8/1 Law, Environment and Development Journal 3. 
104 The principle was adopted in 1974 by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development – see M Kidd (note 1 above) 7; T Field (note 26 above) 761. 
105 S 28 of the NEMA. However, see L J Kotzé (note 20 above) 113 who shows that the extent to 
which the NEMA is applicable in the context of water law remains uncertain. However, T 
Winstanley ‘Administrative measures’ in A Paterson and L Kotzé (eds) Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa (2009) 230 suggests that the NEMA is ‘sufficiently 
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106 S 4(2)(p). For example, in Pretoria, residents have been complaining that their water is 
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News 24 10 April 2013.  
107 See also M Kidd (note 1 above) 8, who comments that the NEMA and other South African 
legislation dealing with the polluter-pays principle does not do so sufficiently. 






The National Water Act implements measures targeted at preventing pollution and 
addressing emergency incidents.108 The onus in these situations is on the party 
who has caused or is likely to cause pollution to take control of the situation.109 
However, where the responsible party, owner or person in control fails to do so, 
the catchment management agency is given the discretionary power to issue a 
directive to this party.110 Failure to comply with this directive entitles the agency 
to implement any measures that it deems necessary under the circumstances and 
recover the reasonable costs from the responsible party, owner or controller of the 
land, or any other negligent party involved.111 The agency may also claim from 
any party who benefitted from the failure to prevent the pollution, to the extent of 
that benefit.112 However, it is not a prerequisite for the agency to act where a 
private party fails to do so, and consequently this approach is largely reactive. 
While the Minister and agencies may take a reactive approach to pollution after it 
has occurred, the polluter-pays principle can also be used in a preventative manner 
to prevent pollution from occurring. For example, the Strategy aims to incentivise 
water reduction practices on the basis of the polluter-pays principle by 
implementing a waste discharge charge system.113 The waste discharge charge 
system will incorporate two charges or levies on water use, with the goal of 
encouraging consumers to reduce their water consumption. The first charge (the 
Waste Mitigation Charge) will be set up to cover the administrative costs of 
addressing the negative impacts of waste discharge.114 The second charge (the 
Waste Discharge Levy) will be charged proportionate to the amount of water 
utilised by a person, to deter water wastage.115 At present, this system is being 
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established in three catchment areas, namely the Upper Crocodile River West, the 
Upper Vaal River and the Upper Olifants River.116 
In the context of acid mine drainage, which remains a major source of pollution of 
water,117 one of the aims of the Strategy is to pursue private individuals for 
remuneration in accordance with the polluter-pays principle, where an identifiable 
owner still exists.118 However, it is typically the case that much of the mining 
activity that originally caused the pollution took place many decades ago, making 
it difficult to identify the original culprits of the pollution, or hold them 
accountable in terms of the prior legislative regime.119 Because of the urgency of 
the situation and the difficulty in tracing the parties guilty of causing the pollution, 
the state has had to finance and install a system to prevent this acid mine water 
from contaminating Johannesburg’s water supply.120 
In an extreme example, the state has, to some extent, applied this principle against 
itself. The Department of Water Affairs has reported the municipality of 
Stellenbosch to the National Prosecuting Authority, which is now considering 
instituting criminal charges against the municipality. This is after the municipality 
failed to treat the pollution of the river that runs through the town, which has 
grown worse for over a decade. The pollution has been caused by inadequate 
sewage facilities, and poses a health risk to both the users of the water for 
domestic consumption as well as farmers who use the water for irrigation.121 
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119 L Ferris ‘The public trust doctrine and liability for historic water pollution in South Africa’ 
(2012) 8/1 Law, Environment and Development Journal 1 - 2. See in this respect the interview 
conducted by Carte Blanche with John Munro, the CEO of Rand Uranium (2010).  
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Another component of responsibility in the environmental context pertains to 
what is termed the ‘life cycle responsibility’.122 Where a person or entity has 
introduced a dangerous substance, component or situation to the environment, that 
party is responsible for it until it is disposed of and remedied.123 
3. Equity 
The goals of water management in terms of equity are encapsulated both in the 
trusteeship provision and the Purposes clause of the National Water Act, as well 
as the preamble to the Water Services Act. The National Water Act requires that 
the basic human needs of present and future generations must be met, ‘equitable 
access to water’ must be promoted, and finally, that the ‘results of past racial and 
gender discrimination must be redressed’.124 In addition to the Purposes clause of 
the National Water Act, the NEMA requires that both renewable and non-
renewable resources must be used responsibly. The use of non-renewable 
resources must be equitable, also taking into account the ‘potential depletion of 
the resource’.125 It is therefore necessary to discuss these aspects of equity to 
establish what trusteeship entails. 
In view of the political history of South Africa, the promotion of equitable access 
to water resources must favour vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. There is a 
large overlap between equality and dignity, and equality and access to water.126 
Equality in the Constitution cannot be interpreted to mean that there is a right to 
an equality of goods, as this would be an impossible task to realise.127 Instead, it 
means that, at the very least, everyone should be afforded the same rights, even 
though the practical realisation of these rights may differ. This right recognises 
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that state intervention is necessary to distribute resources more equally such that 
basic needs can be met.128 Given the inequality of access to resources prevalent in 
the South African society, the state’s duty to realise the rights of South Africans 
progressively in the context of basic needs means not only giving effect to an 
‘equality of rights but also equality of dignity’.129 
As will be discussed below, the promotion of equality in the context of access to 
water will also further the goals of human dignity. To this end, the Water 
Allocation Reform Programme sets aside water for allocation to previously 
disadvantaged groups.130 It aims to redistribute water by 2024 such that 60% of 
available water is in the hands of the black population, and 55% percent of water 
is held by women to further the goals of racial and gender redistribution.131 The 
current national target is for 30% of water to be ‘in the hands of South African 
black and women citizens’.132 This is consistent with the National Water Policy 
Review, which aims to reform the governance of water, and focuses on the 
provision of water, services and the associated benefits on an equitable basis.133 
The Strategy states that this is the ‘decade for equity and redistribution’.134 The 
Strategy aims to ensure that there is sufficient water for all, as well as sufficient 
water for economic growth and development.135 It consequently aims to fulfill the 
constitutional right of access to water, whilst taking into account the requirements 
of sustainable development. There are three approaches to equity in water 
management according to the Strategy, namely equity of access to water services, 
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to the water resources themselves, and to the benefits accrued from water 
development.136 
To remedy the inequality of access to water, the principles of inter-generational 
and intra-generational equity are central, as they aim to ensure not only equal 
access to resources between current users, but also for future users of water. In 
addition, human dignity is central to the right of access to water. This section will 
therefore discuss inter- and intra-generational equity, human dignity, access to 
water resources and the beneficial use of water in the public interest.  
3.1. Inter- and Intra-Generational Equity 
Inter-generational equity requires the use and development of natural resources 
that factors in the needs of both present and future generations.137 Present 
generations must not only use and manage the environment to benefit themselves, 
but also ensure that the environment is capable of being enjoyed by future 
generations.138 As a result, a balance must be struck between the consumptive 
demands of the present generation, as against the potential needs of future 
generations.139 The achievement of inter-generational equity also promotes and 
facilitates the realisation of sustainability.140 
Intra-generational equity, on the other hand, requires the fair utilisation of 
resources between both local and global members of the present generation.141 
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Intra-generational equity is also required by the Constitution and the Act, and is 
expressed in the form of the promotion of equality.142As has been stated, the 
Constitution employs the notion of substantive rather than formal equality,143 
which allows for differentiated treatment of parties, depending on the social and 
economic context in each case.144 
The Act’s goals to eliminate the effects of past racial and gender discrimination 
are promoted by the implementation of substantive equality.145 In this regard, 
emphasis is placed on the role of women, the youth and other vulnerable 
parties,146 whose participation must be ensured. One of the practical ways in 
which this is done is to require that the responsible authority must, prior to issuing 
a license or award, consider the need to redress past racial and gender 
discrimination.147 Similarly, catchment management agencies, in the exercise of 
their functions, are directed to ‘be mindful of the constitutional imperative to 
redress the results of past racial and gender discrimination and to achieve 
equitable access for all’.148 Should the Minister wish to appoint additional 
members to the governing body of a catchment management agency,149 this must 
be done in a way that would ensure adequate representation of the community, 
particularly where the community has suffered racial and gender prejudice.150 It 
must also serve to achieve sufficient gender and demographic representation.151 In 
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addition, where a catchment management agency has acted in a manner that is 
unfair, inequitable or discriminatory, ministerial intervention is permissible, and a 
directive may be issued ordering the agency to remedy the action.152 
Substantive equality is also promoted through the implementation of a pricing 
strategy, where it is permissible for a responsible authority to differentiate 
between parties on the basis of the geographic area and nature of the water use, as 
well as the water users themselves.153 Another mechanism that is employed is that 
the Minister may grant financial assistance in the form of a loan, subsidy or 
grant.154 Some of the factors that may be considered in doing so are the need for 
equity, as well as the need to redress the results of past gender and racial 
discrimination, in the context of the applicant’s financial position and the purpose 
for which the assistance will be used.155 While the current regulations make 
provision for financial assistance to the rural sector for the purposes of farming, 
the Department is currently investigating the possibility of extending this support 
to other ‘water-based rural livelihoods and food-security initiatives’.156 
One of the primary goals of the Strategy is to promote equality and development, 
as well as the elimination of poverty.157 The proposed reform of water legislation 
intends to align water management to focus on the goals of poverty reduction.158 
The Minister of Water Affairs has acknowledged that water reform thus far has 
not adequately addressed the goals of equitable redistribution.159 The Department 
aims to do this by, inter alia, reforming the current water allocation system, and 
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extending financial assistance to ‘emerging farmers’ as well as supporting 
economic development initiatives.160 
The Constitutional Court has had occasion to consider substantive equality and 
the right of access to water. In the Mazibuko case, the applicants contended that 
the implementation of pre-paid meters violated their right to equality and was 
unfairly discriminatory because it was not also implemented in wealthier, 
predominantly white suburbs.161 The policy, however, was not applied in all poor 
areas occupied by black people.162 The court undertook the constitutional test to 
establish whether the discrimination was unfair, which required an analysis of the 
steps set out in the case of Harksen v Lane NO and others.163 Section 9(3) of the 
Constitution is the source of the legitimacy of substantive equality, as it provides 
that discrimination may be permissible provided it is not unfair. The criteria that 
must be evaluated for the purposes of this enquiry include the group affected, the 
interests of this group, and the purpose of the discrimination.164 The court 
acknowledged the importance of not encroaching on the terrain of legitimate 
government purposes, particularly given the difficulty of the state’s task in 
addressing and managing socio-economic conditions in South Africa.165 
The court concluded that the purpose of the policy was legitimate, in that it sought 
to eliminate large scale water losses in the region.166 Further, given the ongoing 
legacy of Apartheid, where large sectors of society are still geographically divided 
along racial lines, differential treatment may be ‘necessary or desirable’.167 
Finally, as to the effect of the policy, the court concluded that the implementation 
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of pre-paid meters, in light of the governmental objectives thereof, did not 
unfairly discriminate against the applicants.168 In concluding, the court was 
careful to point out the legitimacy and importance of substantive equality within a 
constitutional democracy, and further, the necessity for the courts to respect the 
authority of government to introduce policies, provided they are lawful and 
reasonable.169 
There is clearly a relationship between socio-economic rights and equality, and a 
transformative Constitution such as South Africa’s requires that this relationship 
be substantively investigated and furthered. Liebenberg discusses the situation 
where systemic socio-economic inequalities exist, particularly where there are no 
social policies or programmes to redress this inequality. She argues that in these 
circumstances, in order to give effect to the transformative goals of the 
Constitution, the courts must investigate both the cause of action arising from the 
constitutional provision pertaining to socio-economic rights, as well as the right to 
equality.170 
Environmental justice is also a key component of intra-generational equity and 
substantive equity.171 Environmental justice is a movement that developed in 
South Africa after the start of democracy, with the goal of ensuring equal access 
to natural resources, both in terms of adequate quantity and quality.172 This is a 
modern construct that has accompanied the arrival of environmental principles 
and norms, and refers to the ‘distribution of benefits and burdens in a society’.173 
However, similar to sustainability, it has not been adequately defined.174 It does 
appear, though, to be primarily based in substantive equity and ensuring fairness 
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in the context of access to a safe and healthy environment.175 Glazewski states that 
‘environmental justice, social justice and sustainable development, which includes 
socio-economic considerations, are inherently linked’.176 
Kidd highlights that there are two levels of environmental prejudice in the context 
of environmental justice. At a macro-level, environmental prejudice occurs 
between states at an international level.177 For example, the Southern African 
Development Countries (SADC) share a number of water resources. If South 
Africa were to withdraw too much water, or pollute the water, any downstream 
users would be affected. The micro-level amounts to a prejudice within the 
community which is the biggest problem in terms of access to water in South 
Africa. 
The devastating impact of a lack of environmental justice was realised at the 
‘Poverty, Inequality and Environmental Hearings’ where impoverished 
communities were able to express their concerns regarding the environment. From 
this,  
‘it became clear that the litany of environmental problems which beset the poor, 
and which are largely the result of apartheid’s inequitable, racially based planning, 
is a long one…Appalling accounts of the misery resulting from being forced to live 
without hope in conditions of environmental degradation worsened by poverty and 
unemployment were delivered… These accounts underlined the fact that the major 
causes of death in South Africa are related to environmental factors such as 
inadequate sanitation, inefficient (or no) solid waste removal systems, lack of 
access to clean drinking water, and the siting of polluting industries in close 
proximity to areas housing the poor’.178  
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This situation grossly undermines the dignity of those affected and, whilst clean 
drinking water is now available to most people in South Africa, the lack of 
adequate sanitation must be addressed.179 It is also clear that environmental 
programmes will not be successful if they do not factor in the impact of poverty 
on the environment. As stated by Khan ‘[u]nless this issue is faced head on, and a 
concerted effort is made to balance the needs of the environment with that of the 
poor, poverty will continue to force the poor into unsustainable living patterns and 
to perpetuate environmental injustice’.180 
3.2. Human Dignity 
Equitable access to water and human dignity are intimately linked together. As 
Chaskalson states, the rights in the Constitution are ‘rooted in respect for human 
dignity, for how can there be dignity in a life lived without access to … water’.181 
The inclusion of the idea of a principle of dignity in water management echoes the 
sentiments of the international arena, as well as the constitutional ideals of South 
Africa.182 The right to dignity is a non-derogable founding value of the South 
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African Constitution.183 It is also a self-standing clause in the Bill of Rights, 
which provides that ‘everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their 
dignity respected and protected’.184 The UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights has said that the right to water is a prerequisite for the satisfaction 
of other human rights, and ultimately a dignified life.185 
Dignity as a constitutional ideal operates on two different levels in South Africa. 
Because of its inclusion in the Bill of Rights it is a self-standing justiciable human 
right. However, it also independently underlies each of the other rights in the 
Constitution, operating as a value with interpretive weight. Therefore, not only 
does dignity operate as a human right in and of itself, it also underlies all other 
rights in the Constitution. Consequently, the fulfillment of any of the rights in the 
Bill of Rights must seek to ensure that the underlying value of dignity is promoted 
and ensured.186 
It has been stated that other rights in the Constitution are ‘meaningless’ if 
sufficient water is not made available.187 There is consequently a large overlap 
between the principles of dignity and access to water. Practically, the right to 
dignity will be most important in the context of the provision of sufficient water 
for human needs such as drinking, cooking, washing and sanitation.188  
The court had occasion to consider the importance of dignity in the context of the 
Mazibuko decisions.189 In the first of the series of decisions heard in the 
Witwatersrand Local Division, Mazibuko and others v City of Johannesburg and 
                                                     
183 S 1; A Chaskalson (note 126 above) 196. 
184 S 10. 
185 J Scanlon, A Cassar and N Nemes (note 182 above) 6; United Nations Economic and Social 
Council, Committee on Economic social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 15 (2002). 
The right to water (Arts 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights) Twenty-ninth session, Geneva, 11-29 November 2002.  
186 I Currie and J de Waal (note 19 above) 275; G E Devenish (note 43 above) 81. 
187 J Dugard (note 12 above) 596.  
188 H Thompson (note 39 above) 207; D du Toit, S Pollard and R Pejan (note 4 above) 2. 
189 See also the discussion above at Ch 3 (note 76). 






others (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions as amicus curiae)190 [hereinafter 
Mazibuko (W)], the judgment commenced with the words ‘[w]ater is life, 
sanitation is dignity’.191 The decisions of the High Court and the Supreme Court 
of Appeal (the ‘SCA’) found in favour of the applicants and show that dignity 
played a central role in this enquiry, recognising that without giving effect to the 
right of access to water, other rights in the Bill of Rights could not be fulfilled.192 
The SCA, in particular, was mindful that the responsibilities of the state were 
nevertheless limited by its available resources.193 
The Constitutional Court, however, did not engage with the arguments pertaining 
to dignity at all.194 Liebenberg argues that the court should have substantively 
evaluated whether the amount of water provided was sufficient to meet the daily 
needs of the community such that their dignity was not infringed. The ‘impact’ of 
the restriction ‘on their life, health and dignity’ had to be considered in addition to 
whether the City had the resources to make more water available.195 The earlier 
decision of the court aquo shows a far greater appreciation for the concept of 
dignity by stating the following:196 
To deny the applicants the right to water is to deny them the right to lead a 
dignified human existence, to live a South African dream: to live in a democratic, 
open, caring, responsive and equal society that affirms the values of human 
dignity, equality and freedom. The denial would perpetuate the decades-long 
poverty, deprivation, want and undignified existence of the recent past. The Bill 
of Rights guaranteed in the Constitution would, as a result of the denial, remain a 
distant mirage of unfulfilled dreams. The denial is unconstitutional and therefore 
unlawful. 
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The Constitutional Court instead stated that it was not competent to evaluate what 
the content of the right entailed and whether sufficient water was being provided 
by the City.197 However, as the Supreme Court of Appeal pointed out in its earlier 
decision, the City had not argued that it had insufficient resources to provide more 
water to the residents of Phiri.198 Rather, the City argued that it had no obligation 
to provide free water to these residents.199 
3.3. Access to Water 
At the ‘core of [the right to water] is the right of access to water’.200 This is 
embodied by the constitutional provision which requires that everyone has the 
right to have access to sufficient water. Equitable access is one of the primary 
goals of the Strategy201 but, as stated above, this does not necessarily entail an 
equality of goods.202 However, it does at the very least require that provision must 
be made for the basic needs of water use to be met.203 The state has implemented 
the Free Basic Water Programme with the aim of providing access to water to 
all.204 The current daily quota per person amounts to 25 litres per day, or 6 
kilolitres per household per day. Commentators argue that this amount is 
insufficient to meet the basic amount of water required in terms of section 27.205 
The Constitutional Court in the Mazibuko decision clearly stated that it was not 
competent for the court to comment on the sufficiency or not of this amount.206 
This must be compared with the earlier Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision 
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which ordered that the City be required to revise its policy in such a manner that 
42 kilolitres were provided to those who could not afford to pay for water,207 as 25 
litres was insufficient.208  
In South Africa, the inequality of access to resources is exacerbated by poor 
literacy levels, poverty and infrastructural inadequacies inherited from 
Apartheid.209 The stark contrast between running water and flushing toilets in 
suburban households as compared to the lack of sanitation and clean water in 
township areas underscores this reality.210 In addition, dumping sites, industrial 
zones and other waste manufacturers and facilities are often on the doorstep of the 
most vulnerable in the community, contributing to a further degradation of 
environmental health and well-being.211 In the 1980s, environmental movements 
emerged, which focused on what are termed ‘brown agenda’ issues, that is, they 
focus on the importance of the environment in ensuring healthy and safe living 
and working conditions, as opposed to conservationist-oriented movements which 
existed before (termed ‘green agenda’ issues).212 Intrinsic to this progression was 
the understanding of the inextricable link between poverty and the 
environment.213 It is clear that poverty is, and will remain, intimately linked to the 
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quality and quantity of available resources.214 The Strategy acknowledges this 
link.215 However, the Constitutional Court, having had a chance to pronounce on 
this exact issue, failed to reinforce the problematic nature of the relationship 
between poverty and access to resources.216 
In the case of Mazibuko and Others v City Of Johannesburg and Others, the 
Constitutional Court acknowledged the inherently unequal nature of access to 
water in South Africa.217 The way in which the cost of water is calculated and 
charged also presents difficulties. The court in Mazibuko grappled with the 
difficulties inherent in establishing a pricing strategy that was fair and 
accommodating of the most vulnerable in society.218 Given the complexity of 
water management and the difficulties associated in recouping payment from 
water users, the pre-paid metering system is one of the practical ways in which the 
sustainable use of water can be implemented and monitored.219  
The duty to provide access to water also includes a duty on the state to provide 
water services in terms of the Water Services Act. This requires the state ‘to 
progressively ensure efficient, affordable, economical and sustainable access to 
water services’.220 This duty is, however, limited by the available water supply 
and the duty to conserve water resources, the duty to ensure access to water and 
regulate water services on an equitable basis, and the requirement that consumers 
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pay a reasonable fee for water.221 In addition, this duty is limited by the 
geographic features of the area in question, as well as the right of the authorities to 
discontinue water services, provided a ‘failure to comply with reasonable 
conditions set for the provision of such services’ exists.222 
The Water Services Act requires a number of considerations to be taken into 
account by water services authorities in fulfilling its duty to provide access to 
water services.223 They must take into account the need to ensure equitable access 
to resources.224 This must be balanced against the necessity to ensure efficient 
service, as well as economic factors, such as ensuring that costs remain as low as 
possible.225 
Bluemel asserts that the right of access entails that water is ‘physically and 
economically accessible to everyone without discrimination or danger to physical 
security’.226 Furthermore, the water that is accessible should be both of sufficient 
quantity and of an acceptable standard for drinking and sanitation purposes.227 
Access to water and the state’s attempt to eradicate poverty are closely linked 
together.228 In this respect, the state has introduced a number of schemes to 
increase access to water.229 Kidd has stated that ‘the government’s commitment to 
providing access to water and sanitation to all people cannot be faulted’.230 
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However, sanitation services in many township and rural areas are still inadequate 
to ensure that the constitutional values of dignity are satisfied.231 
The Strategy, as well as the National Water Policy Review, has reiterated the 
importance of ensuring equitable access to water.232 One of the ways in which the 
state aims to better ensure equality of access to water is to introduce a ‘use-it or 
lose-it’ scheme.233 Where legitimate users of water fail to use their allocated 
quantities, the State aims to recall this legal entitlement. The available water will 
then be placed in the ‘public trust’, where after it will be reallocated to other users 
on the basis of furthering racial and gender goals.234 
3.4. Beneficial Use of Water in the Public Interest 
New water uses are only to be authorised if it can be shown that the water use is 
beneficial and in the public interest.235 The beneficiaries of water resource 
management are the public, and consequently, decisions pertaining to water and 
its use must be made in the public interest.236 This requires the ‘efficient, 
sustainable and beneficial use’ of water.237 When a responsible authority makes a 
determination as to whether a general authorisation or license should be awarded 
for the use of water, for example, they must take into account whether the 
proposed use is efficient, beneficial and in the public interest.238 In this respect, 
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the authority must also consider the socio-economic impact of both the water use 
itself and the refusal thereof.239 
The Strategy states that the factors that may be considered in deciding whether a 
water use is beneficial and in the public interest include the following: the 
possibility of job creation; the extent to which the use would affect the 
environment; the extent to which the use would affect other users; the extent to 
which the use would further economic and social development; and whether the 
proposed use of water would further the goals of equitable access to water.240 
4. Efficiency 
Modern water infrastructure must take into account the immediate needs of 
providing basic access to water, as well as ensuring that the costs, both financially 
and to the environment, are not too high.241 These principles were discussed above 
in the context of sustainability and equity. The furthering of these goals requires 
solutions to water management that promote efficiency. An efficient 
administration is constitutionally mandated by section 33(3) of the Constitution.242 
Alternative methods of water management, provision of water services and 
development of infrastructure, with a focus on efficiency, need to be highlighted 
as the next step in the development of infrastructure generally.243 
The Strategy has reaffirmed the importance of the state’s role in ensuring the 
efficient and effective functioning of water management.244 The efficiency of 
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water management in particular will depend on the proper functioning of the 
administration itself, which requires not only that administrators have the requisite 
skills and education to perform their tasks, but also that the administration is 
transparent and accountable. Secondly, for the administration of water 
management to be efficient, the requisite physical infrastructure facilitating this 
must be in place. Infrastructure in the context of this discussion refers not only to 
the physical entities necessary for the provision of water services, but also the 
institutional infrastructure necessary to properly implement the goals of 
trusteeship.  
The importance of a competent administration together with the requisite skills 
and technology will be discussed below. In addition, the duty of the state to ensure 
that the physical infrastructure of water management is functional will also be 
discussed. The requirement that administrators act in accordance with the 
principles of democracy (such as transparency and accountability) will be 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
4.1. Functioning Infrastructure 
The importance of the proper functioning and operations of water infrastructure to 
the provision of water services has been acknowledged by the state.245 The Act 
establishes as one of its purposes the promotion of dam safety and the 
management of floods and droughts, which requires that the necessary 
infrastructure should be in place to manage these conditions.246 However, the day-
to-day provision of water and water services would not be possible if the 
necessary infrastructure was not in place, which would result in a breach of the 
duties of statutory trusteeship. Consequently, the Act allows the Minister to 
acquire, construct, alter, repair, operate and control waterworks.247 However, there 
are countless media reports of municipalities around the country which are failing 
to fulfill their trusteeship duties, by not ensuring that the infrastructure in place is 
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adequate, functioning properly or appropriately staffed with skilled operators.248 
The shortcomings of these municipalities result in a failure to ensure the safe and 
sufficient supply and storage of water as well as the rehabilitation of polluted 
water – presenting one of the biggest hurdles to overcome in the arena of water 
management. 
4.1.1. Efficient Water Demand and Supply Systems 
One of the purposes of the Act is to ensure that the demands for water use are 
met249 and at present there is sufficient available water from traditional sources in 
South Africa to meet these demands.250 However, this may not always be the case, 
particularly given the high volumes of water that are lost as a result of poorly 
maintained infrastructure. Recently, the Water Research Commission published a 
report highlighting the wastage of water around the country with up to 90% of 
water being lost through leaking pipes and theft in some municipal regions.251 
This water is termed ‘non-revenue water’.252 A total of 40% of South Africa’s 
water, worth R7 billion, is lost or stolen annually.253 The wastage has been 
attributed to poor management and a failure to adequately maintain records of 
water usage.254 
While there may be sufficient water overall to provide for the needs of water 
users, there are a concerning number of water regions that experience damaging 
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water shortages. In a survey completed in 2004, almost half of the water regions 
in South Africa did not have sufficient water to meet their water use demands.255 
In many of these areas, it would be impractical and very costly to transfer water 
from basins where there is a surplus.256 
 
Figure 4: Water deficit regions in South Africa257 
The National Water Conservation and Water Demand Management Strategy aims 
to minimise water loss and reduce the overall demand for water.258 One of the 
goals of this Strategy is to reduce the amount of water lost and stolen at a 
municipal level.259 Two of the proposed solutions are to install a more accurate 
metering system and also to ensure that water is appropriately priced and the 
funds collected.260 The Department may create regulations to govern this aspect 
and such regulations are required to account for the needs of the vulnerable by 
ensuring that the pricing of water is appropriate.261 
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In addition to this Strategy, the Department has introduced a number of 
mechanisms to ensure that the demand for water does not outweigh the supply 
thereof, which at the present rate of water usage would occur in 2030.262 In 
balancing the supply and demand, fixed targets to improve the efficiency of water 
use were established through strategies called Reconciliation Strategies.263 The 
development and maintenance of infrastructure is one of the focus areas of these 
strategies.264 The measures include the development of the Lesotho Highlands 
Water Scheme, which is to become operational in 2020, as well as the 
introduction of desalination plants around the country.265 The Department has also 
dedicated R4.3 billion to municipalities, which are experiencing a water crisis, the 
number of which amounts to 30% of the municipalities in the country.266 The 
recycling of waste water, as well as the treatment of acid mine drainage, are 
further initiatives which are to be implemented over the next few years.267 At 
present, this waste is not adequately addressed.268 Finally, the Department aims to 
educate the public about the importance of water in an effort to reduce the total 
demand required.269 
In 2004, the first National Water Resource Strategy provided that before any new 
infrastructure is built, water use must be reduced and minimised by reducing 
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water loss and implementing more efficient systems. 270 Plus Economics has said 
that the water infrastructure in place in South Africa is sufficient to meet its needs, 
but is not adequately maintained, rehabilitated and managed.271 Consequently, 
huge water losses can be avoided if the current water infrastructure is properly 
preserved and maintained. A focus on increasing the efficiency of existing 
systems is to be preferred to building new ones. The focus of these improvements 
should aim to prevent water loss as well as conserve water. In particular, the 
efficiency of these systems must be improved, in terms of reducing the demand 
for water rather than by increasing the supply thereof.272 There is thus a renewed 
focus on introducing mechanisms that use water efficiently. An example of such 
an efficiency measure is found in Mexico city, where toilet flushing systems were 
re-designed with the result that enough water was conserved to satisfy the daily 
water needs of 250 000 people.273 The goal, therefore, is to identify areas in South 
Africa where water can be used more efficiently. 
The Strategy has identified certain key areas where changes to water use patterns 
and infrastructure can reduce water use. It is estimated that, worldwide, only 40% 
of water used for agricultural purposes translates into food production.274 In South 
Africa, over 60% of water consumed is used for agricultural purposes and 
decreasing the quantity of water required by implementing more efficient systems 
can result in huge water savings. Efficient solutions that have worked in other 
countries include implementing a drip-method irrigation system, or more precise 
sprinkler systems, that have dramatically improved the efficiency of irrigation.275 
By implementing more efficient systems, the demand for water can be reduced, 
rather than having to increase the supply for the same services. The Strategy has 
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recognised the importance of these methods, particularly in the context of 
reducing water demand in the agricultural sector.276 More efficient systems are to 
be introduced in this sector to prevent water loss and increase the efficiency of 
water use.277 
One of the measures being implemented by the Msunduzi Municipality is the 
installation of water pressure management systems that can learn the ‘operating 
characteristics of the water distribution network and optimise water supply’.278 
This will not only manage the water supply more proficiently, but also provide 
decision-makers with key information about water use. Improved technology is 
central to assisting with water management, addressing the goals of water reform 
and increasing the efficiency of water use systems.279 
The national and catchment management strategies are required to set out 
objectives for the establishment of institutions to meet water management 
goals.280 It is argued that sustainable development cannot be achieved if the 
correct infrastructure is not in place, and, more importantly, if this infrastructure, 
once in place, is not being used properly. Consequently, the state as trustee is 
required to ensure that the requisite infrastructure is in place to provide water 
services, and further, that this infrastructure promotes the efficient use of water. 
4.1.2. Institutional Inefficiency 
The institutional framework of water management has given rise to difficulties 
over the past few years, as the roles and functions of the different institutions have 
not been clearly defined, resulting in an overly complex system.281 In addition, 
there have been insufficient institutions to deal with water management 
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properly.282 The delineation of water management is also proving to be a 
hindrance in certain circumstances, particularly in the context of the municipal 
management of water. The planning and coordination of water management at a 
national level appears to be running quite smoothly. However, at a municipal level 
the implementation of these policies and strategies is inadequate. For example, the 
Strategy highlights that many municipalities are not dedicating sufficient funding 
to the development of water resource infrastructure.283 
The state has acknowledged these difficulties and created the Institutional Reform 
and Realignment process to remedy this situation.284 The state aims to target the 
management of institutions at the national, regional, catchment and local level 
with a goal to simplifying the institutional approach to water management.285 It 
also aims to streamline and more clearly delineate institutional powers.286 
To improve institutional efficiency, the allocation of powers and responsibilities is 
to be revisited to ensure that there is no duplication in functions and the various 
plans and strategies are in harmony with one another.287 This is not only between 
different state departments, but also between national, provincial and local 
levels.288 To make the allocation of responsibilities clearer, the state will realign 
the sector so that water users (such as water service authorities and providers in 
terms of the Water Services Act) are not involved in the process of water use 
allocations.289 As a result, the state aims to clearly separate institutions 
responsible for the regulation and operation of water management.290 Further to 
this process of enhancing efficiency, the Minister will delegate his or her powers 
relating to the implementation of the plans and policies as well as the 
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‘development, financing, operation and maintenance of water resources 
infrastructure’.291 The goal is for the national level to focus only on ‘policy 
development, strategic planning, regulatory oversight and support’.292 
Water management at a municipal level is problematic and, in this respect, the 
Strategy promotes the adoption of a differentiated approach. This allows the state 
to facilitate a different level of support to municipalities depending on their needs. 
The state will also offer institutional support to municipalities through the forum 
of Regional Water Utilities. The Regional Water Utilities will be able to contract 
out their services to municipalities for the provision of water services, or provide 
these services directly to water users on behalf of the municipality in question.293 
More generally, tighter fiscal controls are to be implemented requiring 
municipalities to more successfully recover costs from water users.294 
4.1.3. Financial Inefficiency 
The Department of Water Affairs estimates that it requires R700 billion over the 
next ten years for investment in water and sanitation infrastructure - 
approximately R70 billion per year.295 To put this staggering amount into 
perspective, for the 2013/ 2014 financial year, the Department of Water Affairs 
was only allocated R10.2 billion, evidencing that it is desperately underfunded.296 
The Department has called on the private sector to invest in the development of 
infrastructure to provide some of the financial shortfall that is necessary.297 The 
revision of the current pricing Strategy will also aim to address this deficit by 
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ensuring that the full costs of water infrastructure and management are taken into 
account.298 
The financial governance of the water management sector has been brought to 
light in the Strategy, citing theft, water leakages and failure to ensure payment of 
accounts as some of the reasons for the poor financial performance of 
municipalities. Other reasons that are given are the high costs of treating polluted 
water, poor monitoring of water use, inefficient pricing mechanisms, and 
unsuitable revenue and debt management. While some of the financial losses are 
therefore attributable to inefficiency, ‘corruption, tender fraud, maladministration 
and lack of governance’ are also some of the reasons for the high financial losses 
experienced at a municipal level.299 These problems in the financial management 
of water will further add to the woes of managing the enormous R700bn budget 
required to ensure that South Africa’s infrastructure is furthered. 
In a study undertaken by the Water Research Commission, together with the 
South African Local Government Association, a number of municipalities’ 
performances in terms of infrastructure were evaluated. It was found that many of 
the municipalities were reactive rather than proactive, and lacked the skills and 
facilities to properly manage water supplies. Municipalities also failed to dedicate 
sufficient funding, or simply did not have the funds to allocate to water 
management and infrastructure.300 To improve the financial health of 
municipalities and the water sector generally, more emphasis will have to be 
placed on recouping the expenses of water use from consumers. This also entails 
the strengthening of financial skills and capacity at a municipal level, skills which 
are in short supply.301 
Technical incapacity and a lack of infrastructure are some of the biggest 
challenges that face the proper implementation of the Water Conservation and 
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Water Demand Management programme, as envisaged by the Strategy. To this 
end, the Department aims to provide guidance on the implementation of these 
programmes, build on the success of other municipalities in this regard, and look 
to the private sector to provide the technical and financial expertise necessary.302 
The Strategy also aims to improve the management of water conservation and 
demand before it uses funding to build new infrastructure. The intention is that the 
Water Conservation and Water Demand Management programme is central to 
reducing financial losses by reducing water losses and increasing the quantity of 
water available.303 
4.1.4. Lack of Skills in the Industry 
The Strategy has acknowledged that the overly complex institutional system, as 
well as the shortage of technical skills in the industry, presents a huge obstacle to 
ensuring that water is managed efficiently.304 According to the Strategy, over 57% 
of the engineering positions in the Department are vacant. In addition, over 23 
000 management staff are immediately required, as well as an additional 12 000 
people for the purposes of fulfilling developmental and financial management 
roles.305 The Strategy has identified the development of its institutional capacity 
as a key area for development including the improvement of human resources, 
managing and monitoring systems.306 Further regulations are still required to 
govern the qualifications required for the various positions within the sector.307 By 
streamlining these institutions and staffing them appropriately, a more efficient 
system of water management can be created. 
Schreiner et al argue, however, that the state is failing to meet its duties to 
effectively and sustainably manage South Africa’s water resources because it does 
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not have the capacity to do so. They argue that the state has consistently adopted 
the approach of implementing complicated water policies, with the expectation 
that the requisite capacity will then be developed. However, they point out that 
this has failed. They further argue that the correct approach would be to adopt less 
sophisticated techniques of water management that operate within the bounds of 
capacity that already exist.308 Consequently, while the Strategy aims to simplify 
the processes involved in the management of water, it is argued that this system is 
still too complex to function until the skills shortage in the sector is remedied. 
4.2. Cooperative Governance 
Both the National Water Act and the Water Services Act require the promotion of 
the principles of cooperative governance.309 In addition, the National 
Environmental Management Act requires that government departments must 
cooperate with each other, and this is consistent with the requirements set out by 
Chapter 3 of the Constitution.310 The purpose of this cooperation is to ensure that 
there is consistency and harmonisation of policies, legislation and procedures that 
are implemented in accordance with the legislative framework.311 Where any 
conflicts exist between departments, the appropriate conflict resolution 
mechanisms must be utilised.312 This harmonisation will further the goals of 
institutional efficiency. 
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The Act requires the Strategy to determine and promote the interrelationship 
between agencies in a holistic and integrated manner.313 In addition, a catchment 
management agency must, in the process of establishing its Strategy, consult with 
the Minister and any organ of state or interested party who may be affected, 
thereby promoting the goals of cooperative governance.314 The Strategy reinforces 
the importance of cooperative governance to manage water properly. Particularly 
in the context of bringing awareness of the importance and value of water to 
various stakeholders, including business and communities, the Strategy reiterates 
that the Department requires the cooperation of other departments.315 
While this legislatively enacted goal seeks to harmonise the state’s approach to 
water management, the practical implementation of cooperative governance is 
poor. This is particularly so between the Department of Water Affairs and the 
Department of Mineral Resources, which are arguably the two departments that 
need to communicate the most in the context of the protection of water 
resources.316 
An area of great concern in the context of water management is the protection of 
the resource where mining activities are involved. The pollution of water 
resources caused by years of mining activities is experienced around the 
country.317 While regulations are in place that require, inter alia, the careful 
protection of water and the prevention of pollution, either through run-off, 
seepage or leeching, these mechanisms are not properly enforced.318 
Contravention of these regulations is an offence and could result in a fine or 
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imprisonment of up to five years.319 This not only applies to the manager or 
employee of the mine who contravened the regulations, but also the person in 
control of the mine, where express or implied consent can be shown.320 
The Strategy, in giving effect to the principles of cooperative governance, has 
stated the processes of the Department of Water Affairs and the Department of 
Environmental Affairs are to be consolidated in a number of instances. First, the 
coordination of programmes in the two departments relating to compliance and 
monitoring of water use authorisation and other water uses will be promoted.321 
Secondly, in the context of climate change the two departments will be required to 
align their approaches to managing the anticipated environmental changes.322 The 
application for a mining license is also to be consolidated. To obtain a mining 
license, it is going to become a requirement that a water license is also obtained. 
However, to ensure that this process is swift, there are plans to consolidate the 
mining and water license application into one.323  
Greater efficiency has economic benefits, for example, not dissuading foreign 
investment by making the process lengthy, costly and complicated. However, it is 
unclear who will have the power to award and monitor these licenses. Should the 
process of awarding and monitoring licenses be given to the Department of 
Mineral Resources, as it is anticipated that it will be, this will decrease the scope 
and power of the Department of Water Affairs.  
The courts have recognised the importance of cooperative governance.324 In 2012, 
the North Gauteng High Court exempted the Minister and Department of Water 
Affairs from a ruling that it made against the Carolina Municipality, for failure to 
fulfill its duties. The water source for this region had been polluted by mining 
activities, resulting in acid mine drainage. Despite the National Government’s 
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attempts to provide drinking water to the residents of Carolina, the municipality 
had hampered these efforts. The Minister was also critical of local government’s 
failure to address infrastructural concerns timeously. She specifically 
acknowledged the Department’s role as custodian of water, indirectly stating that 
this applied to all water services authorities as defined by the Water Services 
Act.325 
There is some debate as to whether Catchment Management Agencies’ are subject 
to the principles of cooperative governance.326 Consistent with the arguments put 
forward by Pejan and Cogger, it could not have been the intention of the Act for 
agencies to be excluded from the purview of the principle of cooperative 
governance, given the central role they are intended to perform in the context of 
water management. Thus, despite the fact that the Act does not make this clear, 
the purpose of the Act and water management generally would favour an 
interpretation that ensures that these agencies are treated consistently with other 
institutions.327 
4.3. Cooperation with the Private Sector 
Cooperation between the state, civil society and the private sector is crucial to 
achieving the goals of sustainable development.328 The state has acknowledged 
the importance of the private sector to water management efforts and the need for 
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cooperation between the private and public sector.329 One of the stated principles 
of the Strategy in the context of the reduction in water demand is to focus on 
collaborations between the public and private sector330 and the services that they 
can offer in terms of financial assistance and technical skills. Businesses can offer 
skills and infrastructural development to society, particularly in more remote 
areas. The complementing of the skills and capacities of these entities is referred 
to as ‘complementary core competencies’.331 At the same time, the establishment 
of companies in these areas has to be monitored by both government and Non-
Governmental Organisations (‘NGO’s’) to ensure that the communities’ interests 
are properly considered.332 
The nature of the relationship between government and NGOs should be 
symbiotic rather than antagonistic - government is able to derive an advantage 
from NGOs by utilising the wealth of skills, findings and perspectives they have 
to offer, while NGOs can derive a benefit from governmental cooperation.333 
However, this relationship must be treated with caution so as to avoid the situation 
where government will ‘strike deals with self-interested pressure groups’ under 
the guise of public participation.334  
The long-term consequences of the industry failing to realise the severity of a 
water shortage cannot be understated: a water shortage will be felt in every sector, 
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and preliminary estimates suggest that it will result in a 1.2% decline in South 
Africa’s annual GDP (gross domestic product).335 While this may not sound like 
much, this would have amounted to a loss of 4.61172 billion US $ in 2012.336 
However, there have been developments in the private sector that indicate 
knowledge of these consequences,337 and programmes have been implemented 
that evidence cooperation between the private and public sector.  
The most notable of these is a programme developed by Sanlam, titled the Living 
Waters Programme, which together with its initial R12 million investment has 
attracted a further R67 million from other industry players. The programme’s 
applicability has been extended from only fresh water to ‘anything to do with 
water, anywhere in the country and off its shores’. This proactive approach has 
been welcomed by the WWF fund and it is hoped that other key industry players 
will adopt a similar approach.338 
Whilst this thesis focuses on the obligations of the state as trustee to ensure 
sustainable development, one of the most important stakeholders in this process is 
the private sector. The constitutional provisions relating to the protection of the 
environment and the requirements to provide access to water339 will be applicable 
to private actors to the extent that the Constitution is also horizontally 
applicable.340 Where this is the case, private actors may be held to the same 
standard as the state in terms of ensuring the rights in the Bill of Rights are 
satisfied.341 
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Transnational corporations as well as mega-corporations dominate industries 
around the world. In South Africa, this is particularly so in the mining sector 
where vast sums of capital are required in order to mine natural resources. The 
state has had to relinquish much of its control over the private sector and in this 
respect corporate social responsibility (‘CSR’) may be a mechanism through 
which the state can reclaim some of that power.342 CSR requires companies to be 
accountable not only to their shareholders, but also other stakeholders that are 
affected by their business activities, for example, the local community. This 
extends to a duty to avoid committing harmful acts, that could for example 
damage the environment, but also to ‘engage in activities that promote desirable 
social ends’.343 From an environmental perspective, the King Report (2009) stated 
the following:344 
Sustainability is the primary moral and economic imperative for the 21st century. 
It is one of the most important sources of both opportunities and risks for 
businesses. Nature, society, and business are interconnected in complex ways that 
need to be understood by decision-makers. Most importantly, current, 
incremental changes towards sustainability are not sufficient – we need a 
fundamental shift in the way companies and directors act and organise 
themselves. 
The implementation of CSR is an entirely voluntary imperative of the company as 
there are no legal requirements for its implementation.345 The attraction for 
businesses and companies to implement corporate social responsibility is the 
improvement in profits as a result of an improved reputation.346 As a result, many 
corporations are implementing CSR in order to achieve a ‘more responsible, 
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strategic approach to environmental management, labour relations and community 
development’. 347 
However, criticisms have been leveled against CSR, despite its appeal. The first 
objection made is that the focus of businesses and corporations should be 
economic in nature. If businesses tackle social responsibility in addition to their 
own economic viability they distort market statistics. In addition, they may be 
enabling the state to shirk its responsibilities by performing its tasks on its behalf. 
The second concern with CSR is that commercial entities use it as a smoke screen 
to divert attention away from the negative impacts of manufacturing and 
production. They implement low-impact, highly publicised changes in order to 
appear to be accommodating ‘changed social expectations and global 
circumstances’. Whilst businesses may hold the financial key to ensuring the 
implementation of successful sustainable development, they are also one of the 
biggest reasons why sustainable development is required in the first place. This is 
what is known as the ‘corporate citizenship paradox’. If the commercial world is 
not genuinely interested in improving its social and environmental objectives, 
they are likely to implement just enough change to convey the appearance of 
genuine concern.348 
Another criticism that this approach faces is that the involvement of private 
stakeholders may have the effect of reinforcing the inequality of access to water. 
Privatisation will tend towards wealthier areas, as the objective of private 
companies is profit-driven. Consequently, if private companies are too heavily 
relied on for the provision of water services, this may have the effect of excluding 
the most vulnerable in society from these services. 349 
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The way in which to respond to this potential façade is to ensure that an objective 
standard is developed against which the compliance with environmental and 
social standards is measured. This should include ‘tangible standards and targets, 
combined with joint industry, civil society and government monitoring 
arrangements’. Another recommendation made is that civil society utilises 
compliance with these standards to affect business reputation. This is described as 
the ‘naming and shaming’ or ‘naming and praising’ process.350 
The state has called on the private sector to invest in the improvements being 
made to water infrastructure, as the state is unable to finance these improvements 
unassisted.351 The Strategy aims to attract investment from the private sector to 
assist with the funding deficit and one of the stated goals is to encourage the 
mining sector to invest a portion of the mandatory corporate social investment 
contribution into the development of the water sector.352 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The purpose of this chapter was to identify and discuss the substantive features of 
trusteeship that are created by the legal framework. The state, in its role as the 
trustee when managing water resources, is required to promote the goals of 
sustainability, equity and efficiency, whilst ensuring compliance with the 
constitutional mandate as discussed in Chapter 3. This chapter also attempted to 
highlight the problems that face the state in terms of the implementation of these 
duties. 
Sustainability requires that the considerations of environmental protection are 
balanced against the needs to promote economic and social development.353 Three 
principles assist in ensuring that resources are managed sustainably: the 
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precautionary principle advocates a cautious approach to decision-making;354 
while the preventative principle aims to prevent, minimise and remedy negative 
impacts to the environment;355 and the polluter-pays principle holds the polluter 
responsible for environmental damage.356 These principles, however, do not 
necessarily assist with the practical achievement of sustainability.357  
The second feature that guides water management is the requirement of equity. In 
this respect, access to water resources must be promoted on an equitable basis.358 
Equity requires not only that access to water resources is provided between users 
of the present generation, but it also requires that the needs of future generations 
are taken into account.359 This chapter further showed that substantive equality is 
required, which allows for the differentiation between users.360 In addition, the 
furthering of equitable access to water is intimately linked to the promotion and 
satisfaction of human dignity.361 The requirement for the state to justify its 
decisions by showing that water is beneficially used in the public interest was 
discussed.362  
The third component of this chapter focused on the importance of introducing 
efficient mechanisms in the context of the management of water resources and 
provision of water services. In this respect, the deficiencies in the current physical 
and institutional infrastructure were highlighted.363 In addition, financial364 and 
technical inefficiencies within the water management sector were highlighted.365 
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Finally, the principles of cooperative governance,366 as well as cooperation 
between the private and public sector were discussed,367 to show how these 
relationships are both integral to the functioning of the water sector, as well as 
necessary for the promotion of the efficiency thereof.  
The legal framework of water management has been discussed, as well as the 
substantive features that inform the duties of trusteeship. The focus of the 
following chapter is to evaluate the practical implementation of trusteeship. 
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Natural resources, within the global context, are perceived in many societies as 
essential, not only to human life, but ‘the economy, social justice, and national 
security’.1 The importance of water for the development and survival of humans 
has prompted the recognition of the water cycle as a unitary process, as well as an 
appreciation of the importance of water within the context of the ecosystem.2 
However, there is only a finite amount of water available in a closed system, and 
the rate of human population growth is not stable.3 It is expected that the rate of 
water use and the human need for water will continue to increase exponentially,4 
while the volume of water available to sustain this population remains the same.5 
The consequence of this is a per capita decrease in water availability over time.6 
By 2020, it is anticipated that the quantity of blue water7 will no longer be 
sufficient to satisfy human needs, and up to 50% of the world’s population could 
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be faced with water scarcity.8 What compounds this problem even further is the 
rate of industrialisation and mechanisation around the world as many countries 
rely on production for economic survival. The manufacturing process requires 
vast amounts of water, which is not returned to an acceptable condition for human 
use and consumption. The pollution of water further reduces the quantity of water 
available. In addition, water cannot be contained within the boundaries of a 
nation. As a result, the water usage of neighbouring countries, particularly those 
upstream, will impact heavily on their surrounding counterparts.9 The image 
below demonstrates the percentage of low rainfall across South Africa. 
 
Figure 5: Rainfall patterns in South Africa10 
The consequences of overconsumption and water pollution can be avoided if 
effective regulatory systems and management approaches are implemented to 
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manage the uses of water.11 Contemporary approaches recognise that water 
resources must be viewed within their ‘natural, social, economic and political 
environment’.12 The necessity and urgency of an appropriate regulatory regime 
has been recognised by the international community,13 and the concepts of 
Integrated Water Resource Management (‘IWRM’) and Adaptive Management 
have been proposed as potential management systems to address these concerns.14 
These management systems recognise ‘that complexity, variation, and uncertainty 
are inherent properties of linked social and natural processes, and that natural 
resource management strategies must somehow reflect these properties in the 
pursuit of sustainability’.15 
IWRM is a systematic approach to the management of water and is concerned 
with ensuring a governance system that is coordinated and integrated in its 
approach to natural systems.16 The underlying basis of IWRM is an appreciation 
of natural systems as complex, adaptive systems, or ‘open systems that interact 
with their environment’.17 These systems are dynamic and responsive to change.18 
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Adaptive Management is a key feature of IWRM, and requires a flexible decision-
making process that is holistic rather than compartmentalised.19 Adaptive 
Management ‘acknowledges the complexity of the systems to be managed and the 
limits in predicting and controlling them’.20 It is concerned with embracing and 
reacting to the uncertainty of these natural systems, and learning there from, and 
is more centred on ‘organisational learning’.21 It further recognises that a top-
down, market-related approach to water management is unsustainable. In addition, 
the decision-making process cannot be confined to specific departments and other 
stakeholders must be included and considered.22 
IWRM was first recognised in 1977 by the Mar del Plata Action Plan of the UN 
Conference on Water, and later at the International Conference on Water and the 
Environment in Dublin.23 The principles established at these conferences 
recognised the finite nature of water and its value both to human life and the 
environment. They also acknowledge the economic importance of water, as well 
as the central role that women play in relation to the decision-making process. 
Finally, the principles aimed to give effect to participatory democracy. These 
principles featured heavily in Agenda 21, which was adopted at the Rio Earth 
Summit in 1992.24 These principles are all incorporated into South Africa’s water 
management regime.25 
These management approaches, namely IWRM and Adaptive Management, have 
been adopted by South Africa and are incorporated into the legal framework by 
the National Water Act, the Water Services Act and the Strategy.26 Given that the 
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state, as the trustee of water resources, is responsible for the management of 
water, these approaches are to be put into practice in implementing the principles 
of trusteeship, as set out in Chapter 5. These concepts will now be discussed, as 
well as their implementation within the context of the South African legal 
framework. 
2. Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) 
The Strategy is focused on developmental water management27 and provides that 
IWRM is the basis of the approach to water management.28 It further highlights 
the importance of IWRM, both in the domestic and international context. In terms 
of South Africa’s shared water sources, IWRM must be applied consistently with 
domestic legislation, as well as international water protocols and agreements.29 
IWRM is also relevant in the context of the delineation of power to catchment 
management agencies, as this is a feature of IWRM generally.30 In this respect, 
South Africa has established nine catchment management areas in terms of the 
relevant water basin areas.31 Finally, IWRM also aims to value water as an 
economic good.32 In this regard, the Strategy states that an expert panel is to be 
created with the intention of reviewing the pricing structure for the provision of 
raw and bulk water services.33 The Strategy notes that South Africa currently 
undervalues water and charges too little for the resource.34 This must be 
juxtaposed with the constitutional requirement of access to water, particularly in 
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light of the many South Africans who would not be able to pay for water if it was 
charged for, and/or charged for at a higher rate.35 
IWRM views the water systems within, not only their greater organisational 
framework, but also the natural landscape within which they are situated, 
therefore taking a holistic view of the ecosystem.36 As stated in Chapter 5, 
management decisions are required to take into account the broader ecosystem in 
order to further the goals of sustainability, environmental protection and 
preservation.37 IWRM thus seeks to manage water within its hydrological cycle, 
as required by the Act.38 This distinguishes it from the preceding legal framework, 
where water management was compartmentalised in terms of ground water, 
wastewater, storm water and water supply.39  
These regimes also focused on single systems without taking into account the 
broader context within which they operated.40 The objective of previous regimes 
was to focus on the quantitative output of a single system, for example, profit or 
yield.41 However, IWRM instead focuses on the observable features of the system, 
such as sustainability.42 In this manner, the characteristics of a particular system 
can be monitored over time to evaluate the extent to which sustainability is 
achieved. 
Additional ways in which the promotion of a holistic approach to water 
management is undertaken is through the promotion of cooperative governance by 
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requiring communication and coordination between the departments.43 The South 
African legal framework requires cooperative governance, not only between 
departments, but also between the different hierarchies of the system (that is, 
national, provincial and local government).44 
IWRM acknowledges the importance of holistically managing a resource such as 
water, where the factors that may influence the quality and quantity thereof are 
unquantifiable and uncontrollable most of the time.45 It focuses on the interaction 
of various components in the water cycle including their different uses.46 This 
holistic approach to water management is no easy feat, and the essential 
ingredient is reliable data.47 This approach is labour-intensive, as it requires 
administrators to consider vast quantities of data, on an ongoing basis.  
Both the National Water Act and the Water Services Act require the Minister to 
establish a national information system on water resources and water services in 
the country.48 This duty requires the collection of data for the purposes of 
monitoring, development and implementation of national policy.49 The goal of 
this process in the context of IWRM, namely obtaining and processing data, is to 
identify trends and processes that result in greater efficiency and sustainability.50 
Changes to the water management system may have unintended results, either 
positive or negative, that would go unidentified if a compartmentalised approach 
was to be adopted.  
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An example provided by Fletcher shows this relationship. If the state were to 
introduce efficiency measures in order to reduce the demands on water supply, 
one would expect positive results as this pressure was eased. However, if for 
example, the waste water system has been specially designed to function by 
anticipating a certain volume of daily wastewater, then the unexpected reduction 
in water to the facility could negatively impact the system in place. As a result, 
communication and planning between the different departments is necessary 
before making changes in one system that could potentially affect the functioning 
of others.  
A further requirement for the success of IWRM is that all stakeholders need to 
cooperate, as well as share data, in order to function in tandem towards water 
management goals.51 This requires trust between participants and an ability to 
work together. In order to facilitate this kind of relationship, transparency and 
accountability must be encouraged between the stakeholders. The proper 
collection of data will rely on good leadership, public participation, transparency 
and accountability, and the sharing of collected data in order to ensure true 
stakeholder participation.52 Furthermore, community involvement and public 
participation are necessary to ascertain the cooperation and assistance from local 
stakeholders. Whilst the goals of public participation, transparency and 
accountability are constitutionally mandated, the state has difficulty meeting the 
required standards.53 
In order to collect data, the parameters and nature of the study, as well as the 
objectives thereof, must be clearly defined. This includes identifying the spatial 
and temporal parameters thereof, that is, the geographical area and duration of the 
study. These parameters must anticipate the uncertainty of the data, but also 
establish permissible boundaries for this uncertainty. The contents or variables of 
the study must also be set out. The manner in which data is to be collected must 
be identified, and verification thereof is important. While the collection of data is 
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largely a technical process, it will have no meaning unless the necessary 
information is extrapolated from the data.54 It follows, therefore, that it is 
necessary for this data to be interpreted by persons with the requisite skills. As 
was discussed in Chapter 5, one of the major flaws of the system of water 
management is a lack of skills and expertise, as well as insufficient institutional 
memory.55 Consequently, a management approach which requires vast quantities 
of data to be collected and analysed may not be practically possible. 
An element of uncertainty is essential to IWRM and a linear approach to decision-
making is therefore an inappropriate method of analysis, as it does not allow for 
the criteria to be changed as new information becomes available.56 Instead, cycles 
of data collection and analysis are required with an appreciation that the 
objectives of the study can vary or change along the way, thus requiring a high 
degree of flexibility.57 However, this must always be within the parameters of 
flexibility, as established at the outset of the study. The distinction between data 
collection and analysis is also conflated in practice as the process is interactive 
and will consist rather of feedback loops.58 It thus requires a system that is easily 
capable of evolving in accordance with changing criteria.59 
The National Water Act, the Water Services Act as well as the Strategy enable the 
implementation of IWRM by requiring the establishment of catchment 
management agencies, as well as the acquisition of complete and reliable 
information.60 Water service authorities and water service providers, as the 
suppliers of water services at a local government level, are required to ensure that 
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their planning is consistent with the goals of water management generally.61 The 
Strategy requires a rational approach to planning between the various levels of 
government and the manner in which this is to be achieved is through the 
implementation of IWRM,62 and the promotion of the principles of cooperative 
governance. 
3. Adaptive Management 
Adaptive Management is a ‘systematic approach in improving management and 
accommodating change by learning from the outcomes of management policies 
and practice’.63 In essence, Adaptive Management allows decision-makers 
continuously to test and experiment in the context of uncertainty, to improve the 
governance of natural resources.64 As a result, it ‘provides added value [to 
IWRM] through explicitly embracing uncertainty’.65 It has been introduced as a 
result of an appreciation that water is a highly complex system and traditional 
management models are no longer appropriate.66 
Adaptive Management is popular as a contemporary way of dealing with the 
uncertainty of natural resources ‘because it acknowledges that managed resources 
will always change as a result of human intervention, that surprises are inevitable, 
and that new uncertainties will emerge’.67 In order to manage resources 
efficiently, Adaptive Management allows for ‘learning by doing’ – policy-making 
that is flexible in the face of these surprises. Proponents of Adaptive Management 
argue that for it to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied. In the first 
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instance, it requires resilience of the ecosystem, and secondly, flexibility of the 
decision- and policy-making process.68 
In broad terms, resilience refers to an ecosystem’s ability to withstand changes 
caused by human behaviour.69 The use of natural resources by humans affects the 
surrounding ecological system often in unforeseen ways. While this occurs quite 
quickly in some instances, for the most part these ecological shifts take place quite 
slowly over time.70 Management of ecosystems should aim to increase the 
resilience of a system as this will in turn increase the ability of the ecosystem to 
withstand disturbances and return to equilibrium.71 
One of the ways in which the state has attempted to ensure that water resources 
are kept in equilibrium is to establish minimum quantities of water necessary for 
human and ecological purposes. The National Water Act introduced the concept 
of the Reserve for the purpose of establishing the ‘resource base’, which is the 
absolute minimum amount of water required to maintain a ‘level of ecological 
integrity and function’, in order to ensure the resilience of an ecosystem.72 The 
Reserve, in turn, has two stages of management: Resource Directed Measures 
(‘RDM’) are adopted, which include the classification of water sources and 
establishment of the Reserve, as well as the ‘setting of resource quality 
objectives’;73 in addition, Source Directed Controls (‘SDC’) are implemented, 
which regulate the ‘sources of impacts on water resources such that the objectives 
for resource protection are achieved’.74 Thus, the Reserve establishes a minimum 
water supply (or status of equilibrium) that must be ensured to satisfy the water 
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needs of both humans and the environment, thereby setting the minimum basis of 
water requirements within an ecosystem.  
Thus, Adaptive Management aims to manage a resource flexibly to achieve 
stability of the system. However, where variances in an ecosystem occur, 
decision-makers can react in three different ways. In the first instance, managers 
may wish to do nothing where an ecosystem is changing because of human 
behaviour, in the hope that the system is resilient and will return to equilibrium 
unsupported. The second approach is to intervene actively and try to restore the 
system to equilibrium through human intervention. Thirdly, managers may have 
to acknowledge that the ecosystem has been permanently altered and a new 
management approach will have to be introduced.75 
While there are different responses that managers may take, Adaptive 
Management allows this decision-making process to take place with incomplete 
information. It also allows for decisions to be made purely for research purposes, 
in order to acquire additional information. Adaptive Management requires 
continuous information-gathering of the systems in place. With the acquisition of 
new information, decisions can be updated in order to improve systems.76 The 
focus is therefore on learning, from a variety of sources, including historical data, 
local community knowledge and scientific indicators.77 Given the severe skills 
shortage in the water sector as described earlier in this thesis, the water sector 
urgently needs to address this deficit, as without the relevant, processed data, 
decision-makers will be unable to implement Adaptive Management effectively.78 
It is not only the skills shortage that presents a barrier to the implementation of 
Adaptive Management. An additional problem with Adaptive Management in 
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South Africa is the inability for the various stakeholders (such as scientists and the 
state) to agree to the implementation of IWRM in the first place.79 
Further, the inherent uncertainty necessary for Adaptive Management is 
problematic, as flexibility in a legal system necessarily undermines legal 
certainty.80 This uncertainty is not unique to the management of water in South 
Africa, but is an uncertainty felt with resources management generally throughout 
the world.81 This practical phenomenon notwithstanding, rules, laws and policies 
are premised on the necessity to create certainty between the various stakeholders 
in society. Certainty is an important component of a legal system, as it guides the 
actions and decisions of the public. It is also easier to monitor an administrator’s 
compliance with fixed rules. However, the courts have acknowledged the 
importance of flexibility to the proper functioning of a legal system. While the 
law provides the framework within which to operate, discretion allows decision-
makers to react appropriately to different contexts and circumstances, thereby 
promoting fairness.82 
Uncertainty may also be undesirable for political reasons. Decision-makers may 
be unwilling to take risks in the event that the risk will result in failure, and the 
process of experimentation can also be expensive and time-consuming – factors 
which over a short-term political period may be difficult to justify to voters.83 
Thus, Adaptive Management requires a political context that embraces long-term 
planning, as the learning process is required to take place over a long period of 
time. As a result, it will not function well in a political system where policies are 
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changed every few years.84 The Department has however been praised for its 
long-term approach to water management.85  
As discussed earlier in this thesis, the precautionary principle requires a cautious 
approach to decision-making to be adopted, and this in turn requires an ongoing 
assessment of the situation.86 This principle underlies Adaptive Management, 
which, at its core, also entails an ongoing decision-making process that can factor 
in new information in the face of uncertainty. In particular, the precautionary 
principle features in South Africa in the context of climate change,87 as this is one 
of the factors that undermine the certainty of South Africa’s water supply.88 A 
specific Strategy aimed at the management of climate change is currently being 
developed, titled the ‘Climate Change Response Strategy for Water Resources in 
South Africa’.89 In order to manage these long-term uncertainties, the current 
Strategy expressly makes provision for the implementation of Adaptive 
Management.90 
The Strategy adopts an approach to decision-making in this respect that is centred 
on flexibility and learning. The Strategy also highlights the importance of 
information-gathering and consistent reporting and aims to strengthen these 
aspects.91 In addition, it recognises the importance of accurate and current 
information in order to appreciate the status of water quality and quantity.92 It 
further states that institutional capacity will need to be strengthened to deal with 
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‘high levels of uncertainty’.93 It highlights the importance of water conservation 
and demand management in this context, particularly to ‘build the required 
resilience and adaptive capacity in society and ecosystems’.94 In particular, the 
Strategy states that ‘management institutions such as municipalities, water boards, 
CMAs,95 international bodies and the Department96 are designed to operate as 
adaptive, learning institutions’.97 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In general, IWRM, as well as Adaptive Management are challenged on the basis 
that while in theory the principles are sound, they fail to translate into successful 
management approaches in practice.98 One of the criticisms of a holistic approach 
as required by IWRM is that it may result in ‘large, unmanageable, and 
counterproductive governance systems’.99 However, it has been suggested that the 
intention underlying IWRM is not the integration of these departments into one 
large organisation, but rather to require the integration of management efforts 
through cooperation and coordination between different institutions and 
stakeholders.100 Another criticism of IWRM is that in practice it is difficult to 
implement, as it requires sufficient capacity together with the political will and 
adequate governance to ensure it is properly implemented.101 
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To the extent that IWRM is furthered by the decentralisation of management 
responsibilities to water basins, the state has also failed adequately to establish the 
necessary Catchment Management Agencies.102 Consequently IWRM is not being 
realised at a practical level and most, if not all, decision-making processes still 
take place at a national level.103 In addition, inter-governmental departments such 
as the Department of Water Affairs and the Department of Mineral Resources 
have failed to cooperate, which presents a barrier to coordinating and integrating 
the various stakeholders involved.104 
Both at a national level and between the SADC countries, IWRM has been 
adopted.105 The theoretical side of this adoption has been sound, with legislation, 
policies and plans being put into place. The Strategy has been applauded for its 
long-term management approach and for stepping outside the realm of politics 
with an ostensibly genuine intention to improve management of water over the 
next few decades.106 However, it is the practical implementation of IWRM and 
Adaptive Management that is not yet functioning properly.107 In this respect, 
Walmsley notes that IWRM is not being successfully implemented because 
research projects have a limited time-frame, which defeats the purpose of the 
collection of data on an ongoing basis as required by IWRM.108 Further 
hindrances are that there is a serious shortage of skills within the Department 
itself and thus most of the research and data-collection is outsourced. Also, the 
current setup of water management is not streamlined and results in a fragmented 
approach where the responsible parties for the collection of information are not 
well-defined.109 Thus, the criticisms outlined above resonate in the South African 
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context where ‘while the South African National Water Act is a remarkable piece 
of legislation that should provide for holistic management of water resources, 
including all the tenets of IWRM and Adaptive Management, in practice, short-
term objectives are dominating the decision-making process, leading to severe 
degradation of the system as a whole’.110 
An example of an area where IWRM has been implemented is the Orange River 
Basin, which provides water to South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana and Namibia. 
The complexity of managing this basin is exacerbated by the multiple users and 
uses of water in the region, including drinking water, as well as water for industry, 
forestry, agriculture, the creation of power and mining. Another consideration is 
that economic disparity pervades the region and as a result, access to water and 
the quality thereof is not equal.111 The importance of Adaptive Management is 
prevalent in the context of managing water quality and reducing the damage done 
to wetlands in the region.112 The scientific approaches to water management in 
Lesotho, as well as the collection of data by South Africa, represent some of the 
best practices with regard to water internationally. However, this is not true of 
water management in general. It has been argued that less resistance to the idea of 
adaptability in management decisions will greatly improve the regulation of water 
in the region.113 
Given that IWRM and Adaptive Management both require a complete overhaul of 
the top-heavy management approaches that existed in the sector before, and given 
also that this overhaul requires not only a long-term commitment to change but is 
also resource-intensive, it is not surprising that it has not yet yielded positive 
results.114 The benefits that can be derived from these management approaches 
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may justify the delay in its successful implementation.115 The water governance 
organisation will require time to transform and adopt these strategies, as well as 
time to build an institutional memory to ensure that there is a strong leadership 
within the organisation and that skills are adequately transferred.116 
The economic and social value of water, particularly in light of the future 
challenges that threaten the supply thereof, reinforce the importance of a tenacious 
and resilient attitude being adopted by a strong political leadership. Until a better 
management approach is suggested, one that furthers the goals of protection and 
preservation of water resources, whilst ensuring that societal and economic goals 
are not neglected, IWRM and Adaptive Management may be the best systems to 
implement and are therefore worth the investment.  
The purpose of this chapter was to focus on the nature of the management systems 
that have been adopted by the legal framework. The state, as trustee, is 
legislatively required to implement both IWRM and Adaptive Management, and 
these management approaches therefore inform the manner in which trusteeship is 
to be applied. The theories behind IWRM and Adaptive Management aim to 
manage water holistically within the greater context of the environment and 
adequately promote the substantive principles of trusteeship, particularly those 
discussed in respect of sustainability such as the precautionary and preventative 
principle. However, the implementation of IWRM and Adaptive Management has 
not been successful this far, consistent with the international inability to 
implement these systems. Chapter 7 will discuss the checks and balances in place 
to ensure that the state complies with its responsibilities, as well as the remedies 
available to parties to pursue the state where they fail to adequately satisfy their 
obligations. 
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Chapter 7:  
CHECKS, BALANCES AND REMEDIES 
FOR GOVERNANCE OF WATER 
1. Introduction 
Thus far, this thesis has addressed the historical development of South Africa’s 
water law, the legislative framework that governs trusteeship as well as the 
substantive principles that must be realised in accordance with the duties of the 
state as trustee. It has also discussed the manner in which water management must 
be undertaken, namely using the methods of Adaptive Management and 
implementing a system of Integrated Water Resource Management. The previous 
chapters have thus focused on the context and nature of trusteeship, as well as the 
mechanisms for its implementation, particularly from the perspective of the state. 
The methods and remedies available to hold the state liable where it has breached 
its constitutional obligations in this regard are discussed below. 
There are a multitude of remedies available, not only as an incidence of 
democracy (for example, public participation), but also in terms of statutory law 
and the common law. Prior to 1994, the common law in South Africa was 
premised on the principles of Roman-Dutch and English law as a historical 
byproduct of colonisation.1 These systems did not recognise African Customary 
Law, and as a result, many of the dispute mechanisms employed by African 
communities were ignored.2 These included meetings between parties with the 
goal of settling disputes, a focus on family and community responsibility, all with 
the underlying basis of ubuntu.3 The Constitutional Court has stated that the 
principle of ubuntu ‘emphasises the communal nature of society and “carries in it 
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the ideas of humaneness, social justice and fairness” and envelopes “the key 
values of group solidarity, compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to 
basic norms and collective unity’”.4 The Court has also commented that these 
principles of ubuntu ‘inspire much of our constitutional compact’.5 
The Western systems introduced by Roman-Dutch and English law recognise a 
strict separation between public and private law relationships, which overlook the 
severe impact that private bodies can have on public rights. The express 
recognition of the horizontal application of the Constitution, however, has blurred 
this once-clear distinction.6 Consequently, the courts are encouraged to ensure 
access to resources using the principles contained in the Constitution and an 
approach in terms of the ‘spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’ as 
opposed to traditional constructions of ownership and property.7 The issue of 
access to water resources falls squarely within this grey area between public and 
private law.  
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the mechanisms that are in place to ensure 
that the administrative duties of trusteeship are fulfilled.8 This chapter, therefore, 
seeks to look at trusteeship, or, more importantly, the failure to implement 
trusteeship, from the perspective of water users. Proper accountability of the State 
is essential in the arena of water management: While the state has drastically 
improved the statistics regarding access to water, the same cannot be said for its 
scorecard on promoting issues of environmental protection or the prevention of 
pollution.9 While some of this is attributable to the infrastructure inherited from 
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the pre-democratic era, other issues are clearly caused by government 
mismanagement.10  
The discussion here focuses on the nature of the existing democratic controls and 
watchdog institutions that aim to ensure that the state complies with its duties. In 
addition, this chapter discusses the various judicial remedies that may be pursued; 
more particularly, the Water Tribunal and judicial review on the basis of either 
administrative action or the principle of legality.11 Alternative remedies exist in 
terms of criminal law, delict and neighbor law. However, these remedies have 
been canvassed extensively elsewhere and, due to the constraints of this thesis, 
will not be discussed in great detail below. The purpose of this chapter is to 
discuss the ways in which the state can be held liable generally, as well as more 
specifically in terms of trusteeship.  
2. Democratic Controls 
Since the introduction of the Constitution, a number of democratic features aim to 
ensure that the correct checks and balances are in place to regulate the conduct of 
the state. Relevant for the purposes of this discussion are the rights of access to 
information and public participation. In addition, the watchdog institutions 
implemented in accordance with Chapter 9 of the Constitution will be discussed 
below. 
2.1. Justiciability 
The justiciability of socio-economic rights follows from the recognition of the 
importance of sustainability. The Court has, in the context of sustainable 
development, expressed that all socio-economic rights are justiciable.12 The right 
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of access to water it follows, as a fundamental human right contained in the 
Constitution, is justiciable.13 The court in BP confirmed this position and held 
that14  
by elevating the environment to a fundamental justiciable human right, South 
Africa has irreversibly embarked on a road, which will lead to the goal of 
attaining a protected environment by an integrated approach, which takes into 
consideration, inter alia, socio-economic concerns and principles. 
This echoes the statement made earlier by the courts that sustainable development 
now lies at the heart of environmental jurisprudence.15 The court held that all 
rights in the Bill of Rights are equal, and the environmental right is no different. 
As such, it has to be weighed against the right to freedom of trade, occupation and 
profession,16 as well as the right to property.17 The court held that the balancing of 
these rights would be in accordance with the requirements of sustainable 
development found in the Constitution.18  
Parties can approach the courts if they are acting in their own interest, acting on 
behalf of another person who cannot act for themselves, acting as a member of, or 
in the interest of a group or class of persons, acting in the public interest, and 
acting as an association in the interest of its members.19 The Constitutional Court 
in the case of Ferreira v Levin20 held that in order for one of these parties to have 
standing, they must show that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed, and 
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further, that they have a sufficient interest in obtaining the remedy sought.21 
Currie and De Waal argue that in order for a sufficient interest to exist, the list of 
parties above should at least be directly affected by the law or conduct.22 
The justiciability of these rights requires that a hearing must be fair and publicly 
heard.23 While this right is academically sound, practically the realities of 
litigation are that they are extremely costly and time-consuming.24 The 
justiciability of these rights also does not entail that the state is under an 
obligation to ensure legal representation.25 This right will be of little assistance 
when access to justice comes at such a high price in this country – not only is 
legal representation unaffordable for most, but litigation takes years if not decades 
to complete.26 Even if successful in litigating against the state on the basis of a 
constitutional infringement, there is no guarantee that the state will actually take 
cognisance of the court’s ruling. This is clearly an untenable situation, given that 
those most vulnerable to environmental injustices are also those most vulnerable 
in society generally.27 
2.2. Access to Information 
Access to information is a key component of a functioning democracy.28 Without 
it, the goals of transparency and accountability of government cannot be 
fulfilled.29 The movement towards a society empowered with socio-economic 
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rights must not view the ‘landless and poor “as helpless victims, lacking the 
possibilities of personal moral agency”’.30 Instead, socio-economic rights should 
aim to empower people - access to information and public participation in the 
decision-making process are integral to ensuring such empowerment occurs.31 The 
Constitution, the Promotion of Access to Information Act,32 the National Water 
Act,33 and the National Environmental Management Act34 require and facilitate 
access to information, often couched in directory language, which means that the 
decision-maker has no discretion in the matter.35 It is incumbent upon the state to 
ensure that the decisions taken in the context of the management of water are 
made in an open and transparent manner. Furthermore, information must be made 
available to the public.36 
Primarily, access to information is regulated by the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act. However, both the National Water Act and the Water Services 
Act also require this right to be fulfilled. Du Plessis states that the ‘statutory and 
reporting obligations are particularly rigorous…and nowhere is this more evident 
than in the context of fresh water management’.37 For example, any information 
contained in a national information system must be made available to the public, 
and this duty lies with the Minister.38 This duty is not unlimited, however, as any 
legal obligations in terms of the access to information must still be complied 
with.39 In addition, the Water Services Act requires any water services provider to 
facilitate access to information, provided the request is reasonable, and the 
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36 S 2(4)(k) read with s 142. 
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requestor of the information is either a water services authority in the same 
jurisdiction, the provincial administration, the Minister, or a consumer.40 
Municipalities are further required to report on their progress in terms of the 
management of water services as well as the quality of water provided in terms of 
the Blue Drop Report.41 
The Minister is also empowered by the Act to request information from private 
individuals or companies. This can be periodically or once-off. The reasons for 
accessing the information can be fairly broad, insofar as the request must be for 
the purposes of collecting data for monitoring and information systems, or for the 
protection and management of water generally.42  
In addition to the right of access to information, the Act creates a duty to inform 
the public where there is a threat to life or property, in instances of poor quality of 
water, where a risk of flooding or drought exists, or where there is the risk of the 
malfunctioning or potential failure of a waterwork or dam.43 This duty is more 
onerous than merely allowing access when requested.44 This is not a closed list, 
and the National Water Act prescribes that this information should be provided 
where there is ‘any matter connected with water or water resources, which the 
public needs to know’.45  
Although this is a mandatory duty, it is likely to be difficult to enforce, as it still 
entails an element of discretion. The state has the discretion to decide whether the 
public needs to know something, in terms of this provision, and whether it has 
failed to comply with the Act in this respect will be context-specific. Furthermore, 
should an allegation arise that the state has failed to comply with this duty, this 
allegation will have to be challenged in a judicial forum. A judicial officer will 
then need to evaluate the nature of this discretionary decision, or lack thereof, 
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once again raising the difficult question of managing judicial review within the 
context of the separation of powers doctrine.46 Perhaps the biggest obstacle, 
however, is found in the difficulties associated with challenging any decision 
made by such a judicial officer, given the complexities involved in pursuing 
litigious processes.47 
Unfortunately, government departments are failing to uphold this duty, either by 
ignoring requests made for information, in accordance with the Promotion of 
Access to Information Act, or alternatively, by refusing access to this 
information.48 The three governmental departments that are the most important in 
terms of the protection of the environment are amongst the culprits who are 
failing to ensure compliance with this right. The Department of Mineral 
Resources has been described as ‘consistently poor’ in terms of their cooperation 
with this duty. In addition, both the Department of Mineral Resources and the 
Department of Water Affairs failed to comply with section 32 of PAIA in 2012, 
which requires them to file an annual report with the South African Human Rights 
Commission. The 2012 report filed by the Department of Environmental Affairs 
has further been deemed inaccurate by this Commission.49 
In a survey undertaken by the Centre for Environmental Rights, it was found that 
the Department of Mineral Resources refused 12.5% of the applications for access 
to information in 2012.50 In addition, departments and companies employ tactics 
to comply with PAIA, such as partially releasing information, which does not 
satisfactorily meet the request for information, or using PAIA as a means of 
ignoring the request entirely.51 Information, which is critical to ensuring that the 
values of accountability and transparency are upheld in the ordinary course of 
                                                     
46 See note 243 below.  
47 See note 222 ff below. 
48 See generally Centre for Environmental Rights Barricading the doors (2013); S Kings ‘Access 
to environment information is being blocked, reveals report’ Mail and Guardian 4 March 2013.  
49 Centre for Environmental Rights (note 49 above) 3. 
50 Centre for Environmental Rights (note 49 above) 2; S Kings ‘Access to environment 
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51 Centre for Environmental Rights (note 49 above) 5; S Kings ‘Access to environment 
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democracy, such as an open registry of licenses and compliance data for example, 
is not available to the public.52 
The failure of the state, both in terms of the provision of information, as well as 
ensuring that private bodies make information relevant to the public available, 
amounts to a breach of its duties in terms of the Constitution and PAIA. Insofar as 
trusteeship requires compliance with the Constitution, this also amounts to a 
breach of the duties of trusteeship. The public, armed with the ammunition of 
information, can provide a valuable tool to assist with the regulation and 
enforcement of the law as against private corporations, particularly where 
governments lack the human resources to do so themselves.53 In this respect, the 
state may be doing itself a disservice by refusing citizens access to information. 
2.3. Public Participation 
The importance of public participation has been reinforced as essential in the 
protection of water resources,54 and this, too, is a key feature of democracy.55 
However, facilitating genuine public participation may compromise 
administrative efficiency in the context of environmental management. A sincere 
attempt to involve the public can seriously hamper developmental goals, 
particularly where there is no shared vision for the community involved.56 In 
addition, understanding what a community is and how it functions presents further 
                                                     
52 S Kings ‘Access to environment information is being blocked, reveals report’ (note 48 above). 
53 E Bray ‘Administrative justice’ in A Paterson and L Kotzé (eds) Environmental Compliance and 
Enforcement in South Africa (2009) 197; M Kidd ‘Environmental law’ (1993) 4 South African 
Human Rights Year Book 121 – 122; G E Devenish (note 28 above) 327. 
54 Strategy (2013) 43; H Mackay ‘Water Policies and Practices’ in David Reed and Martin de Wit 
(eds) Towards a Just South Africa: The Political Economy of Natural Resource Wealth (2003) 61. 
See also R P Hiskes The Human Right to a Green Future (2009) 143. 
55 S 59(1), 72(1), 118(1). See Doctors For Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 
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difficulties, especially when it is acknowledged that communities are not 
homogenous, and have different motivations, goals and circumstances.57 
Public participation and the decentralisation of power to the lowest appropriate 
level furthers the principle of subsidiarity, which, in turn, is assumed to promote 
accountability, transparency and democracy, and redress social inequalities.58 
Chapter 3 discussed the extent to which these principles are practically 
implemented through the creation of Catchment Management Agencies.59 Brown, 
however, argues that the participatory approach introduced by the National Water 
Act may ultimately subvert the goals of subsidiarity by further entrenching 
inequality.60 Participatory democracy, to some extent, presupposes a homogenous 
community, that is, that the community will not only strive towards the same 
goals, but also share the same values, and stakeholders will be on the same 
footing.61 However, in South Africa, the vast inequalities that exist within the 
context of greatly varying heterogeneous communities may undermine this 
participatory process. Factors that may further detract from the legitimacy of the 
participatory process include the size of the area involved and the nature of the 
particular community.62 
There are further problems inherent in public participation, particularly in the 
context of highly scientific information. The nature of scientific information is 
such that it is not always readily accessible or digestible.63 There has also been 
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reticence on the part of the state to be truly transparent and involve the public in 
all stages. An example of this can be seen in Earthlife Africa (Cape Town) v 
Director-General: Department of Environmental Affairs & Tourism and 
Another,64 where it became clear that the state only anticipated providing for 
public participation once critical decisions had already been made.65 The 
challenge, as Fields states, is to ‘sustain […] a level of public debate concerning 
issues of major importance such that members of the public can make an 
informed, rational choice about whether to accept a new development’.66 Another 
aspect to guard against is the fact that public participation can result in the state 
responding to those who have the time, expertise and funding to pursue 
participation as opposed to the ‘unorganised, the demoralised, the unfashionable 
and the underprivileged’.67 
The benefits of public participation, however, necessitate a sincere attempt on the 
part of the state to achieve its proper implementation.68 In the first instance, in the 
process of collecting information,69 the local community can be of great assistance 
in explaining practices, norms and sharing traditional knowledge.70 Traditional 
practices established over long periods of time may in some instances be better 
suited to further the purposes of sustainability than suggestions brought in by 
                                                                                                                                                 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Another 2006 (10) BCLR 1179 (C) para 73, the Director-
General of the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism submitted that  
‘the documents submitted to the department deal with “highly complex matters of a 
scientific and technical nature” and unless he were to rely on expert advice in that regard, 
he would not be able honestly and effectively to apply his mind to those issues. It was 
specifically for this purpose that a panel of experts was appointed to advise the DG with 
regard to Eskom’s application herein’.  
64 2006 (10) BCLR 1179 (C). 
65 T Field (note 63 above) 763. 
66 T Field (note 63 above) 764. 
67 C Hoexter (note 29 above) 84 citing D Atkinson Techniques of Public Participation in Local 
Government Electoral Institute of South Africa (1997) 12. 
68 M Kidd (note 53 above) 122. 
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70 J R Ehrenfeld Sustainability by Design (2008) 186; M I Msibi and P Z Dlamini ‘Water 
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outsiders, with little knowledge of the local, practical realities.71 This value has 
been identified by the Strategy, as the coping mechanisms that local communities 
implement to reduce their vulnerability to climate conditions are to be taken into 
account by decision-makers.72 Secondly, for environmental programmes to work, 
it is often necessary for the communities affected by them to buy into these 
ideas.73 Public participation assists in this process by involving and educating the 
community, with the effect of community buy-in. Finally, as part of the 
commitment to democracy and constitutional reform, public participation is 
essential to promoting social justice, and this in turn may enhance the legitimacy 
of state programmes and policies.74 
Other stakeholders that can play a valuable role in public participation are 
NGOs.75 One of the focus areas of Agenda 21, in its attempt to achieve 
sustainable development, is to drive real community involvement and public 
participation.76 This requires involvement from all sectors of the community77 as 
well as the different branches of government. This in turn requires cooperation 
between national government, local government and non-governmental 
organisations. NGOs play an important role in facilitating public participation, 
and consequently participatory democracy, by representing interests that are 
independent of government and business.78  
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The courts also regularly recognise the importance of public participation. For 
example, in Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg,79 the court reiterated the 
importance of public participation and a participatory democracy in the context of 
litigating socio-economic rights.80 In the process of challenging state agencies in a 
court forum, the state must engage in a process of justifying its actions to the 
public, and show that the decision-making process was reasonable.81 Furthermore, 
they must show that a sincere attempt is being made progressively to realise the 
right in question, by evidencing that socio-economic policies are reconsidered and 
updated.82 In addition to holding the state accountable through a voting system, 
litigation against the state holds real importance by ensuring this accountability 
persists throughout the political term.83 This is consistent with the constitutional 
requirement for government to be ‘responsible, accountable and open’.84 
Community participation is distinguishable from community management. While 
the former requires involving the community in aspects of decision-making, the 
latter entails handing over the control of management of a resource to the 
community. Proponents of community management argue that this mechanism 
allows the community to take ownership of a project, by allowing them full 
responsibility over the management and control of the resource.85 However, the 
reverse has proved to be true, and community management of a resource often 
results in, amongst other things, distrust between community members, further 
inequity, and the perception that the state is shirking its responsibilities.86 As a 
result, this may not be a suitable method of addressing the problems inherent with 
the current system of management. 
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The Act facilitates public participation in a number of instances. The 
establishment of catchment management agencies is in accordance with the 
principle of public participation, as it aims to reduce the necessity for state 
intervention87 with the focus on a bottom-up approach as opposed to a top-heavy, 
centralised system.88 This system facilitates public participation by delineating the 
power of water management and allowing the public to be incorporated into the 
decision-making process.89 Catchment management agencies must facilitate 
community involvement in terms of the Act and they are intended actively to 
encourage public participation from communities and other stakeholders.90 In 
exercising its functions, a catchment management agency must attempt to achieve 
‘cooperation and consensus in managing the water resource under its control’.91 
Most of these instances of public participation are in the context of delegated law-
making activities, and require ‘notice and comment’ procedures to be followed.92 
These procedures are problematic in the sense that they facilitate ‘adversarial’ 
rule-making.93 This is because the notice and comment process is inherently 
competitive, which may force parties to adopt extreme positions in order to have 
some of their suggestions incorporated.94 The rationale behind notice and 
comment procedures is to ensure that the rules can be justified to the public. It 
also allows the rule-making body to call on the expertise of the public and aims to 
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ensure that the rule-making body ‘maintains a flexible and open-minded attitude 
towards proposed rules’.95 
The duty to facilitate public participation in the context of notice and comment 
procedures is not discretionary, and the relevant authority must ensure that 
processes are in place to do so when necessary. The language used is consistent 
and gives rise to three basic requirements for public participation. In the first 
instance, the public must be invited and given an opportunity to comment.96 If 
additional steps are required to bring the content of a proposal to the attention of 
any interested parties, the Minister must ensure that this is done, provided she 
deems the action to be appropriate.97 Finally, the comments must be considered by 
the Minister.98  
Prior to the establishment of the national water resource Strategy, or even a 
component thereof, public participation must be fulfilled.99 The duty to facilitate 
public participation is also necessary prior to the establishment of catchment 
management agencies, as well as the disestablishment thereof.100 Where the 
classification of a water resource is concerned, as well as the determination of the 
Reserve, the Minister is also obliged to publish a notice setting out the details of 
the proposed classification, and invite and consider commentary from interested 
parties.101 The Minister must also consider and take any steps necessary to bring 
the proposal to the attention of interested parties.102 Similarly, public participation 
must be facilitated where the Minister wants to declare an activity a controlled 
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activity,103 or a stream flow reduction activity,104 or if the responsible authority 
wishes to issue a general authorisation.105 
Compulsory licensing can be affected where the responsible authority wishes to 
regulate efficient and beneficial use of the resource, promote equity in terms of 
water allocation, or protect the quality of the water resource.106 The responsible 
authority must then consider all the applications made in light of the criteria for 
the award of a license, and prepare an allocation schedule that reflects the quantity 
of water for each user.107 The allocation schedule must be brought to the attention 
of the public, and objections must be invited and considered.108 Once an allocation 
schedule has been made final, the responsible authority must award the licenses in 
terms of this allocation schedule, and the rights in terms of this license will 
replace all previous water use entitlements.109 
Where an amendment of a water use license is contemplated, the effected 
party(ies) must be informed and given an opportunity to be heard.110 Similarly, 
where a license is to be suspended or withdrawn, the party must be informed of 
this action and allowed an opportunity to make representations.111 Prior to the 
establishment of a pricing strategy for water use by the Minister and Ministry of 
Finance, the process of public participation must also be facilitated.112 
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The making of regulations by the Minister in accordance with this Act must also 
facilitate public participation in the manner described above.113 In addition to 
these requirements, the Minister must explain any action or inaction taken as a 
response to comments made, on request from the national Assembly, National 
Council of Provinces or any committees there under.114 The assumption of powers 
by the Minister from a water user association, as well as their disestablishment 
also requires public participation.115 
Before the construction of a waterwork, the Minister must prepare an 
environmental impact assessment and involve the public by affording them the 
opportunity to comment on the plans.116 Prior to the establishment of mechanisms 
to coordinate the monitoring of water resources, the Minister must consult with 
not only with the relevant organs of state and water management institutions, but 
also with water users.117 
The importance of public participation is highlighted throughout the Strategy. It 
states that in order for the Water Conservation and Water Demand Management 
programme to be effective, the public must be educated as to the goals of this 
programme, in order to achieve buy-in from society.118 To improve water 
efficiency, and reduce water losses, it is necessary for the public to participate in 
this programme.119 
The Act dispenses with the need for public participation in emergency scenarios 
or urgent situations that threaten the safety of people or property, or the protection 
of a water resource or the environment.120 Under these circumstances, any notice 
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or publication requirements, time limits and obligations to invite and consider 
public comment may be legitimately ignored.121 
Where a party has failed to pay a water use charge, the supply of water to the user 
may be restricted or suspended.122 Prior to this action being taken, the person must 
be given an opportunity to make representations.123 The Act does not stipulate 
whether it is the Minister or responsible authority that is entitled to make this 
decision.124 Practically, it may be impossible for the Minister to entertain each and 
every matter relating to a suspension, particularly given the right to be heard. 
However, the restriction or suspension of a water supply is a drastic measure. 
In the Mazibuko case, the court had to evaluate whether the state was obliged to 
notify parties and provide them with an opportunity to be heard before their pre-
paid meters stopped the supply of water to their premises.125 The court held that 
when the pre-paid meter switched off the water supply, this did not amount to a 
permanent discontinuation of the water supply.126 It would either be reopened 
upon the loading of more credit onto the meter, or the following month when the 
six kilolitres of free water would be available to the household.127 The court also 
held that, in this respect, the notice and comment procedures, as required by the 
Water Services Act prior to the discontinuation of water, was not applicable 
where pre-paid meters ran out of credit.128 The court stated that the alternative 
interpretation of section 4(3) which would favour such an approach would amount 
to an ‘absurd’ and ‘unsustainable’ situation, as the state could be obliged to notify 
a party a few times per month whenever the meter credit was exhausted.129 This 
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case evidences the necessity to evaluate the obligations of the state based on the 
circumstances at hand to ensure that unintended consequences do not arise from 
implementing a uniform approach. 
In the Director, Mineral Development, Gauteng Region and Another v Save the 
Vaal Environment and Others,130 the court had to deal with the interpretation of 
section 24 in the context of the administration of mineral rights.131 The court held 
that, despite the peremptory nature of the discretion provided to the decision-
maker in the context of the award of mineral rights, the public still had a right to 
be heard.132 Without the express exclusion of the audi alteram partem rule, it 
could not be inferred that the rule was not afforded to the public to make 
representations on the issue.133 The court also emphasised the importance of 
public participation by requiring the involvement of stakeholders in the 
preparation of guidelines.134 These guidelines have to take into account 
‘international perspectives and experiences’.135 
Where the Act is silent on public participation procedures, the PAJA may find 
application. Section 4 thereof requires that if an ‘administrative action materially 
and adversely affects the rights of the public, an administrator, to give effect to the 
right to procedurally fair administrative action’ must either hold a public inquiry 
or notice and comment procedure, or any alternative procedure provided it is 
lawful and fair.136 Consequently, the absence of express provisions requiring 
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public participation in the legislative framework governing water does not 
necessarily entail that it is not required. 
2.4. Chapter Nine Institutions 
The Constitution creates a number of institutions that are aimed at the promotion 
of democracy, called Chapter Nine institutions. The Public Protector, South 
African Human Rights Commission, the Commission for Gender Equality and 
Auditor-General are Chapter 9 institutions that can assist in ensuring that the state 
complies with its duties.137  
The Constitution states that ‘these institutions are independent, and subject only to 
the Constitution and the law, and they must be impartial and must exercise their 
powers and perform their functions without fear, favour or prejudice’.138 The 
courts have confirmed that these institutions are not subject to national executive 
control and should be seen to be ‘outside government control’.139 The Constitution 
also requires all spheres of government to cooperate with these institutions in the 
performance of their duties, and interference is prohibited.140 
The Public Protector is entitled to investigate any maladministration that ‘is 
alleged or suspected to be improper or to have resulted in any impropriety or 
prejudice’.141 The powers of the protector are far-ranging and include not only 
providing an annual report to the National Assembly, but also taking the 
appropriate remedial action where maladministration is found to exist.142 The 
Constitution requires the public protector to be accessible to the public,143 and any 
reports of the protector must be made public documents unless national legislation 
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requires the reports to be classified.144 In the 2010/2011 report of the Public 
Protector to the National Assembly, only one instance of maladministration was 
included in the report relevant to the governance of water.145 
The Auditor-General is similar to the Public Protector, but its powers are limited 
to ensuring that public money is properly managed.146 In the General Report on 
National and Provincial Audit Outcomes 2011/2012, the Department of Water 
Affairs received a qualified audit.147 The root causes of the outcome of this audit 
were stated to be ineffective leadership, a lack of accountability, and insufficient 
monitoring of monthly reporting.148 The audit also cited that poor project 
management in the provinces resulted in ‘irregular expenditure’ and non-
compliance with treasury regulations.149 Irregular expenditure in the Department 
of Water Affairs amounted to R1075,72 million, while fruitless and wasted 
expenditure amounted to R22,73 million.150 The areas of procurement and 
contract management, leadership, financial and performance management and 
governance all received either a status of cause for concern, or intervention 
required.151 The areas highlighted by this audit as problematic are key areas for 
water management. Proper leadership, governance and financial management are 
critical to the implementation of the goals of trusteeship. Without them, the goals 
of attaining sustainability, equity and efficiency cannot be attained.152 
The third institution that may be of assistance in ensuring the compliance of 
government with its duties is the South African Human Rights Commission 
(‘SAHRC’). The SAHRC is empowered to report on the observance of human 
rights, and may ‘take steps to secure appropriate redress where’ violations have 
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taken place.153 However, the Department of Water Affairs is flagrantly 
disregarding the importance of this institution by not complying with its reporting 
requirements. For both the periods of 2010/2011 and 2011/2012, the Department 
of Water Affairs failed to submit the constitutionally required annual report to the 
SAHRC.154 
Finally, the Commission for Gender Equality is empowered to further the 
protection, development and attainment of gender equality, and its powers include 
monitoring, investigating, advising and reporting on issues affecting gender 
equality.155 This Commission may be of relevance to the goals of furthering 
gender equality in the context of water, and ensuring that women play a more 
central role in water management generally.156  
3. Judicial controls 
In addition to the democratic controls in place, a number of judicial mechanisms 
exist whereby the state can be held accountable. These include an appeal process 
through the Water Tribunal, judicial review on the basis of either administrative 
action or the principle of legality, as well as the ordinary criminal and civil 
remedies that may be applicable. These remedies are discussed below. 
3.1. The Water Tribunal 
Water Tribunals are established by the National Water Act, with the intention of 
providing the public with access to justice that is both speedy and cost-
effective.157 The Tribunal has the jurisdiction to adjudicate over disputes 
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pertaining to administrative decisions and directives.158 A distinction must be 
made, based on the nature of the remedy sought. Generally speaking, where an 
administrative decision is to be re-evaluated on the merits of the decision, this 
should more properly be brought before an administrative body, such as the Water 
Tribunal.159 In this instance, the Tribunal will effectively reconsider the merits of 
the decision, and is competent to decide the matter afresh.160 
If the applicant seeks to review the decision, which requires an evaluation of the 
legality thereof, or the procedural fairness of the process, an order should be 
sought from the court.161 The National Water Act does not give the Water 
Tribunal any powers to judicially review decisions that amount to administrative 
actions.162 However, the courts have acknowledged the difficulty in this regard as 
there are no bright lines in respect of this distinction. In order to evaluate the 
legality of a decision, it is often necessary to investigate the merits of that decision 
as well.163 
The Water Tribunal is intended to function as a judicial forum of first instance 
where a complaint relating to the administration of water arises. Where a party 
wishes to appeal an administrative decision or seeks compensation for loss as a 
result of the refusal to grant a license or a reduction in the allocation of water 
afforded to them, they may do so at the Water Tribunal. The Strategy indicates 
that the provisions in the National Water Act that deal with the governance of the 
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Tribunal are to be amended, although it has not indicated what the stated purpose 
of these amendments are to be.164 
The Water Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain a number of issues. It may hear 
matters relating to administrative decisions, such as the award of licenses. It may 
determine the amount payable where water rights are limited or withdrawn. In the 
context of directives issued by catchment management agencies in the context of 
preventing or minimising pollution, the party in question may appeal to the Water 
Tribunal.165 
3.2. Judicial Review of Administrative Action 
Section 33 of the Constitution gives rise to a right to just administrative action. 
This right requires that decisions made by administrators must be lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair.166 Decisions taken by anyone who exercises 
public powers or functions may also fall within the scope of an administrative 
action.167 As a result, ‘the rules (or principles) of administrative justice govern the 
entire process of (administrative) decision-making in the state administration’.168 
The Promotion of Administration of Justice Act (‘PAJA’) has been enacted to 
give effect to this constitutional right.169 In accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, the PAJA is therefore the primary legislation for the determination of 
administrative action.170According to section 1 of the PAJA, an administrative 
action is a ‘decision, of an administrative nature, that is made in terms of an 
empowering provision, by an organ of state or by a natural or juristic person 
exercising a public power or performing a public function, that adversely affects 
rights, that has a direct, external legal effect, and that is not specifically excluded 
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from the definition’.171An administrative action can also arise where there is a 
failure or refusal to make a decision.172 
The exclusions provided for by the PAJA largely eliminate executive, legislative 
and judicial actions from being regarded as administrative action.173 However, a 
distinction must be made between the making of policy, which is not an 
administrative action, and the implementation of legislation, which is.174 The 
implementation of policy, or the formulation of policy to implement legislation, 
may constitute administrative action.175 
Decisions concerning licenses (including the award, suspension and revocation), 
the issuing of directives, the imposition of restrictions or conditions, amongst 
other things, are all examples of administrative decisions that could qualify as 
administrative actions.176 In the Mazibuko case, the applicants sought to have a 
government policy relating to water use set aside, and one of the grounds for 
doing so was that the actions of the municipality amounted to unlawful 
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administrative action.177 The court, on an analysis of the facts, held that the 
municipality had been exercising its executive and legislative functions in creating 
the policy.178 This fell within the exclusions as established by the PAJA and so the 
conduct of the municipality in this respect could not be reviewed on the basis of 
administrative action.179 While the creation of this policy was not subject to 
review, the court did assess whether the policy itself was implemented in a fair 
manner.180  
The courts have developed a number of criteria to establish whether or not an 
action amounts to administrative action.181 These include assessing the subject 
matter of the decision, whether a public duty is exercised, the source and nature of 
the power, and whether it involves the exercise of policy or the implementation of 
legislation.182 Finally, a decision does not have to be made or finalised in order for 
it to qualify as administrative action.183 
Actions that fall outside the definition of administrative action may still be 
capable of review in terms of either statutory law (in this instance, the National 
Water Act) or the Constitution.184 Finally, the ‘principle of legality provides a 
general justification for the review of exercises of public power and operates as a 
residual source of review jurisdiction’.185 The principle of legality goes beyond 
administrative action to require that public power must be exercised lawfully.186 
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The courts have since defined this to also include that public power must be 
exercised rationally, which requires that ‘decisions must be rationally related to 
the purpose for which the power was given’187 and be made in good faith.188 
While the scope of review, either based on administrative action or lawfulness 
generally, is quite broad, the judiciary should be cautious of interfering in the 
administrative decision-making process.189 Judges may lack the expertise to 
appropriately comment on the correctness of a decision, particularly where the 
decision-making is of a highly polycentric or complex nature.190 In addition, 
judges have not been elected, and should be wary of unintentionally usurping the 
power of a body that has been democratically elected to make decisions on behalf 
of the people.191 
The notion of deference allows the courts the power to review the conduct of the 
executive and the legislature, whilst displaying respect for these branches of 
government.192 The decision to intervene and the intensity with which 
intervention takes place will be dependent on the circumstances before the court, 
including the expertise required to make the decision as well as the polycentric 
nature of the decision.193 Liebenberg argues that this process should be informed 
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by ‘pragmatic considerations’ and further that this ‘inquiry must be informed by 
the background and unique factual matrix of the particular case and its social and 
historical context.194 
The National Water Act and the Water Services Act are the primary legislative 
sources of administrative power that government exercises in the context of 
water.195 These Acts confer power to administrators to perform the day-to-day 
functions of management, such as the award of licenses, which would ordinarily 
be ‘performed by the legislature or executive’.196 The principle of subsidiarity is 
given effect to by the PAJA as it requires that if any other remedies exist 
independently of the PAJA, such as an internal legislative remedy, these must first 
be exhausted before turning to the PAJA.197 However, the court in Earthlife Africa 
(Cape Town) v Director General: Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism198 held that section 7(2)(c) of the PAJA allowed for a deviation of this 
rule where it could be shown that there were exceptional circumstances allowing 
for an exemption and, further, that it would be in the interests of justice to do 
so.199 As a result, the primary legislative sources may be circumvented provided 
these requirements are met. 
Accountability, impartiality, efficiency and transparency are all constitutional 
requirements of the modern public administration.200 In this respect, and as 
mentioned above, a right to lawful, reasonable and fair administrative action is 
contained within the Bill of Rights, and this right is given effect to by the 
PAJA.201 Where an administrative action arises, the courts will judicially review 
the decision. If administrative conduct is unlawful, it must first be challenged as 
                                                     
194 S Liebenberg (note 1 above) 59. 
195 See, generally, C Hoexter (note 29 above) 31. 
196 C Hoexter (note 29 above) 31. 
197 S 7(2)(a) and (b). See T Field (note 63 above) 764; Earthlife Africa (note 63 above) 22 – 45; 
Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 
(CC) (2004 (7) BCLR 687) in para [17] at 503B-D; C Hoexter (note 29 above) 538 - 543. 
198 2005 (3) SA 156 (C). 
199 Para 22 – 45. See also T Field (note 63 above) 754. 
200 S 195; C Hoexter (note 29 above) 58. 
201 S 33. 






administrative action, provided it falls within the definition provided by the 
PAJA.202 However, if it does not fall within this purview, a similar course of 
action can be pursued under the principle of legality.203 One of the requirements 
of lawfulness is that an administrator may not exercise any powers that have not 
been conferred on him by the law, which usually originates from empowering 
legislation.204 
A distinction must be drawn between a power and a duty.205 As explained by 
Hoexter, a power enables an authority to do something, while a duty is mandatory 
and must be performed.206 While a power may be discretionary, this is not an 
unlimited power, and it will be restricted by the constitutional duties imposed on 
public officers, as well as the common law duty to act in the public interest.207 
Powers can further be interpreted by the courts depending on the context and type 
of language used in the legislation.208 For example, an implied power may be 
found to exist where the authority is required to do something, and the legislation 
is silent as to the ancillary powers reasonably necessary to complete this task.209 
A power can also be discretionary or mechanical, although the latter is more akin 
to a duty, as the administrator must follow a certain course of action when certain 
criteria are met.210 Discretionary powers afford the decision-maker flexibility to 
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make a decision based on the circumstances at hand.211 This flexibility is curtailed 
by, at the very minimum, an implied duty to ‘act according to minimum standards 
of legality and good administration’.212 In addition, powers can be mandatory or 
directory. A mandatory power is one which, generally, uses peremptory language 
or is phrased as a negative.213 Non-compliance with a mandatory power is likely 
to result in invalid action on the part of the administrator, where the legislation is 
silent as to the consequences thereof.214 A directory provision uses permissive 
language and non-compliance or partial compliance will not necessarily result in 
invalidity.215 The purpose of the legislation as well contextual indicators will be of 
paramount importance in the court’s determination as to the nature of an 
administrator’s powers.216 
3.2.1. Lawfulness 
Lawfulness is the first of the requirements that necessitates compliance in order to 
ensure that a decision does not fall foul of the PAJA.217 In the first instance, 
legality requires that administrators must be properly appointed and qualified, in 
accordance with the necessary requirements.218 Similarly, if an administrative 
body has not been properly established or the procedures in place for making a 
decision are not followed by that body, the decision of that body will be 
unlawful.219 Administrators are also required to act within the bounds of their 
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authority, as conferred on them by the law.220 While these powers may be implied, 
they must at all times comply with the Constitution.221 
Illegality may also arise when an administrator does not just go beyond the scope 
of their authority, but does not have the authority to begin with.222 An example of 
this is where broad lawmaking or discretionary powers are granted to an 
administrator. The rationale behind this is that ‘if broad discretionary powers 
contain no express constraints, those who are affected by [it] will not know what 
is relevant to the exercise of those powers or in what circumstances they are 
entitled to seek relief from an adverse decision’.223 Hoexter argues that the 
possibility exists therefore that all delegated authority that is not informed by 
guidelines will be unlawful, and that this is problematic because most legislation 
currently confers wide, unguided discretionary powers.224 Whether or not the 
action was unlawful for this reason will depend on the circumstances.225 
The further delegation of delegated powers (or sub-delegation) is permissible to 
the extent that it is allowed by legislation.226 Where legislation is silent as to these 
powers, they can be implied, subject to overcoming a rebuttable common law 
presumption against sub-delegated powers.227 Factors that the court will consider 
in evaluating this presumption include the nature and extent of the conferred 
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power.228 For example, the nature of the power and the complexity involved in 
utilising the power may be considered.229 The existence of expressly delegated 
powers may weigh against the existence of implied delegated powers, although 
this is not a fixed rule and considerations will depend on the circumstances.230  
Other forms of unlawful conduct include unlawful dictation, which is a decision 
made by one official, who does not have the authority to act, and then rubber 
stamped by an official who is empowered to do so.231 Similarly, conduct that 
amounts to allowing another party to make a decision on an administrator’s behalf 
will be unlawful.232  
3.2.2. Reasonableness 
Reasonableness is the second of the requirements that must be satisfied to ensure 
that a decision is compliant with the PAJA. While the requirement of 
reasonableness has not been defined,233 it is clear that rationality is one of the 
components thereof.234 In order for a decision to be rational, it must be shown that 
it is connected to both the purpose for which it was taken and the purpose of the 
empowering provision.235 It must also be connected to the information that the 
administrator possesses. Finally, the reasons given by the administrator for the 
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decision must be related to the above.236 The court has held that bad decisions can 
result in a finding by the court that the decision was not rational.237 
In addition to rationality, in order for a decision to be reasonable it must also be 
proportional.238 This requires that there is sufficient balance between the desired 
outcome and the means used to obtain these outcomes.239 The factors that the 
court will consider in evaluating whether a decision is reasonable are the ‘nature 
of the decision, the identity and expertise of the decision-maker, the range of 
factors relevant to the decision, the reasons given for the decision, the nature of 
the competing interests involved and the impact of the decision on the lives and 
well-being of those affected’.240 While proportionality is not specifically required 
by the PAJA, Hoexter argues that it has been introduced by the court, specifically 
when reviewing ‘the nature of the competing interests involved and the impact of 
the decision on the lives and well-being of those affected’.241 
While review proceedings are meant to focus on the procedural aspects of the 
decision-making process, an enquiry will in some circumstances necessarily entail 
a substantive investigation, for example, when evaluating whether a decision-
maker has failed to apply their minds to the decision-making process.242 In the 
context of reasonableness, the courts have utilised the concept of deference to 
ensure that the doctrine of the separation of powers is not infringed.243 The other 
significant aspect of reasonableness is that it is a variable concept, and the 
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reasonableness of a decision will consequently depend on the circumstances of the 
case.244 
3.2.3. Procedural Fairness 
The third element required for a decision to be compliant with the PAJA is that it 
must be procedurally fair.245 Procedural fairness requires that a complainant has 
the right to a fair hearing, and the presiding officer should be objective.246 The 
PAJA distinguishes between procedural fairness in the context of individuals, and 
in the context of a group or the public.247 In the context of individuals, the PAJA 
adopts a variable standard that entails evaluating the circumstances of each case to 
determine the fairness thereof.248 
Procedural fairness is relevant to decision-making in the context of the National 
Water Act insofar as where the Act fails to provide, or is silent, on the nature of 
the procedures to be followed, the PAJA should be followed.249 In addition, even 
where the Act is prescriptive, it is still required to be consistent with these 
provisions.250 
Section 3 of the PAJA sets out certain minimum requirements for the attainment 
of procedural fairness. These requirements include that adequate notice of any 
proposed administrative action must be provided.251 However, a deviation is 
permissible where the provision of notice would defeat the purpose of the 
administrative action.252 The courts have provided further that the nature of the 
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notice given must be suitable for its recipients.253 Where the intended recipients 
are vulnerable, illiterate or ‘legally unsophisticated’, the courts have required 
more than the mere provision of a written notice, thereby confirming the 
importance of the context of the situation as decisive.254 
An administrator is also required to provide persons with sufficient opportunity to 
make representations, although this does not provide that an oral representation is 
required.255 Consequently, and depending on the circumstances, an opportunity to 
make written submissions will suffice.256 At a minimum, the notice should contain 
the factual and legal assertions made by the authority, as well as any relevant 
information that is ‘adverse or prejudicial to the person concerned’.257 
The third requirement of procedural fairness is that once the administrative action 
has been taken, a clear statement thereof must be communicated to the effected 
parties.258 Ordinarily, submissions or representations would be heard prior to this 
event, but where this is not possible, they may in certain circumstances be heard 
afterwards.259 Where a right of review or appeal exists, the administrator must 
further communicate this information to the party timeously.260 In addition, 
adequate notice must be provided to the party conveying their right to request 
reasons.261 
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Another factor that may be necessary for procedural fairness to be achieved is 
allowing a party to obtain legal representation, which will depend on the 
circumstances of the case, including factors such as the seriousness and 
complexity thereof.262 As stated above, whether oral representations should be 
permitted and the format of these representations (for example, whether they 
should allow witnesses and cross-examination) will largely be determined on the 
facts of the case and the extent to which parties will suffer prejudice under the 
circumstances.263 It is also not necessarily the case that the same procedure must 
be followed in each instance, provided that, where a deviation occurs, this is still 
fair.264 
In order for a decision to be procedurally fair, it should also comply with the 
Regulations on Fair Administrative Procedures.265 These regulations provide 
further guidance to both public inquiry and notice and comment procedures, the 
latter of which is specifically required under the National Water Act.266 The PAJA 
sets out the requirements for a public inquiry generally, while the regulations 
establish the nuances thereof, including how the inquiry is to be advertised, as 
well as the content thereof, the language in which it should be heard, and other 
procedural issues pertaining to the hearing itself.267 Where a community should be 
involved in a public inquiry, particularly a vulnerable or illiterate community, the 
regulations require that special steps must be taken to ensure their participation.268 
Similarly, the PAJA sets out the general requirements for notice and comment 
procedures, which include inviting and considering comments from any parties 
that may be materially and adversely affected by administrative action.269 The 
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Regulations also set out the content of the notice and comment procedures, 
including the procedural requirements of the notice, as well as the information 
that must be contained therein in order for the notice to be considered effective.270 
The PAJA also requires decision-makers to act impartially and without bias.271 
There is an overlap between this consideration and other requirements of the 
PAJA, for example, the duty to not pursue ulterior purposes.272 In order for bias to 
exist, it must be shown that actual bias exists in terms of the PAJA,273 or a 
reasonable suspicion of bias per the common law.274 If it can be shown that a 
reasonable person in the position of the litigant would have reasonable grounds to 
suspect that the decision-maker may be biased, bias will be said to exist.275 Bias 
includes a financial or personal interest in the decision.276 Bias will also be said to 
exist where the decision-maker is prejudiced as to the subject matter or clearly 
aligns themselves with one side.277 Finally, decision-makers may fall foul of 
procedural fairness for institutional or official bias.278 
The broadness of the requirement for fair administrative action in the Constitution 
has the possibility to invite endless questioning and litigation into every 
administrative decision. While the PAJA itself has narrowed the types of actions 
that are susceptible to judicial review, Hoexter argues that the concept of 
variability plays an important role in ensuring that the responsibility to act fairly is 
not too onerous.279 
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3.2.4. The Right to Reasons 
In order for decision-making to be fair, parties are also afforded with the right to 
reasons, both in terms of the Constitution and the PAJA.280 Good reasoning is 
intimately linked to the fairness of an administrator’s actions and this is evidenced 
in the PAJA in a number of places, for example, the administrator’s decision is 
required to be rationally connected to the reasons therefor.281 In order for this right 
to be ‘triggered’, a party must allege and show that their rights were both 
adversely and materially affected.282 The Regulations set out the rather onerous 
requirements for requesting reasons, which includes writing to the administrator 
concerned via either post, fax or email and specifically stipulating how their rights 
have been materially and adversely affected.283 To temper this burden on 
potentially illiterate and vulnerable parties, the Regulations also require 
administrators to assist these parties with requesting reasons where it is reasonable 
to do so.284 
An administrator is entitled to decline to provide written reasons, but must justify 
this decision to the party who requested the reasons.285 The reasons for a decision 
should be communicated in such a manner that they assist the party to understand 
how the outcome was reached, and justify the decision-maker’s behaviour.286 In 
this respect, the court has held that the concepts conveyed should include the 
administrator’s reasoning used, and the factual findings in the context of the 
applicable law, conveyed in a manner that is clear and understandable.287 Where 
administrators fail to give reasons and have not relied on one of the justifiable 
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grounds for doing so, there is a rebuttable presumption in terms of the PAJA that 
the administrative action lacks a ‘good reason’.288 
3.2.5. Remedies under Judicial Review 
Section 8 of the PAJA sets out the permissible remedies pursuant to judicial 
review where the court finds that administrative decision-making falls foul of the 
PAJA. The court has wide-ranging powers in terms of this provision, insofar as it 
may make any order that is just and equitable.289 Importantly, this list of 
possibilities as defined by section 8 is not exhaustive, as the wording of the Act 
states that the court may make any order, provided that it is just and equitable to 
do so.290 This includes the power to make a declaratory order,291 award an 
interdict (mandatory, prohibitory and structural)292 as well as make a spoliatory 
order293 and an order as to costs.294 The court may set the administrator’s decision 
aside and send it back to them for reconsideration.295 The moment at which this 
occurs, the decision is no longer of force and effect.296 More dramatically, and 
only under exceptional circumstances, the court may change the administrator’s 
decision, or even substitute it with its own decision.297 
The Act does not define what exceptional circumstances entail, but case law may 
provide guidance in this respect:298 
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where the end result is a foregone conclusion, and it would be a waste of time to 
remit the decision to the original decision-maker; where further delay would 
cause unjustifiable prejudice to the applicant; and where the original decision-
maker has exhibited bias or incompetence to such a degree that it would be unfair 
to ask the applicant to submit to its jurisdiction again. 
Recently, the court in this respect has held that exceptional circumstances will be 
shown to exist when ‘a court is persuaded that a decision to exercise the power in 
question should not be left to the designated functionary’.299 While the 
abovementioned factors may be considered, this must be in light of the 
constitutional requirements to ensure that administrative action is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair, and the court will not refer a decision back 
where it would be procedurally unfair to do so.300 
Where an administrator has failed to take a decision within a certain time period, 
or there is an unreasonable delay in taking the decision, the PAJA also provides 
for certain remedies.301 The court may order the administrator to take the decision, 
declare the rights of the parties in that respect, provide an order relating to the 
granting of an interdict, and make any costs order, provided that it would be just 
and equitable to do so.302 
In terms of the common law, the courts are entitled to set aside a decision or 
correct it, upon review proceedings.303 Alternatively, an interdict or declaratory 
order may be necessary and the courts are permitted to make this award in the 
appropriate circumstances.304 It is clear that the list of remedies as afforded by the 
PAJA goes beyond that which was allowed by the common law. 
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3.3. Judicial Review on the Basis of the Principle of 
Legality 
Where administrative action within the bounds of the PAJA does not afford a 
complainant any relief, they can apply to the court to review any decision based 
on the principle of legality.305 The principle of legality is a component of the rule 
of law and it limits the exercise of public power, independent of the PAJA.306 The 
rule of law is in turn entrenched and protected by the Constitution, and judicial 
review on the basis of the principle of legality thus has its jurisdictional source in 
the Constitution.307 The rule of law requires that a legal system should be certain, 
predictable and applied equally.308 These requirements go hand-in-hand with 
democratic principles such as freedom of expression and the right to participation, 
to ensure that there are constraints on the exercise of public power.309 
3.4. Alternative Civil and Criminal Remedies 
In terms of proceeding against administrators in the courts, judicial review is not 
the only avenue available to aggrieved parties. They can also proceed by way of 
the common law, utilising the Aquilian action.310 Alternatively, criminal sanctions 
can provide an effective remedy in appropriate circumstances.311 While nuisance 
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is one of the common law remedies that may be of assistance, this remedy is 
applicable between private parties and will therefore not be discussed.312 
While a criminal complaint can be lodged, the discretion to prosecute an 
environmental crime rests with the relevant Directorate of Public Prosecutions. As 
stated by Craigie et al, environmental crimes are insufficiently monitored on this 
front, both in terms of investigation and prosecution.313 
The nature of the remedies that can be obtained through the use of civil sanctions 
vary. For example, the court may award either an interim or final interdict, 
although an interdict is described as an ‘extraordinary remedy’. Should a court 
award an interdict, it will either cause the state to refrain from doing something 
(that is, be prohibitory in nature) or it will compel the state to take a certain course 
of action (that is, be mandatory in nature).314 Where the remedy sought is 
compensation, it is more appropriate to sue the administrator in delict if the 
elements thereof can be satisfied.315 While compensation may be sought under 
exceptional circumstances under the PAJA, or more generally in terms of the 
Constitution, which allows the court to award appropriate relief, this avenue is the 
more acceptable course of action.316 In this respect, the courts will necessarily 
have to evaluate the substance of the decision-making process and will therefore 
entertain an indirect review of the administrator’s decision.317 
In order for a litigant to be successful in a delictual action, they must show that 
the administrator committed an act (or omission) which caused loss, and was 
further both negligent and wrongful.318 Administrators can therefore generally 
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escape liability if they can show that they were acting within the purview of the 
legislative framework.319 The courts have been reluctant to award damages where 
an administrator acted in the public interest, provided this decision was made in 
good faith.320 The enquiry will be context-specific and the courts will evaluate 
policy decisions and the public interest. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
The purpose of this chapter was to set out the nature of the oversight mechanisms, 
as well as the remedies available to dissatisfied parties where the state is failing to 
fulfill its trusteeship duties. In terms of the checks and balances on the state, the 
public has a right to public participation,321 which is expressly required in terms of 
the National Water Act in certain circumstances. In addition, the public has the 
right of access to information, and can request information from both the state and 
private parties, subject to certain criteria.322 
The Constitution created four Chapter 9 institutions, which all aim to oversee and 
regulate the functioning of the state. These are the Public Protector,323 the South 
African Human Rights Commission,324 the Commission for Gender Equality325 
and the Auditor-General.326 However, as was observed in this chapter, none of 
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these institutions appear to be putting the state under pressure to ensure that water 
resources are properly managed in accordance with the duties of trusteeship.327 
The Water Tribunal is required to function as a court of first instance in terms of 
the National Water Act, in instances where water rights have been infringed.328 
However, this remedy is currently unavailable, as the Water Tribunal has been 
disbanded until an interim Tribunal can be created.329 
The right to just administrative action can also provide a remedy in the context of 
trusteeship as any decision which is either unlawful, unreasonable or procedurally 
unfair can be challenged and set aside.330 Even where one of these requirements is 
not satisfied within the scope of the PAJA, provided that it can be shown that the 
decision violates the principle of legality, a decision can be set aside.331 In the 
event that it is found that a decision amounts to administrative action, there are a 
number of remedies available to the courts to remedy the situation.332 
While a number of oversight mechanisms and remedies therefore exist within the 
context of water management, it is clear that these do not necessarily serve to 
ensure that the state fulfils its role as trustee. This is particularly in light of the 
current problems with water resources, such as pollution and a lack of access to 
adequate sanitation services, owing to poor management by the state. This area 
requires further attention to ensure that the duties of trusteeship are properly 
fulfilled. The following chapter aims to address the shortcomings of the legislative 
scheme as well as propose suggestions in this regard. 
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Chapter Eight:  




It is the suggestion of this thesis that the legislative introduction of the concept of 
trusteeship imposes no more duties on the state than their ordinary constitutional 
responsibilities, although it does provide the content of these duties.1 State 
trusteeship in the context of the National Water Act and the Water Services Act is, 
therefore, state trusteeship in the narrow sense. However, from the perspective of 
the Constitution, which imparts the duties of trusteeship not only onto the state, 
but also the courts and society, trusteeship is viewed more widely. As mentioned, 
the concern of this thesis is with the content of the narrower meaning. 
The use of the terminology ‘trustee’ and ‘custodian’ is found in numerous other 
legislative sources in South Africa, evidencing the legislature’s intent to impart 
administrative responsibilities onto the state.2 While the Act certainly gives 
content to these constitutional duties, the responsibility of the state to ensure that 
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the goals of sustainability, equity and efficiency are promoted exists 
independently of the statutory trusteeship provisions.3 What these provisions did, 
was to make the state the administrator of water as a resource.4 Whether the word 
‘administrator’ or ‘trustee’ is used makes little difference to the responsibilities of 
the state. In other words, the responsibilities of the state as trustee (in the narrow 
sense) go beyond that of the statutory framework and, in particular, section 3 of 
the Water Act. Given that the state was the administrator of water and its use prior 
to the introduction of the constitutional legal framework, what has changed is not 
the role of the state, but rather the values that guide its conduct. State trusteeship 
in the narrow sense then is mere rhetoric: the use of the word ‘trustee’ evidences 
an appreciation of the value of water to society, both as a social and economic 
good. State trusteeship certainly invokes images of protection and care in a way 
that the word ‘administrator’ does not. However, given the problems identified 
with water management in the preceding chapters, it is clear that the use of the 
term ‘trusteeship’ has not promoted good governance, accountability, or the 
proper management of water by the state.5  
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of 
trusteeship within the context of the legal framework. Whilst there is much 
written about the shortcomings of the legal framework governing water, the 
approach of this thesis is to view these shortcomings from the perspective of 
trusteeship. This chapter will reiterate that the understanding of the duties of 
trusteeship is not furthered either by the notion of res publicae, or with reference 
to the public trust doctrine. Secondly, it will analyse the approach to water 
management with a view to identifying the shortcomings of the legal framework, 
the values of trusteeship, as well as the mechanisms and remedies available in this 
regard. 
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2. Analysis of the Existing Attempts to Explain 
Trusteeship 
The relevance of Roman and Roman-Dutch law was discussed in Chapter 4, as 
was the relevance of the public trust doctrine. Part of the novel contribution of this 
thesis is to show how the requirements of trusteeship contained in the South 
African legal framework go beyond those required by the historical classifications 
and the public trust doctrine. This is discussed below. 
Water was capable of private ownership in both Roman and Roman-Dutch law. 
This has clearly not been the nature of legal developments in South Africa, where 
the legislature elected to classify all water as public, and part of the same 
hydrological cycle subject to the same legal framework.6 All water is public 
therefore, and if one were to classify it in terms of the historical sources, it would 
be capable of classification as either res publicae or res communes.7 While res 
publicae would afford the state administrative control over the resource, the texts 
do not discuss to what extent the state is capable of administering res communes.8 
Given the nature of the examples listed as types of res communes (that is the air, 
light and sea), it is possible that the old authors never contemplated the state 
needing to administer these resources.  
 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of Appeal has erroneously found that ‘public 
water, running in a river or a stream, was recognised as being res communes and 
therefore incapable of being owned’.9 The effect of this judgment is that water, 
which should be classified as res publicae, that is water running in rivers and 
streams, must now be classified as res communes. Previously, all other water 
would either have been classified as res communes (that is, running water) or 
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private.10 Private water should now be classified as public in terms of the 
legislation, contrary to the historical sources, and consequently should either be 
treated as res publicae or res communes. Given that all water is now part of the 
same hydrological cycle, it would be an anomaly to classify it differently to other 
water within the hydrological cycle, which is already classified as res communes, 
as asserted by this thesis. Therefore, the argument can be made that all water 
within the hydrological cycle is classified as res communes. The practical 
implication of this judgment is that water is incapable of ownership and therefore 
incapable of being stolen.11 In all other respects, the constitutional and statutory 
framework regulates water resources, thereby allowing the state to administer 
water resources, despite this classification.12  
In the context of res publicae, these historical classifications aimed to ensure 
access to these resources and the use thereof.13 Furthermore, the rules pertaining 
to their management by the state centred on regulating the navigability of rivers 
and regulating the relationships between users of water.14 The nature of the 
examples listed to explain res communes (that is light, air and the sea)15 create the 
impression that regulating the use and access of these resources were not in issue. 
Given their abundance and inability to be controlled, the silence of the sources as 
to the role of the state in relation to these resources further reinforce this 
impression that control and regulation was not contemplated. 
However, it is clear that that both the use and access to water resources is highly 
controlled under the new water management regime.16 In addition, the goals of 
this management are to ensure both equitable access to the resource as well as the 
                                                     
10 See Ch 4 note 10 above. 
11 See Ch 4 note 160 above. However, see above at Chap 4 (note 124) where the possibility of 
“bare” or “nude” dominium is discussed. 
12 See discussion at Ch 3 above. 
13 See Ch 4 note 46 above. 
14 See Ch 4 note 55 above. 
15 See Ch 4 note 10 above. 
16 See Ch 3 note 221 above. 





sustainable use thereof.17 To understand trusteeship, therefore, reliance must be 
placed on the content of the Constitution and the statutory framework, rather than 
these historical sources. 
In the context of ensuring equitable access to resources, Roman and Roman-Dutch 
law developed during a vastly different socio-political era, one which was not 
concerned with ensuring equity.18 Public property notions did not vest in the 
Roman public any rights of public participation in the political process, as is 
required today.19 Further, the expression of the principles of public property may 
have been normative20 – a statement of ‘what the Emperor might have wished the 
law to be’… thereby elevating this ‘to the level of undeserved authority’.21 In 
addition, it is unclear whether Roman law, despite it affording the public with a 
guaranteed right of use of and access to the resource, actually vested in the public 
any sort of enforceable right.22 As Sax states, ‘no evidence is available that public 
rights could be legally asserted against a recalcitrant government’.23 
By comparison, an analysis of the public trust doctrine is useful, to the extent that 
it shows how the South African legal framework has better provided for the goals 
of water management.  
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The public trust doctrine is inherently flexible, as each state is entitled to provide 
its own content in terms of the equal footing doctrine.24 The South African legal 
framework necessitates the implementation of Adaptive Management, which 
requires decision-makers to adopt a flexible approach, which can accommodate 
environmental changes as and when they occur, depending on the environmental 
and social needs at the time.25 However, this approach is resource-intensive and 
necessarily undermines legal certainty. A criticism of this approach in the 
American context is that it is not certain that the underlying goal of the doctrine is 
environmental protection.26 While the American doctrine may in time shift away 
from environmental protection, it is clear that sustainability and consequently the 
protection and preservation of water resources in South Africa are fundamental 
goals from which deviation is not permissible.27 
South Africa has adopted a management system with a universal legal framework. 
Similar to the equal footing doctrine in America, each catchment management 
area must develop its own Strategy for the management of water in its region, 
provided that this is consistent with the goals of the national Strategy.28 In this 
respect, the South African approach is more favourable than the American 
approach in two ways: the management of water is demarcated along the natural 
water boundaries resulting in a more organic method of regulating water use 
whilst the public trust doctrine in America is regulated in terms of political 
boundaries;29 secondly, water is required to be managed consistently with the 
goals of the national Strategy, resulting in a coherent effort to address the goals of 
water management. By comparison, each state in America has developed the 
scope and meaning of the doctrine in vastly different ways.30  
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Between the states, there is no consistency as to which resources are protected.31 
However, in South Africa it is clear that all water resources are protected: all 
water is public and part of the same hydrological cycle.32 There is no distinction 
made between ground and surface water, or whether the water is used for fishing 
or recreation. This again results in a consistent approach to the management of 
water resources.33 
Another area of uncertainty is whether the doctrine has its source in federal or 
statutory law.34 However, in South Africa, the constitutional right to a healthy 
environment and access to water resources at the very least creates an implied 
constitutional doctrine of trusteeship, as it is the state that must give effect to these 
rights.35 Further, trusteeship is an expressly created statutory creature.36 As a 
result, there is no uncertainty as to the source of its authority: trusteeship is 
anchored in both the Constitution and statutory law. The relevance of looking to 
the Roman and Roman-Dutch classifications is to establish whether trusteeship 
could also be anchored in the common law. However, there is a clear 
constitutional and statutory basis for its implementation. The courts are permitted, 
and required, to investigate the conduct of the state where they breach their duties 
as trustee. The content of these duties is derived from the Constitution and 
legislation, as well as the Strategy.37 The difficulties experienced in American law 
as to whether the judiciary is competent to investigate state conduct and the extent 
to which this is permissible is therefore not experienced in South Africa.  
The American doctrine has also given rise to problems of classification within the 
legal system, with authors positing that it could be classified as administrative 
law, constitutional law or property law, or a combination of these areas.38 In South 
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Africa, the duties of management of water are vested primarily in the state as 
trustee, and these duties concern the protection, use, development, conservation, 
management and control of water – duties that are primarily administrative.39 
Given that the source of trusteeship in South Africa is the Constitution, trusteeship 
can also be classified as constitutional in nature. As was argued in Chapter 4, the 
classification of water as either res publicae or res communes provides no real 
assistance to furthering the duties of trusteeship.40 Consequently, while water 
resources do constitute public property, these classifications provide no further 
guidance than understanding the nature of the property. The content of 
trusteeship, however, is informed by the Constitution, legislation and the Strategy, 
which give effect to the state’s duties to administer the resource. Consequently, it 
is better described as an administrative and constitutional law doctrine in South 
African law. 
Both the public trust doctrine and trusteeship require management of resources 
consistent with the public interest.41 While there is no clarity as to what the nature 
of the public interest is in terms of the doctrine, the public purpose for which 
water uses may be allocated in South Africa are clearly contained within the 
Constitution, the National Water Act and the Water Services Act.42 Consequently, 
identifying a public purpose will start with these sources of law. This does not 
necessarily mean that it is easy to identify whether a public purpose is legitimate. 
Where courts are required to intervene, they will still have to balance the various 
interests, including the social, economic and environmental interests, in order to 
evaluate whether a decision is legitimate.43 However, it is clear that in the context 
of the constitutional right of access to water, the state is bestowed with a positive 
obligation to fulfill this right, subject to the limitations set out in the Constitution, 
as assessed against a standard of reasonableness.44 Similarly, in the context of the 
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right to a healthy environment, the state must show that it has actively engaged 
with this provision and genuinely attempted to further the goals of sustainability.45 
The doctrine also contains an inherent tension, namely, an attempt to ensure the 
protection of resources almost always entails regulating, or more particularly, 
trying to prevent access to the resource.46 In South Africa, access to water 
resources and the ecological protection and preservation of environmental 
resources create two independent rights in the Constitution. These rights are by 
their very nature in conflict, and the state is required to balance the needs of these 
competing rights within the parameters of the requirements of sustainability.47 As 
stated in Chapter 3, the environment cannot be preserved at all costs, particularly 
not where legitimate social and economic goals outweigh the preservation of the 
environment.48 However, this must be balanced against the need to ensure that the 
environment is capable of sustaining life not only for the present generation, but 
also future generations.49 
The fulfillment of democratic principles, such as public participation, the 
provision of access to information and the separation of powers, is crucial to 
ensuring that trusteeship is properly implemented by the state.50 In the context of 
the doctrine, Sax has shown that the government in America employs two 
mechanisms to avoid complying with the requirement of public participation: it 
either intentionally reduces the level of public participation by making ‘low-
visibility’ decisions; or it waits until development is too far gone for a change in 
the outcome to be justifiable.51 Both of these problems are experienced in South 
Africa, where the state actively attempts to evade its responsibilities of ensuring 
access to information and public participation in the decision-making process.52 
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However, the problem with public participation is not that there are insufficient 
legal mechanisms in place to ensure that it is given effect to, but rather, a failure 
to properly ensure its implementation. 
The separation of powers aims to dilute the concentration of power into three 
separate divisions, such that each branch is able to maintain an oversight function 
over the other two branches.53 The judiciary plays a particularly important role in 
this regard, as private citizens are able to challenge state actions where this 
conduct may have gone beyond the powers conferred on them.54 The issue of the 
counter-majoritarian dilemma cannot be avoided whenever the courts are called 
upon to question state conduct. This is even more so when the decision-making 
process is multi-faceted and very technical, such as the nature of the decision-
making process in the context of water resources. However, this must be balanced 
against the need for legitimate judicial interference in the context of socio-
economic adjudication, where administrators fail to fulfill their constitutional 
mandate.55 Liebenberg argues that the technical nature of a case should not 
preclude the judiciary from hearing matters dealing with socio-economic rights, 
nor however, should they be permitted to shirk their responsibilities in this 
regard.56 
3. Analysis of the Current Approach to Water 
Management 
The potential solutions to the problems encountered in water management are not 
new, nor are they easy to implement. Most of the problems are both widespread 
and difficult to fix. The state has set itself the following primary targets in order to 
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improve water management, namely: ‘Achieving equity, including Water 
Allocation Reform; Water conservation and water demand management; 
Institutional establishment and governance; Compliance monitoring and 
enforcement; and Planning, infrastructure development and operation, and 
maintenance of water resources infrastructure’.57 The state is thus alive to many of 
the problems of water management, and is actively addressing these problems. 
However, the extent of these problems combined with a budget deficit, skills 
shortage and high levels of maladministration, means that the state may never be 
able to do so. 
The proposed solutions below have all been stated before, by various authors and 
in various configurations. There is no magic solution to fixing the problems of 
water mismanagement. However, simplifying the processes, clarifying 
inconsistencies and increasing the efficiency of water use may go a long way to 
solving these problems.  
The purpose of this section is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the 
current approach to water management. This will be addressed with a particular 
focus on the role of the court in relation to trusteeship, the state’s failure to 
adequately administer water resources in accordance with the legal framework, as 
well as the shortcomings of the framework itself. In addition, the inadequacies of 
the available oversight mechanisms and remedies will be discussed.  
3.1. The Role of the Courts 
It is the assertion of this thesis that the use of the terminology ‘trusteeship’ in and 
of itself did not change the role of the state as the administrator of water 
resources, as confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Mostert Snr and 
another v S.58 To the extent that the state does not comply with the constitutional 
and statutory duties established to fulfil this administrative role, the courts are 
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empowered to review state conduct and ensure compliance.59 The Constitutional 
Court has gone so far as to state that it is the duty of the court to ensure that the 
responsibility of the protection of the environment (which it terms ‘trusteeship’) is 
fulfilled.60  
However, an absurdity has arisen in this context: while the court has elected itself 
the trustee or guardian in respect of the protection of the environment (that is, 
matters related to section 24 of the Constitution), the same court has refrained 
from involving itself in the context of ensuring that the right of access to water is 
fulfilled. The court in Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg61 specifically stated that 
‘it is institutionally inappropriate for a court to determine what the achievement of 
any particular social and economic right entails and what steps government should 
take to ensure the progressive realisation of the right’.62 
The state is not complying with its duties of trusteeship: there is an endemic and 
apparent failure on the part of the state to ensure that water is both protected and 
preserved, and that access to sufficient water is made available in order to give 
effect to the right to dignity.63 While the courts have adopted an active role in 
respect of the former,64 a more active role on the part of the judiciary in terms of 
the right of access to water is required, in line with the approach of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in City of Johannesburg and others v Mazibuko and others.65 
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Given the importance that dignity plays in the constitutional dispensation, 
especially when viewed against the historical background of water management, 
the courts should not shy away from challenging the state in order to ensure it 
satisfies its mandate. Liebenberg criticises the current approach to the positive and 
negative duties of the state as set out by the Constitutional Court. She argues that 
the model of review used to evaluate state conduct in the context of their positive 
duties results in ‘less robust forms of accountability’. This fails to acknowledge 
the role of the state in the distribution of resources. More importantly, it fails to 
acknowledge that a lack of access to resources exacerbates and entrenches 
poverty.66 
3.2. The Current Legal Framework 
Despite the fact that the current legal framework already represents a more 
simplified approach to water management,67 it is necessary to streamline it further 
in order to increase efficiency. The perfect opportunity for this streamlining has 
now arisen, as the National Water Act and Water Services Act are to be 
consolidated in accordance with the National Water Policy Review (hereinafter 
the ‘Water Policy’).68 The focus of the consolidated legislation will be 
developmental water management, management of the entire ‘water value chain’, 
and to establish a National Water Strategy which incorporates water services and 
sanitation.69 
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However, it has been pointed out that the unification of this legislation is unlikely 
to target the real problem of water management in the country, ‘namely 
departmental and municipal incompetence’.70 
The National Water Act provides that all water is public, and management of this 
resource should be allocated to the lowest appropriate level, in order to further the 
principles of public participation. Brown notes that while the National Water Act 
ostensibly promotes the decentralisation of power, it has in fact removed water 
management powers from local government and instead given them to the 
national government as trustee, thereby consolidating and centralising power.71 
While the long-term goal is for these powers to be devolved to catchment 
management agencies, no time-frame is established for this process to be 
completed. Consequently, a failure on the part of the Minister to transfer these 
powers will not result in a transgression of the legislation.72 Thus far, the Minister 
has been inclined to resist the devolution of the powers and duties that are more 
appropriately suited to catchment management agencies.73 
While the devolution of power is aimed at the upliftment of communities and 
allowing them greater participation in the context of the management of natural 
resources, Francis is critical of this decentralisation of power, particularly given 
South Africa’s history and socio-economic environment.74 In the first place, 
catchment management agencies are legislatively required to fund themselves, 
creating huge difficulties where these funds are not easy to generate.75 Secondly, 
the devolution of power requires participation of community members who are 
                                                     
70 Editorial ‘New water law won’t help much’ (note 68 above); Water Research Commission 
‘Water and society: Upscaling community-based partnerships in South Africa’(note 68 above). 
71 J Brown ‘Assuming too much? Participatory water resource governance in South Africa’ (2011) 
177 The Geographic Journal 180. 
72 J Brown (note 71 above) 180. 
73 See Ch 3 (note 277 above).  
74 R Francis ‘Water justice in South Africa: natural resources policy at the intersection of human 
rights, economics and political power’ (2005-2006) 18 Georgetown International Environmental 
Law Review 20 - 22. 
75 R Francis (note 74 above) 20 - 22. 





not homogenous, resulting in power imbalances.76 Not only are there institutional 
difficulties, such as a lack of skills and capacity, but in addition, there also still 
exist large gender and racial inequalities.77 Consequently, Francis states: 78 
Whatever the intentions behind decentralized management, it may not amount to 
much more than an artful legislative copout by the national government, because 
so many communities have neither the capacity to manage water democratically 
nor the finances to supply it affordably. 
Similarly, in the context of the provision of water and sanitation services, the 
lowest appropriate level for the decentralisation of powers is the municipality. 
However, as pointed out by Muller, many of these municipalities lack the skills 
and expertise to function without assistance and support from regional or national 
bodies.79 Consequently, as with the criticism of decentralisation of power to 
catchment management agencies, the intention to dilute the powers to a lower 
level may in this instance also be misguided. 
However, the delineation of powers to catchment management agencies is also a 
positive feature of the current legal framework.80 It allows decision-makers to 
regulate water resources relative to local conditions and needs, within the greater 
scheme of the goals set out by the national Strategy.81 The failure to establish 
these agencies more quickly, and to delegate and assign powers is a flaw of the 
current system and must be urgently addressed so that these institutions and their 
capacities can be developed.82 In addition, clarification of the impact of 
assignment of powers by the Minister to catchment management agencies and 
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other parties is required.83 Finally, the creation of catchment management 
agencies, given that they are required to fund themselves, must carefully ensure 
that ‘existing differences in economic and social power are reduced and not 
strengthened’.84 
It is uncertain how the new legislation will address the fact that the delineation of 
the various water management functions do not coincide: water is managed within 
the boundaries of a catchment management area, and water and sanitation services 
are managed according to municipal boundaries. The problem with overlapping 
jurisdictions is that it increases the complexities of decision-making by increasing 
the number of persons involved in one particular task.  
One of the primary criticisms of the entire legal framework regulating the 
environment is that it is fragmented and fails to take a holistic approach to the 
regulation of the environment.85 Of greatest concern is that water and mineral 
resources fall outside the purview of the compliance and enforcement provisions 
created by the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (hereinafter 
the ‘NEMA’). Whilst land and air pollution, biodiversity, protected areas and 
integrated coastal management are all regulated within the array of legislation 
dealt with by the NEMA, water and mineral resources fall to be dealt with in 
terms of their own legal regimes and departments.86 One of the mechanisms 
introduced to ensure compliance with environmental obligations is the 
Environmental Management Inspectorate (the ‘Inspectorate’).87 However, these 
inspectors have no jurisdiction to evaluate and enforce compliance in the context 
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of water and mineral resources.88 Given that these inspectors form part of a 
dedicated, trained unit specialising in compliance and enforcement, the omission 
of water and mineral resources from their portfolio is a serious shortcoming of the 
current legal framework.89  
Whilst the Water Policy aims to bring the legislation governing water in line with 
the NEMA in terms of the available dispute resolution mechanisms, it is silent as 
to the mechanisms available in terms of compliance and enforcement.90 The 
powers afforded to inspectors may be of huge benefit to promoting the goals of 
water management. Consequently, if these inspectors are not to be given the 
powers to regulate issues concerning water, then the Department should be given 
the mandate to create its own equivalent of environmental management 
inspectors. In addition, these inspectors should be given the same powers as those 
contained in the NEMA, and should furthermore be entitled to investigate all 
water resources, including water used in mining operations. 
‘Trusteeship’ should be expressly defined in line with the legislature’s desired 
purpose for the role of the state. It is argued that statutory trusteeship currently 
amounts to the administrative role of the state in accordance with its constitutional 
and statutory obligations to manage water sustainably, equitably and efficiently. 
All stakeholders and role players in the management of water should be clearly 
defined and have expressly stated powers and duties. Thompson has suggested 
that the current legislative scheme, which allows for different powers to be vested 
in different persons (that is, between a responsible authority, authorised person 
and/or CMA), needs to be rationalised. These powers need to be vested in 
individuals such that compliance with the legal requirements can be ensured. This 
also entails improving the competencies of such persons so that they have the 
requisite skills to perform their functions, as well as ensuring that these persons 
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are tasked solely with the job of ensuring compliance, rather than diluting their 
functions with other responsibilities.91 
According to the Water Policy, the new legislation must cater for equitable use of 
water resources not just for domestic purposes, but also economic purposes.92 
However, there is to be no increase in the minimum amount of free water 
provided to indigent households, which remains at 25 litres per person per day.93 
Finally, the new legislation must recognise the link between poverty and access to 
water resources, and consequently ensure that the ‘water needs of poor rural 
communities are met and protected to support the development of sustainable 
livelihoods’.94  
It is clear, therefore, that giving effect to equity and sustainability will feature 
strongly in the new legislation. The primary policies established by the Water 
Policy do not yet include customary law entitlements, although this may become a 
recommended key policy after further investigation.95 Another key policy that 
may be added is free basic sanitation.96 The Water Services Act currently provides 
that ‘[e]veryone has a right of access to basic water supply and basic sanitation’.97 
Implementation of a free basic sanitation policy would thus take this right one 
step further. It is argued that this approach would serve to give effect to the right 
to dignity. Increasing the minimum quantity of free water in particularly 
vulnerable areas would also go a long way to promoting the principles of human 
dignity and equality.  
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3.3. The Values of Trusteeship 
The values of trusteeship were discussed in Chapter 5 in terms of sustainability, 
equity and efficiency. Whilst sustainability and equity are normative, the value of 
efficiency aims to assist in achieving the goals of sustainability and equity.98 What 
lies at the heart of the problems inherent to the water management system is 
inefficiency, caused predominantly by a lack of technical skills, institutional 
skills, financial management and cooperative governance.99 The Water Policy 
captures this sentiment by stating: 
The present generalised lack of technical and managerial expertise means, 
however, that a mechanical decentralisation or delegation of functions is unlikely 
to achieve the objectives of more responsive and effective water management. 
The goals of public policy will only be achieved if such delegation goes hand in 
hand with systematic capacity building and effective monitoring and support 
from the national Department.100 
The current licensing system is one of the inefficient aspects of water 
management. At present, the state is not meeting its responsibilities to review 
existing licenses every 5 years, largely due to capacity constraints.101 Nor is it able 
to monitor compliance with authorisations, which has led to the illegal use and 
pollution of water, including in some instances from municipal wastewater 
treatment works themselves.102 Further, the process of applying for a license is a 
lengthy and highly complex process. In some instances, where the application 
should take only five months to complete, it has taken over five years to 
finalise.103 
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Kidd points out that the trusteeship role of the state, together with its obligations 
in terms of the licensing system, result in an onerous ‘administrative burden’ on 
the state.104 In addition, there are insufficient human resources to ensure that the 
licensing system is properly implemented. This is exacerbated by the fact that the 
system of licensing is not clearly defined, as it is ultimately a discretionary 
process.105 As a result, persons are being compelled to apply for water use 
licences in instances where they are not legally required to do so, and vice 
versa.106 The combination of an increased number of decision-makers in the 
system, together with a lack of defined rules allows greater scope for ‘corruption 
and other maladministration’ to occur.107 
Kidd argues that one of the ways in which the Act has attempted to alleviate this 
administrative burden is by allowing for the continuation of pre-existing, lawful 
uses, which reduces the need for administrative interference. As a result, decision-
makers should only have to award licenses in situations where an area is classed 
as water stressed, or for some other ‘compelling’ reason.108 However, existing 
lawful uses are problematic for a number of reasons, the most important of which 
is the obstacle that they present for redressing inequality. The majority of the 
holders of these uses do not reflect the goals of equity and social transformation as 
required by the Constitution and the Act.109 Historically, commercial farmers in 
South Africa have been almost exclusively white males. As a result, most of the 
existing use authorisations are in white male hands.110 Pre-existing water uses are 
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also intended to provide for lawful water use in terms of African customary law. 
Instead, these pre-existing uses have been difficult to verify, with the result that 
genuine pre-existing use of water may not be being appropriately recognised.111 
Consequently, one of the biggest challenges to the goals of ensuring equitable 
access to water and its benefits is the system of existing lawful uses.112  
The second problem is that existing lawful uses are not subject to conditions or 
review by the state, as is required in the context of licences. However, while 
licences facilitate control over the use of water, practically the state is failing to 
utilise the system properly.113 There is a backlog of license applications for water 
use and no system currently in place to verify existing lawful water uses.114 A 
verification programme is being developed to ascertain the details of existing 
lawful uses, but this process is both slow and resource-intensive.115 In addition, 
the enforcement of licences and their conditions is poor.116 This much is conceded 
by the state itself in the latest Strategy.117 Consequently, although existing lawful 
uses are not subject to the same controls as licences, even if they were, the state 
simply does not have the capacity to subject existing lawful uses to the same 
control as the licensing requirements. 
The Strategy aims to improve water conservation and demand management by 
ensuring that holders of water uses report regularly on water use.118 In addition, it 
aims to tighten the control, in particular, over large-scale irrigation schemes by 
introducing regulations that monitor water usage and requiring regular 
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reporting.119 However, given how poorly the state already performs in terms of 
monitoring licences and water uses, it remains to be seen whether this will change 
anything practically. This is especially so given the prevailing skills-shortage, 
coupled with the lack of political will and financial resources to pursue these 
goals.120 To give effect to considerations of equity and redistribution, a more 
flexible approach to the award of licences is required, which factors in the 
capacity constraints present in water management.121 
As stated above, there is a backlog in licence applications and the verification of 
registered water users as well as existing lawful uses.122 The Strategy asserts that 
the backlog has largely been reduced and it now aims to restructure and simplify 
the application process.123 This includes establishing a single licensing process 
between the Department of Mineral Resources, the Department of Water Affairs 
and the Department of Environmental Affairs.124  
In addition to the problems outlined above, in terms of the delay in applying for 
licences, the use of a permit system has been criticised, as it provides greater 
opportunities for the abuse of public power.125 By affording the Minister the 
discretion to manage water uses, it creates an opportunity for both ‘the exercise of 
undue influence and … corruption’ as well as the oppression of minorities.126 This 
issue has recently been raised in the context of hydraulic fracturing (more 
commonly known as fracking)127 where the state alleges that it will reduce the 
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threat to the environment by implementing a licensing system for this mining 
activity.128 However, concerned parties argue that the licensing system is 
‘vulnerable to political influence’ and has been abused by those with political 
connections.129 
The second criticism of the permit system in place in South Africa is that it 
creates uncertainty,130 particularly in the context of agriculture where water rights 
are not permanent under a permit system. Without security of tenure in this 
respect, farmers will be unlikely to invest their time and money in infrastructure. 
In addition, it is unlikely that banking institutions would be willing to finance 
agricultural operations where licences can be easily revoked.131 
Burger also states that the permit system is unconstitutional, as it infringes the 
separation of powers doctrine by affording the Minister discretionary powers of 
authorisation that are not based on an objective legal principle. He explains that 
this mechanism excludes the legislature and ‘seriously curtails the functions of the 
courts’.132 Burger’s concerns bear merit, particularly in the context of a 
government that faces highly levels of corruption and maladministration.133 
However, the administrative function of the state, including the award of licences, 
is an incidence of democracy, and is the only rational mechanism to control water 
use in a manner that is fair and does not rely on land ownership.134 Secondly, the 
regulation of water based on the permit system seeks to achieve the goals of the 
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protection of water resources and the promotion of equality – which are both 
constitutionally mandated goals.135 The use of a permit system is integral to the 
goals of water reform, including the equitable redistribution of water access.136 
In addition to the inefficiencies caused by the licensing system, the classification 
of water sources and the determination of the Reserve is also being hindered by 
problems of inefficiency. Kidd notes that the determination of the Reserve ‘entails 
administrative decision-making of a highly technical nature and it is proving to be 
a time-consuming process’.137 The ecological aspect of the Reserve has not yet 
been implemented in all management areas.138 It is clear that the classification of 
water sources as well as the determination of the Reserve entails decision-making 
that requires complex scientific data as well as a contingent of staff who are able 
to analyse and process this data. The skills shortage currently experienced by the 
Department of Water Affairs will almost certainly be a hindrance to this 
process.139 
It is not only the lack of technical skill and shortage of personnel that is 
contributing to the inefficiency of water management. The users of water hamper 
water management efforts by wasting, polluting and stealing water resources, 
thereby reducing the quantity of water available as well as its quality.140 As a 
result, efforts to address the issues of inefficiency must necessarily address the 
wastage, theft and pollution of water. 
One of the mechanisms put forward to address the wasteful use of water is to 
value water properly. The Strategy requires water to be more appropriately priced 
through the implementation of a new pricing strategy, to ‘send the correct 
                                                     
135 See Ch 2 note 198 above.  
136 M I Msibi and P Z Dlamini (note 122 above) 39. 
137 M Kidd (note 104 above) 77. 
138 Strategy (2013) 29. 
139 See discussion above at Ch 5 (note 305). 
140 See Ch 5 (note 251 above).  





economic signal that water is a scarce resource’.141 In this respect, the National 
Water Act allows the Minister together with the Minister of Finance to establish a 
pricing strategy in order to fund water resource management and development, as 
well as to promote the equitable and efficient allocation of water.142 Financial 
incentives and disincentives may be implemented to promote the efficient and 
beneficial use of water, prevent wastage and minimise the detrimental impacts on 
a water source.143 This is consistent with the global trend to value water as an 
economic good to force consumers to use water more carefully.144 
However, this must be balanced against the right of access to water, and the 
necessity to ensure that the poor and most vulnerable in society are not 
prejudiced.145 The difficulty of creating a pricing system that does not cause 
undue hardship to the vulnerable in society was highlighted in the Mazibuko 
decision.146 The state was able to show that, given the complexities in the 
provision of water services to different households, it was very difficult to 
implement a system that differentiated between water users.147  
Communities themselves play an important role in the protection and preservation 
of water. The separation of society along racial lines prior to 1994 resulted in 
environmental racism, where black people were viewed as a threat to the 
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environment.148 Black people were actively excluded from any form of 
participation in the management of natural resources, including decision-making 
and any educational and conservationist programmes that were offered by the 
Department of Agriculture.149 The low levels of literacy caused by an 
impoverished educational system ‘presented a major obstacle to the development 
of an aware, informed public, able and willing to participate in environmental 
decision making’.150 The mitigation of pollution requires education of the public 
as to the value of water as low levels of public awareness and education contribute 
to water wastage and pollution.151 To remedy this information gap, the 
Department has implemented a literacy and public awareness programme as part 
of the 2020 Vision for Water and Sanitation Education Programme, which has 
already been implemented in a number of schools.152 The aim is to educate users 
of water as to its value, in order change the behaviour of these users from wasteful 
usage patterns to conservationist and protectionist patterns.  
3.4. The Management Approaches Practically Required 
Chapter 6 introduced the concepts of Integrated Water Resource Management 
(‘IWRM’) as well as Adaptive Management. The lack of skills and technical 
inability that pervade the water sector presents a severe barrier to the successful 
implementation of Adaptive Management.153 Further, the failure of the state to 
establish catchment management agencies and facilitate sincere cooperative 
governance hinders the proper realisation of IWRM.154 However, the Department 
has adopted a long-term approach to water management and has further 
recognised the importance of flexible decision-making. In addition, it has renewed 
the focus to improve the technical and skills capacity in the sector and has 
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reiterated the importance of information-gathering processes and systems.155 
While there are many factors that currently undermine the successful 
implementation of IWRM and Adaptive Management, the long-term benefits of 
investing in these management approaches are worthwhile.156 This is especially 
so, given the likelihood that water resources will in the future need to be even 
more very closely monitored and managed to ensure that there is sufficient water 
available to meet the demands.  
Both IWRM and Adaptive Management require an ongoing assessment of current 
data. In this respect, the management of water may be improved by using 
sustainability indicators.157 Two situations where these indicators have been 
practically implemented are discussed below, namely the NeWater Project and the 
Water Poverty Index. However, these indicators are not, and should not, only be 
limited to the issues of sustainability. As will be shown below, they may be of 
great assistance to providing decision-makers with information that has been 
digested and is therefore more accessible. 
Sustainability is a difficult concept to measure, given the vagueness of the criteria 
of which this definition is comprised, and the consequent difficulty in measuring 
the success or failure thereof.158 Similarly, the equity principles are difficult to 
implement in practice because of the difficulty in establishing measurable 
standards.159 Further, there is the difficulty of quantifying the needs of future 
generations,160 or balancing the needs of the present generation, particularly where 
vast inequity exists in access to water resources between different water users.161 
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For example, should the same amount of natural capital available today be 
available for future generations?162 This is a clear impossibility in the context of 
the use of non-renewable resources. However, this depletion may be justifiable in 
certain contexts where social or human capital is justifiably increased.163 In South 
Africa in particular, it may be justifiable to deplete resources to improve and 
promote socio-economic circumstances to meet the goals of substantive equality.  
In the context of sustainability, indicators have been promoted as an objective 
way of measuring the state’s progress.164 Similarly, this approach may provide a 
helpful tool to establishing whether the goals of equity are being achieved by the 
state. 
The NeWater project implemented in the Orange River Basin used sustainability 
indicators to create a Water Vulnerability Index for the region.165 This index 
measures all the variable data to ascertain the quality and quantity of water. The 
project was implemented at a municipal level, thus providing decision-makers 
with the relevant data to inform their decision-making on a continuous basis. In 
addition, the index serves the purpose of highlighting vulnerable areas so that 
decision-makers can monitor and update their policies and plans to cater 
appropriately for the needs of affected water users and the environment.166 The 
indicators should serve to provide decision-makers with information about the 
socio-economic conditions in a region, the condition and status of water 
resources, the status of levels of waste and pollution, as well as the performance 
of governance institutions in terms of their management of water in the region.167  
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Flexibility is important to achieving sustainability as it allows decision-makers to 
monitor and adapt systems as the context changes.168 Decision-makers therefore 
require the tools to ensure that their decisions are appropriately flexible that they 
advance the goals of sustainability.169 In this respect, decisions must be capable of 
being updated and amended as more current information becomes available.170 
The information obtained in the NeWater project as described above can be of 
great assistance to the process of flexibility by providing decision-makers with 
adequate data and parameters for continuous decision-making processes.171 
This flexibility is relevant to the framework for the consideration of data, as it 
must be amenable to change in order to accommodate different social, 
environmental and economic values and practices.172 This is not only applicable 
between different geographic areas but also different departments. For example, 
the needs and criteria for the Western Cape, which experiences its predominant 
rainfall in winter, will be vastly different to the Northern Cape, which experiences 
its chief rainfall in summer. Departmentally, the criteria to be considered for the 
supply of water, where the focus is on balancing demand, quality and 
environmental concerns, will be vastly different to the criteria for the management 
of wastewater, where the focus is on sanitation processes. As a result, one set of 
criteria will not be sufficient to furnish the needs of all users and stakeholders 
across the board.  
Sustainability indicators provide a useful theoretical tool to provide decision-
makers with both the discretion and the parameters within which to operate, 
where competing considerations are in play.173 However, sustainability can only 
be valuable to society when the decision-makers utilising it have the requisite 
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skills and information adequately to balance these considerations. Furthermore, 
this decision-making process requires good governance as discretionary decision-
making is highly susceptible to corruption and maladministration.174  
Sullivan et al have developed a Water Poverty Index (the factors of assessment set 
out in the table below) that assesses the provision of services to local communities 
in the context of poverty eradication.175 In terms of this index, poverty is assessed 
in the context of water management, and the considerations taken into account 
include the available access to water, the quality of the water, the time taken to 
access this water, whether sufficient water is provided for domestic and 
agricultural or industrial uses, and whether the capacity for the management of 
water exists at a local level.176 
This Water Poverty Index (‘WPI’) may provide key information to decision-
makers when formulating policies that address issues of access to water and the 
eradication of poverty. This index can also provide decision-makers with a tool to 
establish which communities require the greatest assistance thereby prioritising 
uses. This could, for example, assist the state in justifying that a decision has been 
taken in the beneficial interest of the public. In addition, this index can assist 
decision-makers to monitor their own progress, and will create a measurable tool 
against which the duties of trusteeship can be measured. 177 
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Figure 6: Water Poverty Index178 
While these indicators are largely focused on poverty in the context of water, it is 
clear that access to water and poverty are closely associated, both of which are 
primary factors in the decision-making process in water management in South 
Africa.179 Accordingly, any factors that measure the relationship between water 
use and poverty will provide important information to decision-makers with 
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regard to access to water and the equity of water use. The table shows that access 
is one of the express components that is used to measure poverty. The developers 
of the WPI stated that180  
WPI is a powerful tool for determining priorities. It empowers decision-makers to 
act impartially by allowing them to justify their choices, based on a rational and 
transparent framework. At the same time, it gives local communities an opportunity 
to express their needs in a systematic way, and helps them to lobby for action. 
As a result, the WPI will not only provide decision-makers with information that 
is easier to use, but will also provide the community with a mechanism to 
communicate with decision-makers. This will be equally applicable to other sets 
of indicators, which can be developed to suit the required goals of water 
management.  
3.5. Available Oversight Mechanisms and Remedies 
One of the biggest challenges facing the implementation of effective management 
of water is a lack of poor enforcement of the regulatory measures. An example of 
this is contained in the nature of the licensing process. Decision-makers are able 
to create restrictions for water use upon the award of a water use license.181 
Unfortunately, it is not mandatory for the authority to do so, and it is possible that 
a water license will be unconditionally awarded. In addition, the monitoring and 
enforcement of these licensing conditions has thus far not been hugely successful 
given the capacity constraints in water management.182 Consequently, even if 
licenses were to stipulate conditions for their award, this would not necessarily act 
as a deterrent for offenders, as the state has not adequately enforced these 
conditions in the past. As stated by Kotzé, ‘without compliance and enforcement, 
the entire environmental governance exercise [is] undermined’.183 
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The Department is competent to deal with the enforcement and compliance of 
provisions relating to water pollution. While the Department may appoint persons 
to ensure compliance with the legal framework, the powers of such persons do not 
adequately allow them to complete this task. Craigie et al argue that the powers 
and competencies that have been established for this purpose ‘do not provide 
officials with the necessary investigation, search, seizure and arrest powers to 
render its criminal offence provisions useful’.184  
The need for designated officials who monitor compliance with the environmental 
legal framework, particularly the conditions as set out in permits, was recognised 
by the government and an Environmental Management Inspectorate (hereinafter 
the ‘Inspectorate’) was introduced in 2003, through the enactment of National 
Environmental Management Amendment Act (First Amendment Act).185 The 
introduction of the Inspectorate has gone a long way to improving the 
enforcement, monitoring and compliance of environmental measures.186 It has 
done so by creating specialised roles within the Inspectorate that also further 
cooperation between the various governmental departments to rationalise the 
approach to enforcement mechanisms.187 Further, it has established training 
programmes for the skills development of Inspectors and established minimum 
required skills for their employment.188 The functions of these Inspectors are 
graded according to their skills set, but these can be as wide-ranging as including 
powers to enter and search any premises without a permit, formally question a 
person and/or inspect a premises, take possession of any item, and obtain any 
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evidence necessary in circumstances where a reasonable suspicion of an 
environmental offence has occurred.189 
Given the potential of this institution to ensure compliance with environmental 
goals, as well as the speed and success with which it has been initially established, 
it is surprising that water and mining pollution have been excluded from the 
purview of the Inspectorate.190 It has been suggested that an independent, central 
environmental enforcement agency ‘outside the normal spheres of government’ is 
one method of regulating compliance.191 In terms of establishing an entity that is 
independent and able to monitor the compliance with the legal framework of 
water management, this idea has many advantages. This agency, should it be 
established, should however be given the powers to monitor and ensure 
compliance with the legal framework governing both water and mineral law.  
Other mechanisms to hold the state accountable are already in practice. For 
example, the NEMA expressly requires the Department of Water Affairs, amongst 
others, to submit an environmental implementation and management plan at least 
every four years to the Minister or MEC for Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 
for evaluation.192 The underlying purpose of these plans is to promote cooperative 
governance and ensure consistency between the various departments in the 
context of environmental management.193 Once these plans have been submitted, 
they must be published in the Government Gazette, and from that point onwards 
they are binding on that department.194 Further, any official, even if they have 
delegated powers, must act ‘substantially in accordance’ with these plans and 
‘substantial deviations’ are to be reported to the Director-General of the 
Department.195 
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However, Kidd notes that while these provisions are theoretically sound, their 
practical implementation thus far has been abysmal.196 Departments have failed to 
submit and publish plans timeously, sometimes with a delay of years.197 Further, 
Kidd also points out that the Department of Minerals and Energy is not amongst 
the list of departments required to submit these plans.198 Given the environmental 
damage caused by mining activities, particularly in the context of water, this 
omission represents a severe flaw in the legislation and undermines the goals of 
cooperative governance. 
Where the state has failed to fulfil its obligations and civil society wishes to hold 
it accountable, they can do so by approaching the court to seek judicial review of 
the decision. However, judicial review is inherently problematic. For one, it is 
limited to a focus on the legality of a decision, rather than whether the decision 
was made correctly based on the merits.199 The second problem is that judicial 
review is inaccessible to most due to the high cost of litigation.200 Finally, judicial 
review is ‘circuitous’, as it is unclear whether ‘administrators actually learn from 
the case law’.201 As a result, judgments may be handed down with the intention of 
remedying defective administrative behaviours, but administrators remain largely 
ignorant thereof. In addition, there is the issue of the counter-majoritarian 
dilemma and the extent to which judicial interference in the activities of the 
legislature and executive can be justified.202 However, the Constitutional Court 
has emphasised that a modern constitutional democracy requires an interrelated 
and integrated approach to be adopted between the judiciary, executive and 
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legislature.203 A flexible relationship between these three institutions must be 
adopted, with the ultimate goal of ensuring that socio-economic rights, and more 
broadly the tenets of the Constitution, are implemented and furthered.204  
Alternative remedies can be pursued in terms of the common law, for example, 
obtaining a prohibitory or mandatory interdict.205 However, inherently 
problematic in this respect is the fact that these common law remedies have been 
developed and established ‘principally to protect individual rights to 
property’.206As a result, these remedies are not well-suited to providing a solution 
to environmental issues centred on the public interest.207 While the common law 
must be developed consistently with the mandates established by the Constitution, 
Summers states that these remedies ‘should not...be viewed as an alternative to the 
statutory regulation of the environment, but rather as an important 
complement’.208 
The Water Tribunal is also able to hear appeals based on the merits of the matter, 
and is in theory intended to be more suitably qualified to make a decision within 
the context of the highly specialised, complex field of water law.209 However, the 
Water Tribunal to date has been largely ‘dysfunctional’.210 In 2012, the Water 
Tribunal was dissolved by the Department of Water and Environmental Affairs on 
the basis that it was not properly constituted.211 It has also been suggested that the 
previous Water Tribunal lacked the necessary legal expertise to properly 
implement the Act.212 This situation is to persist until legislative amendments 
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have been put in place to increase the efficiency of the Tribunal. An interim 
Tribunal is to be constituted to address the backlog of queries.213  
However, the future of the Water Tribunal is no longer certain. The failings of the 
Tribunal have been recognised by the state in the National Water Policy Review, 
which states:214 
An appropriate, administratively simpler mechanism is required where disputes 
are resolved through internal dispute resolution such as round-tables, negotiation 
and mediation. Failure to resolve an appeal through this mechanism may proceed 
to adjudication in a court of law. 
Implementing mechanisms that facilitate easier, quicker and cheaper access to 
justice are critical to the goals of water management, particularly ensuring 
equitable access to water. Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms also 
represent a shift towards customary law approaches to the extent that the remedies 
employed traditionally involve less adversarial approaches that focus on ensuring 
fairness and equity.215  
Research suggests that the control and authority that customary communities 
experienced in relation to water ‘since the pre-colonial era has been eroded’.216 
Water in rural areas is still to a large extent managed as a common pool resource 
in terms of customary law, although this practice is being overshadowed by the 
introduction of catchment management agencies.217 As stated by Sowman and 
Hasler, the implementation of the new approach to water management may 
‘marginalize and replace these customary systems which contribute to [water 
resource management] objectives’.218 As a result, they argue for a more clearly 
defined role for traditional leaders and greater involvement of local communities. 
This will not only facilitate a more meaningful role for these communities, but 
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also assist with ensuring their buy-in into the process of water protection and 
access.219 They also argue for the recognition of the cultural practices and norms 
in place so that indigenous knowledge of the area can be retained and incorporated 
into water management models.220 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide an analysis of the approach to water 
management. It is clear that the classifications of res publicae and res communes 
have not only been confused by the courts,221 but also confuse the issue of 
trusteeship. To the extent that they do not shed any light on an interpretation of 
trusteeship, they are unhelpful in defining the parameters of the state’s 
responsibilities. Similarly, the inherent difficulties with the public trust doctrine222 
mean that it is unable to deepen the understanding of trusteeship, except possibly 
in limited and specific scenarios. Further, many of these difficulties are not 
experienced in South Africa as the legal framework adequately addresses these 
issues.223  
It is suggested that the Constitutional Court, in particular, needs to assume a more 
active role in ensuring that the state complies with its duties, particularly when 
contrasted with their approach to the environment.224 The current legal framework 
adequately caters for the management of water and it is largely the practical 
implementation of the duties of trusteeship to which effect is not properly 
given.225 However, some of the functions of various state authorities are not 
clearly defined or are duplicated.226 In addition, the separate approach to the 
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management of water and sanitation services in municipal areas, and the use of 
water within catchment management areas, is to be consolidated in order that the 
entire water value chain will be coherently managed.227 The failure of the state to 
adequately set up catchment management agencies was also repeated as well as 
the suggested shortcomings of the nature of these agencies.228  
The values that arise from the legal framework also contain shortcomings, 
although these are experienced at a practical level. In particular, inefficiency on 
the part of the state results in most of the grievances pertaining to water 
management.229 This inefficiency is largely caused by a lack of funding, 
leadership and accountability, as well as a shortage of staff and technical skills.230 
These shortcomings are neither easy to overcome, nor is there a quick, one-size-
fits-all solution.231 However, the state has clearly acknowledged that it is aware of 
these problems and aims to address them.232 Further, the long-term approach that 
has been adopted in respect of water management also evidences an appreciation 
on the part of the state that the nature of the problems experienced require long-
term solutions.233 
It has been argued that central to any decision-making concerning the 
environment is flexibility.234 In this respect, South Africa has implemented IWRM 
at the level of catchment management agencies, and Adaptive Management in the 
context of addressing climate change.235 It is argued that Adaptive Management of 
water resources should be extended to the management of all water resources in 
all circumstances. However, sufficient information, which is both processed and 
up-to-date is required for decision-makers to properly implement these 
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approaches.236 This requires technical skills and financial and institutional 
resources, all of which are already in short supply.237 Indicators may be of 
assistance in implementing these approaches, by providing digested information 
that is of greater use to decision-makers.238 Further, these approaches require a 
concerted effort between the various Departments to actively implement the 
principles of cooperative governance.239 This further requires trust and 
communication between the Departments, both of which appear to be lacking 
between the Department of Water Affairs and the Department of Minerals and 
Energy in particular.240 Similarly to sustainability, the implementation of the 
principles relating to equity in practice may be facilitated through the 
implementation of indicators, such as the Water Poverty Index.241 The 
implementation of these indicators can assist the state with its decision-making 
processes and can also provide a tangible standard against which the state’s 
satisfaction of its duties as trustee can be measured.242 
Finally, the inadequacies of the oversight, compliance and enforcement 
mechanisms as well as the remedies available to aggrieved parties must be 
addressed. In particular it is argued that the Department of Water Affairs urgently 
needs dedicated Inspectors who have the requisite powers to ensure compliance 
with licensing and statutory requirements.243 Alternatively, the current 
Inspectorate established in terms of the NEMA must have the scope of its 
mandate widened to include oversight of water resources.244 The concerns with 
judicial review have been canvassed and it is clear that this method does not 
facilitate adequate accountability of the state.245 The costs as well as the lengthy 
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duration of litigation prevent access to justice for those who do not have the time, 
resources or know-how to launch proceedings against the state.246 Consequently, a 
functional Water Tribunal must urgently be established and alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms aimed at cheap and efficient remedies should be created.247 
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Chapter Nine:  
CONCLUSION 
1. Public Trusteeship and Water Management 
The importance of water as a resource cannot be denied, particularly in South 
Africa, where, for decades, millions of people were denied access to sufficient 
water. In 2008, Professor Asmal wrote:1  
Water has been called the oil of the 21st century, with all the political and 
economic pressures accompanying that. Failure to ensure its judicious use will 
put paid to aspirations for the kind of economic growth required to provide our 
citizens with the basic rights they’re entitled to under our Constitution. No fresh 
water, no economic growth, no social justice. 
This thesis aimed to address the following topic, namely, ‘Public trusteeship and 
water management: Developing the South African concept of public trusteeship to 
improve management of water resources in the context of South African water 
law’. To do so, a number of questions were asked, with the intention of attempting 
to shed light on the nebulous notion of state trusteeship. The notion of state 
trusteeship and custodianship is not unique to the area of water law.2 Due to the 
constraints of this thesis, its operation in other areas of resources law has not been 
considered and there are a number of issues that can be canvassed in future 
research in this respect.3 
2. Returning to the Research Question 
The first question that this thesis addressed was why has trusteeship been 
implemented? As outlined, the scarcity of water, combined with the rapidly 
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increasing demand therefor, will ultimately result in the untenable situation where 
insufficient water will be available to sustain the requirements of society.4 
Without state intervention, if water use continues at its current rate, this will be 
the most likely outcome.5 This will occur irrespective of the additional pressures 
on available water resources, including pollution, climate change, and a myriad of 
other stresses caused by human interference that effect the quantity and quality of 
available water.6 It is, therefore, necessary for the state to regulate the use of water 
resources. 
The historical background against which modern water management emerged was 
mired in the racial inequality to access resources.7 Consequently, the Constitution 
sought drastically to amend the legal framework governing water resources to 
address the concerns of the gross social inequalities of access to water, whilst 
simultaneously ensuring the protection of water resources.8 This resulted in the 
introduction of the National Water Act and the Water Services Act, which 
abolished the distinctions between public and private ownership of water.9 
Instead, all water in the hydrological cycle is public water, and its use is 
administered by the state as the trustee of this resource.10 The answer to the first 
question is therefore as follows: the denial of access to resources in the past has 
resulted in huge inequalities of access to water and water services in the present - 
the modern appreciation of water as a finite and precious resource against this 
background necessitates state management of the resource in the interests of the 
South African public.11 As a result, trusteeship aims to place the state in a 
different role to that of its oppressive predecessors. Instead, the state is required to 
serve the people, by ensuring that the beneficial interest of the public is furthered 
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in the context of the constitutional goals of ensuring access to water and the 
protection of the environment.12 These constitutional goals require the promotion 
of the principles of equity and sustainability, as well as efficiency.13 The state’s 
role is still administrative in nature. However, the principles and values that guide 
the administration and management of water resources has changed.  
The second question asked was who is required to give effect to trusteeship and 
who are the intended beneficiaries of the system of trusteeship? The National 
Water Act clearly provides that the National Government is the trustee of water 
resources.14 The Minister of the Department of Water Affairs is authorized to act 
on behalf of the National Government. The Water Services Act places the 
responsibility on the National Government as custodian.15 To dilute the 
concentration of power from central government, the powers and functioning of 
the system of water management is intended to be delineated to the lowest 
appropriate levels, both in the context of catchment management areas and water 
service providers.16 In this respect, the Minister may delegate or assign these 
duties to catchment management agencies, water user associations, water service 
authorities, and water service providers.17 The delegation and assignment of duties 
is problematic for two reasons: the first is that it is slowing down the development 
and implementation of catchment management agencies;18 the second is that it is 
unclear whether the assignment of duties results in a severing of the duties of 
trusteeship from the Minister.19 However, it is argued that the stated purposes of 
the Act go beyond the duties required in terms of the trusteeship provision and 
consequently, even if this were to be the case, duties similar to trusteeship would 
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still need to be satisfied by an authority or provider performing assigned duties.20 
The legislative framework makes it clear that the intended beneficiaries of the 
system of trusteeship are the public. In addition, in terms of the Constitutional 
provisions,21 the definition of ‘public’ is not limited to South African citizens 
only.  
Thirdly, this thesis asked what are the legal parameters of trusteeship? The 
trusteeship of water resources is not expressly defined by the legislative 
framework. The research question thus sought to address the nature and content of 
the duties of state trusteeship by looking to the legal framework.22 The starting 
point for ascertaining these duties was to discuss the legal framework introduced 
by the Constitution, the legislative and regulatory enactments pursuant to the 
Constitution, and the consequent strategies and policies.23 The National Water Act 
sets out that the responsibilities of the state entail administrative functions, 
namely, the protection, use, development, conservation, management and control 
of water resources.24 The state is required to administer water rights through the 
use of a licensing system, the goals of which are to further equity amongst water 
users, whilst protecting the resource and the environment more generally.25 In 
addition, the legislative framework aims to achieve a decentralised model of water 
management, by devolving the powers of water management to catchment 
management agencies.26 
The fourth question sought to ask whether the content of trusteeship could be 
informed by historical sources or comparative law. In Mostert Snr and another 
v S,27 the Supreme Court of Appeal clearly stated that water, running in a river or 
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stream, is to be classified as res communes.28 This is in contradiction to the 
traditional Roman and Roman-Dutch law classifications, in terms of which this 
type of property would have been classified as res publicae.29 This latter 
classification better explains the administrative nature of the state’s role in 
relation to managing water resources.30 This notwithstanding, the Supreme Court 
of Appeal’s ruling that water is to be classified as res communes may better reflect 
the modern appreciation of water as a shared, global resource.31 The only practical 
implementation of this classification - one which is particularly disturbing, given 
the scale of theft of water in South Africa - is to make water as a resource 
incapable of theft.32  
The public trust doctrine does not necessarily facilitate a more meaningful 
understanding of trusteeship, either.33 While the primary requirements are similar, 
that is, the state is required to manage the resource in the public benefit, the 
statutory framework in South Africa is far clearer and requires much more of the 
state than the doctrine in the U.S.34 Neither a historical perspective, nor a 
comparative investigation has furthered the understanding of the duties of 
trusteeship.35 
The fifth question looked to establishing what are the substantive principles that 
inform the operation of the state’s duties as trustee? The National Water Resource 
Strategy, implemented in accordance with the National Water Act, provides that 
the goals of water management are the equitable, efficient and sustainable use of 
water.36 In this respect, equity refers to the promotion of substantive equity to 
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ensure that the effects of the prejudicial past are redressed.37 It also requires the 
promotion of the value of dignity, which it has been argued, is intimately linked to 
ensuring that all persons are able to access water and water services.38 
Sustainability requires the furthering of the precautionary principle39 the 
preventative principle40 and the polluter-pays principle.41 The goals of 
sustainability, and environmental management, are to ensure that the resource is 
conserved as best as possible, whilst still allowing for the development of the 
nation, in accordance with social and economic goals.42 Thus, the protection, 
conservation and preservation of the environment are to be undertaken in a 
manner that does not undermine social and economic goals. The converse is also 
true, as without a functioning environment, human survival would not be 
possible.43 Finally, the goals of trusteeship require the efficient use of water.44 
This requires not only an efficient infrastructure in terms of the physical systems 
in place to transport, store and recycle water,45 but also the requisite financial, 
technical and other skills to promote efficiency within the Department of Water 
Affairs.46 It is the argument of this thesis that these values, namely equity, 
sustainability, and efficiency, form the core of trusteeship. The duties established 
by the legislation must be pursued in fulfillment of these values. 
The sixth question asked how does trusteeship operate in practice, that is, what 
are the requirements for the management of water? In this respect, the practical 
approaches to water management, as required by the legal framework, were 
discussed.47 These consist of Integrated Water Resource Management, which 
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seeks to approach the management of water resources in a coordinated way;48 and 
Adaptive Management, which entails the ongoing assessment of information to 
continuously inform and revise the decision-making process.49 It is by 
implementing a flexible and coordinated approach to decision-making, which 
relies on current information, that the values of trusteeship can be satisfied. 
However, as highlighted, the functioning of these management approaches relies 
on having the requisite skills and infrastructure in the industry, both of which are 
in critical demand.50 It is further dependent on a functioning state, which lives up 
to the values of accountability and good governance. 
The seventh question was concerned with how is trusteeship enforced? The 
democratic rights used to keep government conduct in check are applicable in this 
context. The rights of access to information and public participation provide 
valuable platforms for ensuring that the state complies with its duties.51 The 
Chapter 9 institutions created by the Constitution find application in the context of 
ensuring that the state complies with its various functions.52 The Water Tribunal 
should, in theory, also provide an effective mechanism for holding the state 
accountable.53 Where state conduct amounts to administrative action, it will be 
reviewable in terms of judicial review.54 However, state conduct that does not fall 
within the definition of administrative review may still be reviewable on the basis 
of the principle of legality.55 Finally, civil and criminal remedies may be pursued 
where the mechanisms, aimed at ensuring that the state complies with its duties, 
fail.56  
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The final question asked what are the shortcomings of the approach to trusteeship 
and water management? It is well known that the problems associated with water 
management exist, not necessarily as a consequence of the legislative framework 
itself, but rather because of the implementation thereof.57 In particular, the 
greatest hurdle to the proper management of water is inefficiency.58 In this 
respect, the state has a critical shortage of skills as well as sufficient finances to 
manage water properly.59 In addition, the separation of the management of water 
generally, and the management of water and sanitation services into two separate 
legal frameworks is problematic.60 Consistent with the approach of treating all 
water within the hydrological cycle as one entity, all water within the entire value 
chain should be coherently managed.61 The state is aware of these issues and has 
set itself long-term goals to rectify these problems.62 One of the issues that has not 
been addressed, however, is the lack of clarity as to the effect of delegation or 
assignment of powers, as well as the slow pace at which the delineation of power 
is being completed.63 In addition, there are insufficient mechanisms in place to 
ensure the compliance and enforcement of licensing conditions and statutory 
obligations. This glaring oversight requires urgent remediation.64 So, too, does the 
fact that the Water Tribunal is completely dysfunctional and has had to be 
disestablished.65 Where the costs of litigation are so high, in the absence of cheap 
and efficient mechanisms for dispute resolution, many legitimate complaints will 
fall by the way side.66 This is an untenable situation, and certainly not consistent 
with the values of trusteeship, which require the state to manage water resources 
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for the benefit of the public.67 Inherent in this construction is the capacity of the 
public to hold the state accountable to this duty. What is needed is ‘a more 
flexible, less resource-intensive system that fits with actual capacity and takes 
people’s local needs into account’.68 
3. State Accountability 
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Mothutlung region, in the North West 
province, where water shortages recently resulted in tragedy.69 The members of a 
community took to the streets to protest, after what was believed to be 
incompetence and/or incapacity and/or poor management resulted in their water 
supply being cut off for over a week.70 Unfortunately, two men were killed during 
the violent protests.71 This story is just one indication of the appalling state of 
affairs of water management in parts of the country, particularly at a municipal 
level. Without a serious and determined effort on the part of the state to earnestly 
change this reality, the rights of dignity and equality of many of the South African 
public will never be realised.72 Whether the use of the rhetoric of ‘trusteeship’ will 
facilitate this process is irrelevant: it does not matter what the title of the state as 
administrator is, as long as the state implements its duty to administer water 
resources in a sustainable, equitable and beneficial manner that furthers its 
constitutional mandate.73 
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